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1. Introduction
This morning, probably without even noticing, you already performed a variety of 
tasks. You got up, had some breakfast and got dressed. While these tasks might 
be common routine for many, they are not for everyone. In old age, carrying out 
these activities of daily living, might become very difficult to perform and require 
assistance. The rising demand for such assistance is an important topic in the light 
of population ageing.
In 2018, almost 20% of the European population was aged 65+, about half of this 
group reports at least one difficulty with personal care or household activities 
(Eurostat, 2020a; 2020b). In the next decades this share of elderly is projected to 
continue to grow in nearly every country around the world (UN, 2019). In addition, 
the share of the oldest-old, individuals aged 85+, is even expected to double or triple 
between 2020 and 2060 (Figure 1.1). Despite uncertainty about dependency rates of 
elderly and medical care advances, this growth in the number of elderly individuals 
is predicted to lead to a strong increase in the demand for long-term care (LTC) 
(Colombo et al., 2011; de la Maisonneuve & Martins, 2015; EC, 2018a). LTC here 
refers to the help or medical support that is provided to elderly who need care for a 
longer period of time. Textbox 1.1 provides further insight into the different types 
of care that are defined as LTC.
Figure 1.1: (Predicted) Share of population aged 85+ in 2020 and 2060
 
Source: OECD statistics (2020a).
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This thesis focuses on two types of LTC: informal care and nursing home care. 
To explain the relevance of focusing on these two types of care, first an overview 
of country differences in LTC systems and the changing role of informal care and 
nursing home care within these systems will be given. Subsequently an overview of 
the specific research questions answered in this thesis will be provided.
Textbox 1.1: Defining long-term care
LTC entails help with personal and household activities and medical support for 
individuals with a chronic illness or disability (OECD, 2017a). In contrast to curative 
care, the goal of LTC is not to heal but to relieve or assist. Most of the LTC recipients 
are not expected to recover from the problems they are facing. Although LTC is not 
restricted to elderly care users, about two-thirds of LTC is provided to individuals aged 
65+ (OECD, 2020b). Throughout this document, when referred to LTC, this can be read 
as LTC for the elderly.
LTC can entail a wide variety of tasks. It entails medical services such as administering 
medication or wound dressing, but also help with Activities of Daily living (ADLs)1 and 
instrumental Activities of Daily Living (iADLs)2 like help with getting dressed, or help 
with household chores (OECD, 2017a). Another common distinction relates to the place 
of care provision: dependent individuals can receive care in specialized institutions or at 
home. In most countries the share of individuals receiving formal care at home is much 
higher than the share of individuals that is institutionalized (OECD, 2020b). Additionally, 
for many of the dependent elderly, care is provided by friends and family members outside 
of formal care contracts, which is referred to as informal care.
Country differences in LTC systems
The costs of formal LTC, especially for someone who needs a lot of care, can be 
substantial. In the Netherlands, one year of nursing home care for example costs 
between 60.000 and 160.000 Euro (NZa, 2020a). To protect elderly against this 
financial risk and to ensure access to long-term care, governments often subsidize 
or organize the provision of formal LTC for at least the individuals with the lowest 
income and wealth. In most OECD countries the majority of the formal LTC costs 
is financed from public budgets (OECD, 2020c).
1 ADLs refer to eating, bathing, washing, dressing, getting in and out of bed, getting to and from the 
toilet and continence management.
2 iADLs refer to tasks like shopping, doing the laundry, vacuuming, cooking, performing housework, 
managing finances and using the telephone.
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Despite this common feature of financing of LTC from public budgets, LTC systems 
differ strongly by country. One of the main criteria by which the systems differ is 
eligibility for publicly funded LTC. Eligibility can either be universal, granted to 
everyone in need for care, or means-tested, solely available for the least well-off 
individuals. Next to eligibility, LTC systems also differ in the range of services that 
is covered and the share of copayments that is required from the users (Colombo et 
al., 2011).
The differences in LTC systems across countries might derive from different norms 
and values regarding the division of labour between the family and the state or 
differences in the size of the country’s economy. The characteristics of LTC systems 
could, in turn, influence the choice between formal and informal care (Bakx et al., 
2015a). For example, when copayments for LTC are very high, individuals with a 
lower income will be more likely to opt for informal care instead of formal care. A less 
generous formal LTC system hence often means that individuals need to rely more 
strongly on care from their friends and family. In most countries informal care is 
even the predominant source of LTC. This importance of informal care within LTC 
systems, is clearly depicted in Van der Ende et al (2021) where for all countries in the 
European Union the time values of informal care are estimated. In most countries 
the estimated values of informal care exceed formal LTC expenditures.
The Netherlands as a specific case
The Netherlands is one of the countries where most of the responsibility for 
organizing LTC is placed at the state-level. It holds a top position in terms of public 
LTC expenditures. In 2018, the country ranked 1st among OECD countries, with 
3.7% of GDP that was spent on health or social long-term care by government or 
compulsory insurance schemes (OECD, 2020c) (Figure 1.2). This figure does not 
include out-of-pocket expenditures made by individuals. In the Netherlands these 
expenditures are limited: copayments for nursing home care only cover 8 percent 
of the total expenditures (2020 level – Rijksoverheid 2020), home care copayments 
are either zero or a monthly rate of at most 17.50 euro (2019 level – Bakx et al., 
2020a). These numbers reflect an extensive LTC system where generous and fairly 
comprehensive support is offered to those in need (Mot, 2010; Colombo et al., 2011).
The Dutch LTC system, like many other systems around the world, is under pressure. 
While health care expenditures are rising, LTC expenditures have been doing so at 
an even more rapid pace (OECD, 2020c) and are expected to grow even further in the 
years to come (De la Maissonneuve & Martins, 2015). These increasing expenditures 
are not only driven by population ageing, also limited possibilities for increases 
in labor productivity for care-tasks are identified as a strong driver of the rise in 
spending (Wouterse et al., 2016). In the Netherlands public expenditures on long-
term care are expected to grow by on average 1.6% annually between 2014 and 2030 
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(Eggink et al., 2017) and are identified as a major threat to the sustainability of public 
finances (Smid et al., 2014).
Figure 1.2: Public expenditures on formal long-term care expenditures as a % of GDP, 2017Figure 1.2: Public expenditures on formal long-term care expenditures as a % of GDP, 2017 
Note: The OECD average only includes 17 countries that report health and social LTC. Source: OECD (2020c) 
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In part as a response to this growing pressure on its sustainability, the Dutch LTC system was reformed in 
2015. The organization and financing of care previously funded via the Exceptional Medical Expenses 
Act (de Algemene Wet Bijzondere Ziektekosten, AWBZ) was transferred to the LTC Act (Wet 
langdurige zorg - Wlz), the Social Support Act (Wet maatschappelijke ondersteuning - Wmo) and the 
Health Insurance Act (Zorgverzekeringswet - Zwv). The newly established LTC Act covers intensive 
home health care and nursing home care; via the Social Support Act social support is provided and the 
Health Insurance Act covers home health care and community nursing. The reform aimed to increase both 
the quality of care and the financial sustainability of the care system by stimulating citizens to seek help 
in their own social network before turning to government-funded formal care (Ministry of Health Welfare 
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In art as a respo se to this growing pressure on its sustainability, the Dutch LTC 
system was reformed in 2015. The organization and financing of care previously 
funded via the Exceptional Medical Expenses Act (de Alge ene Wet Bijzondere 
Ziektekosten, AWBZ) was transferred to the LTC Act (Wet langdurige zorg - Wlz), 
the Social Support Act (Wet maatschappelijke ondersteuning - Wmo) and the Health 
Insurance Act (Zorgverzekeringswet - Zwv). The newly established LTC Act covers 
intensive home health care and nursing home care; via the Social Support Act social 
support is provided and the Health Insurance Act covers home health care and 
community nursing. The reform aimed to increase both the quality of care and the 
financial sustainability of the care system by stimulating citizens to seek help in their 
own social network before turning to government-funded formal care (Ministry 
of Health Welfare and Sports 2013; WMO 2015). For example, eligibility criteria 
for institutionalized care became stricter3 and individuals whose social network is 
cap ble of providing sufficient i formal care are no longer entitled to formal (social) 
care provided by municipaliti s.
The downsides of increased reliance on informal care
With the reform, the Netherlands aimed to shift towards a system in which informal 
caregivers play a larger role. This trend is not only visible in the Netherlands, but 
in various countries. In 2010 LTC policymakers from around the world emphasized 
3 Already in 2013 nursing home eligiblity became stricter. Individuals with low care needs, defined 
by the care package (zorgzwaartepakket) they were entitled to, were no longer eligible for nursing 
home admission. As of 2015 individuals are only entitled to nursing home care in case they need 
around the clock care or supervision (Zorginstituut, 2019).
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that encouraging informal caregiving was one of their top priorities (Colombo et al., 
2011). However, while informal care provision may help relieve public expenditures 
on LTC - a key priority in the light of the growing financial pressure on LTC systems 
- informal care is not for free.
There are concerns regarding the negative impact of informal care on the labour 
market and health outcomes of caregivers. Individuals who increase their informal 
care provision might, for example, reduce their working hours to be able to care for 
a dependent family member and experience stress, fatigue or physical strain as a 
result of the care tasks.
Reforms further decrease use of nursing home care
Next to the ambition to increase reliance on informal care, also nursing home care 
plays an important role in LTC reforms. Various LTC policies specifically steer 
towards ageing-in-place: In nearly all OECD countries ageing-in-place policies have 
been implemented (Colombo et al., 2011). These policies aim to stimulate individuals 
to use home care to remain at home longer instead of making use of nursing home 
care. Recent Dutch policy changes for example were geared towards this goal by 
making eligibility rules for nursing home care more stringent and by increasing 
out-of-pocket costs for institutional care relative to home care.
The justification for ageing-in-place policies is twofold. First, ageing-in-place-policies 
align with the preference of most elderly to stay at home as long as possible. Very 
few elderly perceive nursing home care as the preferred type of LTC (Eurobarometer, 
2007) and most of them prefer to remain living independently at old age (Costa-
Font, 2017). An additional justification for the focus on ageing-in-place from 
the governmental perspective relies on the idea that home care is perceived as a 
cheaper alternative to nursing home care. This latter assumption has however been 
challenged in recent research indicating that while the costs of nursing home care 
are higher than the costs of home care, nursing home residents have lower medical 
care expenditures than people with similar care needs staying at home (Bakx et al., 
2020b).
The focus on ageing-in-place aligns with longer-term trends. Over time the use of 
permanent institutional care has already become much less frequent: between 1980 
and 2010, the share of the Dutch 80+ population living in institutions has dropped 
from 63% to 24% (Ministry of Health Welfare and Sports, 2013). This decline in 
nursing home use is only to a small extent driven by changes in health status of 
elderly, especially changes in policy, technological advances, like telehealth or home 
automation, and changes in social norms seem made elderly stay home longer (Alders 
et al., 2017).
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Outline of the thesis
Part 1 – The health effects of providing informal care
The first part of this dissertation focuses on one specific downside of informal care, 
namely the health effects of care provision. These effects are potentially large and 
long-lasting as many candidate caregivers are fairly old and vulnerable themselves. 
Chapter 2 of this thesis provides an overview of the current literature base regarding 
the causal impact of informal care on the health of the care provider. Does informal 
care provision indeed lead to worse health and if so, what kind of health effects can 
be expected?
Chapter 3 and 4 provide insight into how these health effects differ among caregivers, 
and for example differ between providing care to parents and spouses. Are these 
health effects mostly borne by a small part of the caregiving population, for example 
the most vulnerable or heavily burdened group, or are they uniformly distributed 
among all care givers? And is care provision more straining when done for certain 
care recipients? Or when done intensively or for long care episodes?
Additionally, it is verified whether the observed health effects can indeed be 
attributed to the provision of informal care instead of the impact of worrying about 
an ill family member. The latter is referred to as the family effect (Bobinac et al., 
2010). It is important to make a distinction between the family and the caregiving 
effect as the two effects require different policy responses. Respite care could for 
example help when someone is overburdened from care tasks, but will not relieve 
the worries experienced as a result of having an ill family member.
While the focus mainly lies on studying individual differences in chapter 3 and 4, 
also system and country characteristics may matter. Differences in norms, values and 
LTC systems may (indirectly) affect informal care provision and may thus make these 
tasks more or less straining. In chapter 5, the difference in caregiving effects between 
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom will be analyzed. The United Kingdom 
makes for an interesting comparator to the Netherlands as it offers a considerably less 
generous, means-tested LTC system and has strong social norms regarding informal 
care provision.
Understanding to what extent country-context or individual-characteristics shape 
the impact of providing informal care is important when further developing LTC 
policy. The findings help to understand the costs of stimulating informal care 
provision and may guide policymakers on how to distribute these costs over the 
population. Additionally, identifying those individuals who are most strongly 
affected by informal care tasks allows for tailoring of support.
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Part 2 – The determinants and impact of a nursing home admission
The second part of the dissertation focuses on nursing home care. Despite a common 
focus on ageing-in-place, countries differ widely in their institutionalization rates. For 
example, in the Netherlands about 13% of the 80+ population was institutionalized 
in 2017, compared to 6% in the United States (OECD, 2020b). These differences 
can be driven by two elements: population characteristics, like how old, fragile or 
wealthy the population is, and system and cultural characteristics like access and 
availability of nursing homes and home health care. Chapter 6 explores the drivers of 
the differences in nursing home admission rates between the United States, Denmark 
and the Netherlands. Interestingly, whereas there are more permanent nursing home 
stays in the Netherlands and Denmark compared to the United States, short-term 
nursing home stays are much more prevalent in the US. Is the US population solely 
older or unhealthier, leading to more short-term nursing home admissions, or do 
the countries differ in the generosity of their systems? Knowing what elements drive 
differences in nursing home admissions helps in defining LTC policy that suits the 
needs and preferences of the population.
After focusing on cross-country differences on the determinants of nursing home 
admissions, the last chapter (chapter 7) of this thesis studies whether elderly are 
actually better or worse off in terms of well-being once admitted to a nursing home. 
Elderly often prefer to stay living at home, the general perception of nursing homes 
is negative, and individuals often fear the move to a nursing home. Actual insight 
into the well-being of individuals living in nursing homes, and the difference in their 
well-being compared to individuals who are still living at home, is rather scarce. 
Are individuals indeed happier at home or do they simply fear the idea of going to a 
nursing home? Perhaps a move to a nursing home might even be beneficial to highly 
dependent elderly as it would limit loneliness or increase safety. Insights from this 
study can help to better understand how the well-being of elderly changes after 
moving to a nursing home and provide a more nuanced view on the impact of a 
nursing home admission.
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CHAPTER 2
Informal caregiving, a healthy decision? Determinants 
and health-related consequences of providing informal 
care
With Pieter Bakx, Erik Schut and Eddy van Doorslaer
An abridged version of this chapter is published as: Bom, J., Bakx, P., Schut, F., & van 
Doorslaer, E. (2019). The impact of informal caregiving for older adults on the health 
of various types of caregivers: A systematic review. The Gerontologist, 59(5), e629-e642.
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Abstract
The demand for long-term care (LTC) is growing in most OECD countries. LTC 
can be provided by formal and informal caregivers, and striking the right balance 
between both types of care is a challenge. We first analyze from an economic 
perspective the trade-offs involved in this balancing act, by a review of the relevant 
economic literature. Next, we focus on one particular aspect of this trade-off: the 
negative health effects of providing informal care by means of a systematic literature 
review regarding the causal effect of informal caregiving on the health of various 
subgroups of caregivers.
The review of the economic literature suggests that the individual decision to provide 
informal care is likely to depend on personal characteristics and the institutional 
context. Informal caregiving is likely to be concentrated among individuals with 
lower opportunity costs, or with fewer other activities competing for their time, such 
as people without a paid job. This implies that the burden of informal caregiving and 
the associated negative health effects are likely to be unequally distributed across 
the population.
The systematic literature shows that there is evidence of a negative impact of 
caregiving on the mental and physical health of the informal caregiver. The presence 
and intensity of these health effects strongly differ per subgroup of caregivers. 
Especially female, and married caregivers, and those providing intensive care appear 
to incur negative health effects from caregiving.
The findings emphasize the need for targeted interventions aimed at reducing 
the negative impact of caregiving among different subgroups. As the strength and 
presence of the caregiving effect differ between subgroups of caregivers, policymakers 
should specifically target those caregivers that experience the largest health effect 
of informal caregiving.
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2.1 Introduction
Many individuals face the decision whether to provide care for a spouse, family 
member, friend, or neighbor who needs help with running the household or personal 
care on a regular basis for a longer period. This help is defined as informal care and 
is typically unpaid. Alternatively, a formal, i.e. professional caregiver, may provide 
this long-term care (LTC). In all developed countries, governments subsidize or 
organize some level of formal care. Aside from formal care, also informal care is 
often promoted by policy. Dutch policy, for example, stimulates citizens to seek 
help in their own social network before turning to government-funded formal care 
(WMO, 2015; CIZ, 2017). When informal care and formal care operate as substitutes 
(see e.g. Bolin et al., 2008; Bonsang, 2009), governments need to balance the costs 
and benefits of both alternatives to achieve the appropriate mix of the two.
This paper aims to shed light on this LTC puzzle in two ways. First, we analyze the 
trade-offs that governments face when subsidizing or organizing formal care. We do 
this by providing an overview of the economic literature regarding these decisions 
and focusing on what these models mean for the role of government in LTC.
Second, we zoom in on one specific downside of informal care: the individual 
health effects of providing informal care. We focus on these effects because they 
are potentially major and irreversible – most caregivers are older and vulnerable 
themselves – and more difficult to compensate financially than, say, foregone labor 
market opportunities. In several countries the health effects of informal caregiving 
have been investigated empirically. However, a systematic overview of the results 
of these studies is lacking. To fill this gap, we provide a systematic review of the 
empirical literature aimed at estimating the causal effects of informal care on health. 
We conclude this paper by summarizing the insights from both theoretical and 
empirical literature. Based on these insights, we formulate policy recommendations 
for the Dutch situation.
Textbox 2.1: Financing of long-term care in the Netherlands
The Netherlands has a comprehensive public LTC financing system. This has a legal 
basis in the Long-Term Care Act (Wet langdurige zorg – Wlz), the Social Support Act 
(Wet maatschappelijke ondersteuning – Wmo) and the Healthcare Insurance Act 
(Zorgverzekeringswet – Zvw). The types of LTC covered under these separate acts are 
respectively (1) institutional care and home health care; (2) social support, assistance, 
and housekeeping services; and (3) nursing and personal care (Non et al., 2015).
Costs are kept in check through rationing measures that target both the supply and 
demand side (Bakx et al., 2015b). On the supply side, the provision of LTC is rationed 
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by imposing budgets, i.e. regional provider budgets (and regulated maximum prices) for 
LTC benefits covered by the Long-Term Care Act and block grants to municipalities for 
providing Social Support Act services. On the demand side, co-payments are required for 
care provided through these two Acts. Furthermore, access to care provided under the 
Long-Term Care Act can only be obtained via the independent care assessment agency 
(Centrum Indicatiestelling Zorg, CIZ). This agency assesses whether someone is eligible 
for formal care based on centrally set eligibility criteria (CIZ, 2017). Local authorities 
assess eligibility for care via the Social Support Act. In this eligibility assessment, the 
social context is taken into account. Hence, individuals are encouraged to rely on their 
social network before making use of formal care.
Textbox 2.2: Informal care in the Netherlands and Europe
The share of caregivers has risen over the years. In some cases, informal caregivers may be 
paid from LTC insurance (through cash benefits). Informal care thus does not necessarily 
refer to unpaid caregivers but to caregivers outside formal employment contracts. 
According to data from the Dutch Health Monitors of 2012 and 2016 (N > 350,000 in both 
surveys), weighted to represent the Dutch population, the share of informal caregivers 
has grown from 19.3% to 23.1% of the adult population. This represents an increase of 
almost 20% in four years in the total number of informal caregivers. Based on these 
numbers, we estimate that in 2016 more than 3 million individuals provided some form 
of informal care. Currently, more females than males provide informal care, although 
male participation is growing. In 2012, about 30% of the caregivers were male; by 2016, 
male participation had risen to 35%.
Both male and female caregivers provide around 9.5 hours of care a week on average. 
This average is higher for older caregivers (aged ≥65) as these provide about 14.5 hours of 
care a week. A similar trend is present when comparing the caregiving intensity between 
low-income and high-income quintiles. Individuals in the lowest income quintile provide 
twice as many hours of informal care compared to individuals in the highest quintile 
(12 hours compared to 6 hours of care per week). A majority of Dutch caregivers have a 
paid job, and caregiving is furthermore concentrated among the older inhabitants. Most 
caregivers are aged 45-60, since of this group over 30% provided informal care in 2016. 
As to occupation, we note that homemakers, pensioners, and part-time employees more 
often provide informal care compared to full-time working employees (see table 2.1).
The share of the Dutch population that provides informal care is similar to that in 
neighboring countries. The Netherlands, and other Northern and Central European 
countries strongly differ, however, from the countries in Southern and Eastern Europe 
when it comes to the intensity of care provided. In the Netherlands, about 20% of 
caregivers provide intensive informal care (20+ hours per week), whereas this share is 
over 30% in the Czech Republic and about 50% in Spain (Colombo et al., 2011).
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Table 2.1: Share of informal caregivers per subgroup
2012 (% of total) 2016 (% of total)






Part-time employee 23.1 26.4
Full-time employee 15.0 18.7
Pensioner 19.3 24.8
By age
19-40 years 11.6 13.0
40-65 years 26.0 30.3
65+ years 18.1 22.5
By income
Lowest income quintile 15.3 16.9
Highest income quintile 21.1 24.1
Note that various confounding variables may underlie these descriptive statistics. Data weighted to represent Dutch 
population, results based on own calculations using Gezondheidsmonitor 2012 and 2016
Textbox 2.3: The need for government intervention
Expected LTC expenditures over the lifecycle are high – on average about 35,000 euros for 
men and 91,000 euros for women (Hussem et al., 2016) – and highly uncertain. Therefore, 
insurance against these costs is welfare-improving. However, private long-term care 
insurance covers no more than a few percent of all long-term care spending (OECD, 2017b). 
Reasons for this low uptake include correlated risks, asymmetric information, consumer 
myopia, and a rational choice of parents who expect that the level of informal care provision 
will negatively depend on the level of long-term care insurance (see Boyer et al., 2017; Brown 
& Finkelstein, 2009; and Cremer et al., 2012 for more comprehensive overviews).
This market failure to provide adequate coverage against the financial risks associated 
with LTC use is one of the reasons for government intervention in LTC financing. An 
important other reason is solidarity, as irrespective of market failures not everyone has 
the means to purchase insurance. Public LTC insurance, as opposed to subsidization and 
regulation, can overcome some of the problems that inhibit adequate private coverage. 
However, public insurance may be inefficient due to moral hazard, e.g. consumers 
using more – or more expensive – formal care or because potential informal caregivers 
underreport their ability to provide care (Barr, 2010; Bakx et al., 2015b).
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2.2 The trade-off between formal and informal care: an economic 
perspective
Not everyone has a potential informal caregiver, and the costs of hiring a formal 
caregiver can be very high, placing a large financial burden on dependent individuals 
(Colombo et al., 2011). Furthermore, private LTC insurance that could protect 
individuals against the high costs of care has limitations, leading to a low uptake 
(Brown & Finkelstein, 2009). For these reasons, governments often subsidize or even 
organize the provision of formal long-term care for at least the poorest part of the 
population. Indeed, in most OECD countries the majority of LTC costs is financed 
from public budgets (OECD, 2010; European Commission, 2015).
Informal and formal LTC are partly substitutes (e.g. Bolin et al., 2008; Bonsang, 
2009), and individuals may decide to use either of the two types of care.4 Economic 
literature provides some insight into what determines these decisions. We summarize 
this literature and discuss potential implications for the role of government in LTC.
2.2.1 The role of labor market productivity
A useful economic model to provide insight into a person’s decision to provide 
informal care is the Roy model about the self-selection of workers into different 
occupations (Borjas, 1987; Heckman & Honoré, 1990; Heckman & Sedlacek, 1985). 
Nocera and Zweifel (1996) were the first to apply the Roy model to the decision to 
provide informal care. In this model, the caregiving decision lies with the caregiver, 
not with the person in need for care, and the potential caregiver maximizes expected 
utility. Utility can be derived from consumption, leisure, and potentially from 
caregiving. In maximizing utility, caregivers face a budget and time constraint.
Because of the trade-off between leisure, paid work, and caregiving, the opportunity 
costs of caregiving are foregone wages and leisure time. A person’s decision to provide 
care is based on his or her reservation wage for providing care. This is especially 
dependent on the wage that one could earn in the labor market. Other elements 
affecting this reservation wage are productivity, real wage, and preferences towards 
leisure and consumption. Productivity in this model refers to a person’s productivity 
in caregiving and to the productivity in using consumption goods (relative to the 
price of these goods).
Nocera and Zweifel (1996) conclude that for all individuals the reservation wage for 
caregiving is positive. The height of this reservation wage, reflecting the willingness 
4 Throughout this paper, we make use of economic terminology and refer to the ‘decision’ to provide 
informal care instead of ‘determinants’ of providing informal care, which is more common in e.g. 
public health.
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to provide informal care, could, however, differ. As the reservation wage for care 
depends on the wage that someone can earn in the labor market, high earners 
will be less likely to provide informal care, for they would forego more income by 
providing care. Furthermore, highly productive caregivers, for example because they 
live closer to the care recipient, would be more inclined to provide care compared 
to less productive caregivers. Lastly, individuals strongly valuing consumption will 
be less willing to cut back on working hours and are therefore less likely to provide 
informal care.
Next to dedicating time to provide care themselves, individuals may help their 
dependent family member by hiring a formal caregiver. This might especially be 
the case for individuals who are employed full-time and for relatively high earners. 
This trade-off is considered explicitly by the Roy model used by De Zwart, Bakx & 
van Doorslaer (2017), where the decision is framed as a choice between informal 
caregiving and working but having to pay for formal care. The decision depends on 
the trade-off between wage and the cost of paying for formal care. This model shows 
that the individual decision to provide informal care might be driven not only by 
individual productivity, but also by contextual factors, namely the costs associated 
with formal care consumption.
This rather simplified model provides two important insights. First, it shows that 
informal caregiving – and hence the burden of caregiving – is not likely to be 
equally distributed across the population of potential caregivers: some people are 
more likely to take on caregiving tasks than others. Second, it shows that in case 
a government would have perfect information about which people will provide 
informal care, it may target formal care to people who do not have a potential 
caregiver in their network.
However, when the government has imperfect information, subsidizing formal care 
may result in moral hazard because people may pretend to be unwilling to provide 
informal care in order to receive governmental aid (Jousten et al., 2005). To reduce 
moral hazard, a government could take measures to encourage self-selection towards 
the type of LTC that is optimal from a societal perspective. This will be discussed 
in the following sections.
2.2.2 The role of intra-family strategic behavior
A second set of economic models focuses on a specific type of potential caregivers and 
care recipients: adult children who may take care of their parents when these become 
dependent on help. In these models, caregivers are not viewed as the decision makers 
but as agents in a principal-agent setting in which they may be convinced to provide 
care to their principal – their parent – through the prospect of a bequest (Zweifel & 
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Struwe, 1996; Cremer & Roeder, 2017).5 These models consider a society consisting 
of two generations, parents and children, and two periods. Moreover, instead of a 
distinction between formal and informal LTC, they identify three potential sources 
of LTC: the family providing informal care, the market providing formal care via 
private insurance, and the state providing formal care via public insurance. These 
three options are assumed to be close or perfect substitutes.
In these models, utility-maximizing parents derive utility from wealth. Parents 
face uncertainty about whether they will become dependent but know under which 
conditions to expect informal care from their children. Based on the potential help 
that parents expect from their children in case of illness, the parents decide in the 
first period whether to spend part of their wealth on private LTC insurance or to save 
it as a bequest to their children. These expenditures would yield a drop in utility at 
the cost of the insurance or the bequest. In the second period, parents may become 
dependent and need LTC, with insurance or informal care protecting them against 
LTC expenditures. The children decide their level of labor and informal care supply 
in period two, based on their wage and the expected bequest from their parent.
Cremer and Roeder (2017) show that the outcomes of this strategic game are 
suboptimal and hence imply that government intervention may be welfare-
improving. The authors mention that without government interference, several 
inefficiencies may arise. First, parents might purchase insufficient insurance when 
the insurance premium involves significant loading costs or due to limited financial 
possibilities. Second, the labor supply may be inefficiently low because the level of the 
bequest depends on the amount of informal care a child is able to supply. Children 
who work more would have less time to provide informal care. Their parents in turn 
need to hire formal care, resulting in a lower bequest for the children. A caregiving-
dependent bequest hence implies a tax on labor as additional labor earnings are 
partly ‘taxed away’ by a drop in the bequest. Third, the supply of informal care might 
be inefficiently low because children do not account for the possibility that parents 
value the help of their children more than care provided by a formal caregiver. Parents 
with limited ability to pay in this model are the ones in highest need of public aid. 
These parents experience a double burden as they cannot purchase insurance and 
are unable to induce their children to provide informal care via a bequest.
The authors discuss several interventions to overcome inefficiencies, all differing 
based on the informational context. A key element in these interventions is the need 
for subsidization of informal care, as otherwise not enough care is provided. Most 
importantly, the models show that public aid does not necessarily crowd out informal 
5 Knoef and Kooreman (2011) (among others) further extend these models by including siblings’ 
caregiving interactions, but this is beyond the scope of this review.
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care when children are non-altruistic. When children solely provide care because 
their bequest is dependent on doing so, they do not consider publicly provided LTC 
as an alternative when making their caregiving decision. In case parents do not 
have the resources to purchase insurance or to transfer part of their wealth to their 
children, publicly funded care might even enhance informal caregiving. When the 
state offers some level of public care, parents save money, which they can use as a 
bequest to induce their children to provide additional informal care.
2.2.3 The role of altruism and social norms
While the previous sets of economic theories assume ‘selfish’ motives to providing 
informal care, the third set of theoretic models acknowledges that informal 
caregiving might be provided as a deed of altruism or due to social norms. Social 
norms, which make a person feel obliged to provide care, could be culturally 
determined (e.g. “it is one’s duty to care for a sick relative”) but can also differ based on 
caregiver characteristics (e.g. “daughters and daughters-in-law have more caregiving 
tasks than sons and sons-in-law”). These social norms have been incorporated in 
some theoretical models. Barigozzi, Cremer and Roeder (2017), for example, assume 
that daughters feel a stronger obligation to provide care than sons and hence suffer 
disutility when they provide less informal care than the average child. Social norms 
may partly explain the observed gender differences in the supply of informal care.
Altruism, on the other hand, refers to the utility that children derive from helping 
their parents; this concept has thus far received more attention in literature than 
social norms. Pestieau and Sato (2008) assume that children are altruistic and 
willing to help their parents if needed.6 In their model, children derive utility from 
consumption and providing help. The effect of help on utility depends on the amount 
of help provided and someone’s level of altruism.
The type of help – LTC provision or financial aid – given by children is based on 
their labor market productivity, as reflected in their labor income. Children with low 
market productivity lose less when they give up work to provide LTC by dedicating 
time to their parents. As a result, these children tend to provide a higher level of 
informal care. The amount of informal care that people are willing to provide drops 
when their labor productivity increases, down to a certain point where the amount 
of care provided is minimal. From this point, children earn enough to provide LTC in 
the form of financial aid. From this point onwards, the level of monetary aid provided 
increases when productivity increases. If children are altruistic, the model predicts 
that the total amount of support will be U-shaped.
6 We will focus on the 2008 paper as this one includes the market as a potential source of LTC, whereas 
the 2006 paper solely accounts for family and state provided care.
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The model furthermore assumes that parents know how much help to expect 
from their children. Based on this knowledge, parents decide to purchase private 
insurance or to leave part of their wealth to their children. The model demonstrates 
that differences in the productivity of children may result in inequalities in the care 
received by their parents. Parents with low- and high-earning children can rely on 
help from their children. The remaining group has to purchase private insurance 
or to rely on governmental support. Government support is needed for the parents 
who do not receive enough help from their children and are unable to purchase 
private insurance. The state could furthermore improve social welfare by subsidizing 
informal care when children are not fully altruistic. In such a situation, children do 
not completely account for the utility gain of their parents and provide less than the 
optimal value of help.
The authors examine various types of government interventions assuming imperfect 
information. They show that the optimal type of government intervention is a 
combination of measures that induce rich parents to purchase private insurance 
and that guarantee the public provision of care to poor parents. To achieve this, 
the state should encourage appropriate self-selection by setting the level of subsidy 
for the uptake of private insurance and the quality level of public nursing homes in 
such a way that rich parents will value private insurance over public nursing homes.
Cremer, Gahvari and Pestieau (2017) extend this analysis by assuming that different 
levels of altruism exist. This extension provides insight into the optimal amount 
and type of LTC insurance that should be supplied considering that the state cannot 
condition its support on the default of altruism (as this is unobservable and prone 
to moral hazard). The role of insurance (public and private) is studied assuming two 
forms of insurance supplied by the public sector: topping up and opting out. Either 
the state provides a lump-sum subsidy for formal care that persons can top up; or it 
provides LTC in kind, which elderly people decide to use or to opt out from. Which 
option leads to the optimal outcome depends on the altruism levels of the children 
in the population. If most children are highly altruistic, the opting-out scheme is 
preferable because highly altruistic children will let their parents opt out of this 
scheme and provide care themselves. After all, these children would provide more 
help than the state would and hence receive a higher utility from providing care 
themselves. In this situation, governmental aid is spent solely on those who need 
it, i.e. parents whose children are not sufficiently altruistic to help. By contrast, a 
topping-up scheme is optimal when the altruism of most children is very low. As 
children with low levels of altruism would not provide enough care to be the sole 
caregivers, a topping-up scheme makes use of their limited supply of informal care 
instead of letting them opt out from informal care completely. In case children are 
moderately altruistic, the optimal level and type of public LTC is more difficult to 
define. Under an opting-out system, the level of public insurance coverage should 
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then be small enough to convince children to provide informal care, leading to a 
downward distorted supply of publicly provided care.
Both models show that altruistic children, in contrast to selfish children, take 
governmental interference into account when deciding upon the level of informal 
care to supply. In such situations, the level of publicly supplied care could crowd 
out as well as enforce informal care. Although the government is unable to observe 
altruism directly, it has the possibility to steer informal care decisions, for example 
via the quality of publicly provided nursing homes, the form of public LTC provision 
(lump sum or in-kind), and subsidies for the uptake of private LTC insurance.
2.2.4 Societal trade-off between formal and informal care
The above-mentioned models demonstrate (i) how individual characteristics and the 
institutional context shape a person’s caregiving decision and (ii) that government 
needs to account for the response of caregivers when it intervenes in the financing 
and provision of LTC. As a variety of elements shape one’s decision to provide care, 
not everyone is equally likely to be a caregiver and therefore not equally likely to 
experience negative consequences. Combined with the fact that children often 
cannot fully insure themselves against the negative consequences of caregiving on 
the market, this provides an efficiency argument for government intervention, either 
by reducing the need to provide informal care or by compensating caregivers for the 
negative consequences of caregiving.
However, the government may not be able to achieve the optimal allocation of formal 
and informal care because of imperfect information about a potential caregiver’s 
ability and willingness to provide informal care, and because of strategic behavior 
on the part of both caregivers and care recipients. Therefore, governmental policies 
that reduce the need to provide informal care (e.g. through public provision or private 
insurance subsidies) should encourage appropriate self-selection to ensure that 
public money is spent effectively. Potential instruments to achieve this (desirable) 
self-selection are (i) the quality of publicly provided care, (ii) in-kind provision of 
care (rather than a lump sum cash benefit), (iii) subsidization of insurance, and (iv) 
taxation of labor earnings and bequests. However, the three sets of models we have 
discussed show that the optimal combination of instruments to achieve this self-
selection depends on assumptions regarding social norms and the level of altruism 
of children – two aspects that are notoriously hard to measure.
2.3 Health-related consequences of providing informal care
Our review of the economic literature highlights the complexity of the trade-off 
between formal and informal care. One important element in this trade-off are 
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the costs of informal caregiving, including the potentially negative health effects 
on the informal caregiver. We focus on the health effects of informal caregiving 
for three reasons. First, the effects are potentially major and irreversible, especially 
considering that most caregivers are older and vulnerable themselves. Second, health 
effects are a risk for all caregivers whereas labor market effects can only occur for 
working-age caregivers. Lastly, it is more difficult to financially compensate health 
effects than other effects such as foregone labor market opportunities.
Several studies have been carried out to assess whether informal care indeed is 
correlated with the health of the caregiver (e.g. Beach et al., 2000; Schulz et al., 
1997), which is confirmed by prior systematic literature reviews and meta-analyses 
reviewing these studies (e.g. Pinquart & Sörensen, 2003a, 2007; Vitaliano et al., 2003).
However, these reviews did not distinguish between studies that merely study the 
correlation between health and caregiving and those that estimate a causal effect. 
The crucial difference is that the former set of studies conflates differences in health 
state caused by caregiving tasks with differences caused by other factors. These 
factors, such as lifestyle and pre-existing health differences are largely unobserved 
and vary over time, and hence cannot be controlled for in multivariate regressions, 
even when panel data are available. Hence, these estimates are biased estimates of 
the true effect that caregiving has on health (Little & Rubin, 2000).
Quasi-experimental methods offer a solution to this problem by carefully modelling 
the selection into the treatment and control group. Doing so, these methods allow 
for comparison between caregivers and non-caregivers, and hence make sure that 
the change in caregiver health is caused by the provision of care and by nothing else 
(Antonakis et al., 2014). A recent strand of the literature on the relationship between 
caregiving and health (e.g. Coe & Van Houtven, 2009) makes use of these methods to 
eliminate bias in the estimates of the caregiving effect caused by unobserved factors 
and thus allows for causal inference.
To our knowledge, we are the first to review this relatively new strand of literature. To 
provide an objective, transparent, and replicable overview of the literature, we carry 
out this review systematically following PRISMA guidelines (Moher et al., 2009). 
Next to focusing on the causal impact of informal care, we will add to the literature 
by paying specific attention to subgroups of caregivers. The health impact of care 
might namely strongly differ by, for example, gender or the type of care provided 
(Penning & Zu, 2016). We sought to address the following questions: What causal 
impact does providing informal care to elderly or older family member have on the health 
of the caregiver? And how does this caregiving effect differ between subgroups of caregivers?
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2.3.1 Review methodology
Eligibility criteria
We included studies based on the following eligibility criteria:
1. The article focuses on informal caregiving to elderly or older family members.
2. The article estimates the health impact of informal caregiving on the caregiver.
3. The article is aimed at finding a causal relation between informal caregiving and 
caregiver health using any one of the following methods: propensity score analysis, 
simultaneous equation models (instrumental variables), regression discontinuity 
designs, difference-in-difference models or Heckman selection models.
4. The article is written in English.
5. The article is not a conference abstract, letter, note, or editorial.
We defined informal care as providing care to a person in need and limited this 
definition to care to elderly persons or older family members. This focus excludes 
looking after (healthy) children or grandchildren, but does not impose any restriction 
on the age of the caregiver.
To specify our search to studies making causal estimations, we only include 
articles using quasi-experimental methods that enable causal estimations in 
nonexperimental settings. We limited our search to five methods for causal inference 
listed by Antonakis et al. (2010; 2014). Table 2.2 provides a short explanation of 
these methods. As especially health of individuals could already differ before starting 
providing care, we exclude studies making use of a matching design that does not 
match on health of the caregiver.
Table 2.2: Quasi-experimental methods for inferring causality in non-experimental settings
Method Brief description
Propensity score analysis
Compare individuals who were selected to treatment to 
statistically similar controls using a matching algorithm
Simultaneous-equation models
Using ‘instruments’ (exogenous sources of variable that do 
not correlate with the error term) to purge the endogenous 
x variable from the bias
Regression discontinuity Select individuals to treatment using a modeled cutoff
Difference-in-differences models
Compare a group who receive an exogenous treatment to a 
similar control group over time
Heckman selection models
Predict selection to treatment (where treatment is 
endogenous) and then control for unmodeled selection to 
treatment in predicting y.
Note: Taken from Antonakis et al. (2010), for further explanations regarding the summed methods we refer to 
the original article.
30    |     
Search strategy and data sources
Our search strategy, which is available as supplementary material, was set up with 
the help of an information specialist. For all criteria, we defined keywords as well 
as Medical Subject Headings (MeSH) and Embase Subject Headings (Emtree terms). 
Databases were searched for combinations of keywords and (if applicable) MeSH or 
Emtree-terms related to the eligibility criteria: informal caregiving, health impact, 
and older adults. Additionally, we limited our search to English language studies 
using one of the quasi-experimental methods to infer causality listed by Antonakis 
et al. (2010; 2014), and excluded abstracts, letters or editorials.
The following databases covering social sciences as well as bio-medical literature 
were searched from database inception through April 1, 2018: MEDLINE, Embase, 
Web of Science, and Scopus. We did not search the CENTRAL database, which 
covers studies using RCTs, as our research question cannot be answered by studies 
using this research design. All search results were stored in RefWorks, our main 
platform for keeping track of the literature review. We did not register a systematic 
review protocol.
We furthermore used Google Scholar to identify any additional papers. This search 
engine could help in retrieving papers that (i) have not been published yet, or (ii) 
missed relevant search terms in their title and abstract. For this manual search, we 
used a search strategy similar to the search string used for the other databases. We 
hand-searched the first 150 Google Scholar hits. When articles were deemed eligible 
for review, they were added to the list of full-text review articles.
Review procedure
Three reviewers screened the titles and abstracts of all articles based on predefined 
eligibility criteria. Before commencing the review, the criteria were discussed 
to guarantee shared understanding. The researchers screened the articles (two 
researchers per article) based on title and abstract. To avoid bias, authors and journal 
names were not visible during this screening stage. If the article adhered to all 
inclusion criteria, it was then selected for full-text review. In this second stage, all 
included articles were reviewed full-text by two researchers based on the inclusion 
and exclusion restrictions. For both stages, differences in screening results were 
discussed and resolved by dialogue, and if needed the third researcher would act 
as judge.
Data abstraction
Data were extracted from the articles included in the review using a predefined 
extraction table. The following items were recorded from each article: the author(s) 
and year of publication; country/region of interest; care recipient; definition of 
informal care; sample characteristics of the caregiver; health outcome measure; 
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estimation technique; and main findings of the study. As we do not aim to provide 
a meta-analysis of the results, the main study findings were recorded qualitatively 
based on presence and direction, not on effect size. The results were synthesized in 
a narrative review.
Quality assessment
To assess the methodological quality of the studies meeting inclusion criteria, 
methodological information from the papers was extracted using a predefined 
extraction form designed to fit the methodologies used in the included articles. This 
form summarized the most important methodological elements of the papers. We did 
not calculate quality scores for the studies, but instead explained the methodological 
differences between the studies in narrative terms.
To assess the quality of studies using propensity score analysis, we follow recent 
progress in the causal inference literature (Lechner, 2009a) and added a separate 
check. The quality of matching studies is dependent on the likelihood that the 
assumptions hold that (i) the propensity score is not affected by whether one is a 
caregiver (no reverse causality) and (ii) there are no relevant remaining unobserved 
differences after matching (see Rosenbaum & Rubin (1983) for an overview of all 
assumptions). The matching approach proposed by Lechner (2009a) makes it credible 
that these assumptions hold, as it suggests to match individuals on pre-treatment 
covariates instead of current covariates and to stratify the sample according to 
care provision in the previous year. The latter suggestion means that individuals 
who recently started caregiving (and did not do so last year), are only compared to 
individuals who did not provide care last year either. Doing so, potential influence 
of the treatment status on the covariates is avoided and pre-treatment differences 
in health are controlled for. For the studies making use of matching techniques, we 
evaluated whether this approach is followed.
The quality of the instrumental variables is assessed based on instrument strength. 
For studies included in this review, it means that the effect of the instrumental 
variable, for example, a health shock of a parent, has a sufficiently strong effect on 
informal care provision. This strength of the instrumental variable can be assessed 
based on the F-statistic of excluded instruments. We follow the most commonly used 
rule of thumb that the F-statistic showing the strength of the instrument should be 
greater than 10 (Staiger & Stock, 1997).
Finally, we assess for all studies whether they accounted for the family effect. This 
effect refers to the impact of caring about an ill family member and is different from 
the caregiving effect related to the impact of caring for someone (Amirkhanyan & 
Wolf, 2006; Bobinac et al., 2010). Recent literature highlights the importance of 
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considering this effect, as not accounting for it may lead to an overestimation of the 
caregiving effect (Roth et al., 2015).
2.3.2 Results
Search results
Our searches yielded 1,326 articles in total. After eliminating duplicates, our search 
findings totaled 661 articles. The hand-search resulted in five additional articles. 
From these 666 articles, 613 were excluded for a variety of reasons. Often the studies 
did not focus on informal caregiving but on another type of care. Furthermore, 
various studies were excluded as they did not estimate the impact of caregiving, but 
reviewed the efficacy of a specific intervention to improve the health of caregivers. 
Eventually, 53 articles were selected for full-text review. From these 53 articles, 38 
were excluded in the full-text review round. The most prominent reason for exclusion 
at this stage was that a study did not use any of the defined methods to identify a 
causal effect. Eventually, 15 articles met all inclusion criteria and were included in 
this systematic literature review. Figure 2.1 depicts the flowchart of screening phases.
All articles were published recently, the oldest dating from 2009 (Coe & Van Houtven, 
2009), the most recent one published in 2017 (De Zwart et al., 2017). The articles were 
published in a variety of journals, mostly relating to gerontology or health economics. 
The articles cover various countries of interest, using European data (n=6); Asian data 
(n=4); US data (n=4), or Australian data (n=1). An extensive overview of all articles 
is provided in Table 2.3.
Methodological quality of studies included in the review
Table 2.4 presents an extensive overview of the methods per study meeting the 
inclusion criteria. Three of the 15 studies use simultaneous equation models to 
estimate the causal impact of providing care. The instrumental variables used in 
these studies are roughly similar, including indicators of either the health (Do et 
al., 2015) or the widowhood of the parent (Coe & Van Houtven, 2009; Heger, 2017). 
The F-statistics show that the instrumental variables applied in the main analyses 
of these studies all have sufficient strength.
Most articles (n=12) use a matching design to compare caregivers and noncaregivers. 
As mentioned in the Method section, we only included studies that matched 
respondents on the health of the caregiver to avoid omitted variable bias. Six (Brenna 
& Di Novi, 2016; Di Novi et al., 2015; Kenny et al., 2014; Schmitz & Westphal, 2015; 
Stroka, 2014; de Zwart et al., 2017) of the 12 matching studies follow the approach 
of Lechner (2009a) by matching on precaregiving variables and only comparing 
caregivers with noncaregivers who both did not provide care last year.
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Figure 2.1: Flowchart of screening phases
methods to identify a causal effect. Eventually, 15 articles met all inclusion criteria and were included in 
this systematic literature review. Figure 2.1 depicts the flowchart of screening phases. 
All articles were published recently, the oldest dating from 2009 (Coe & Van Houtven, 2009), the most 
recent one published in 2017 (De Zwart et al., 2017). The articles were published in a variety of journals, 
mostly relating to gerontology or health economics. The articles cover various countries of interest, using 
European data (n=6); Asian data (n=4); US data (n=4), or Australian data (n=1). An extensive overview 
of all articles is provided in Table 2.3. 
 



















No causal estimation (n=110)
Not about informal care (n=349)
No health impact estimated (n=71)
Not about informal care for elderly (n=83)
Records excluded (n=38)
Reasons:
No causal estimation (n=33)
Not about informal care (n=2)
No health impact estimated (n=2)
Article not English (n=1)
 
 
Methodological quality of studies included in the review 
Table 2.4 presents an extensive overview of the methods per study meeting the inclusion criteria. Three of 
the 15 studies use simultaneous equation models to estimate the causal impact of providing care. The 
instrumental variables used in these studies are roughly similar, including indicators of either the health 
(Do et al., 2015) or the widowhood of the parent (Coe & Van Houtven, 2009; Heger, 2017). The F-
Only two of the studies under review (Do et al. 2015; Heger, 2017) specifically 
accounted for the family effect. Do and collegues (2015) argued to avoid picking 
up the family effect by focusing on (i) physical health effects and (ii) females who 
provide care to their parents-in-law. As the family effect relates to worrying about 
an ill family m mber, the a thors assumed that these worries do not a f ct the 
physical health of the caregiver. They furthermore assumed that this family effect 
is absent or at least smaller if one’s parent-in-law falls ill rather than one’s own 
parent. Heger (2017) aimed to disentangle the family effect from the caregiving effect 
and estimated the family effect by including a variable representing ‘poor health of 
a parent’ and the caregiving effect by including a variable representing ‘informal 
caregiving’ in the model. None of the other studies accounted for the family effect, 
thereby potentially overestimating the effect of caregiving on health.
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Comparability of studies
The studies that we review use different methods, which complicates comparing 
effect sizes across studies because, even if estimated on the same study sample, the 
methods would yield estimates of the effect that are valid for other subgroups of the 
study samples. With a matching design, caregivers are matched to similar individuals 
who do not provide care. These studies hence estimated the Average Treatment 
Effect on Treated (ATT): the health impact of informal care for the current informal 
caregivers. When using instrumental variables in simultaneous equation models, 
the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) is estimated. This represents the health 
impact of caregiving for those who started caregiving in response to the instrument, 
that is, illness or widowhood of a parent.
Hence, there are two potential methodological reasons for any observed differences 
in effect size between studies included in this review. First, effect sizes could differ 
as the ATT measures the impact of any form of caregiving while the LATE measures 
the impact of caregiving in response to severe illness or decease. Second, some studies 
do not account for the family effect, which leads to different estimates.
The various definitions of informal caregiving and the variety of outcome measures 
further complicate comparison of the findings of these studies. The definition of 
informal caregiving differs per study from providing care to a parent (n = 5) or 
spouse (n = 1), caring for anyone / a family member or friend (n = 5), and informal 
care for someone with a specific illness (e.g. dementia; n = 2). Lastly, two studies 
(Fukahori et al., 2015; Hong et al., 2016) proxy for informal caregiving by defining 
caregivers as persons living together with a family member or spouse in need. 
Although these studies aimed to estimate the impact of informal care, and as such 
adhere to the inclusion criteria, these rough measures of informal care might lead 
to underestimations of the caregiving effect because many noncaregivers may be 
misclassified as caregivers.
In addition, various health measures were used to estimate the impact on health. 
Studies focus on the mental health impact (n = 3), the physical health impact 
(n = 4), or both (n = 8). These health states are measured via either validated health 
measures, drug prescription data, or information on health care usage. The studies 
also differ in their specification of caregiving, for example, by restricting the sample 
to respondents who provide more than two hours of informal care per day.
Synthesis of results
The studies included in the review provide a fairly coherent picture. All studies find 
a short-term negative effect for certain subgroups of caregivers, except for the study 
by Fukahori and colleagues (2015). An explanation for this latter finding could be 
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the very rough proxy of informal care used in this study: household members were 
assumed to provide informal care when someone in the household needs care.
While all but one of the studies found a negative effect on the short term, there are 
interesting differences in the effect sizes between and within the studies. The studies 
estimating mental health effects all found that caregiving might result in higher 
prevalence of depressive feelings and lowered mental health scores. Estimates of the 
physical health impact of informal care were less stable and differed in sign. Many 
studies found negative physical health effects of caregiving (Coe and Van Houtven, 
2009; Do et al., 2015; Goren et al., 2016; Hong et al., 2016; Stroka 2014; Trivedi et 
al. 2014; De Zwart et al. 2017). These effects relate to a wide variety of physical 
health outcomes such as increased drug intake (Stroka, 2014; De Zwart et al., 2017) 
and pain affecting daily activities (Do et al., 2015). In contrast to these negative 
effects, Di Novi and colleagues (2015), Trivedi and colleagues (2014), and Coe and 
Van Houtven (2009) found positive effects of informal caregiving on physical health 
for some specific subgroups. How physical health is measured appears to be crucial: 
when measured by self-assessed health, the short-run impact of caregiving is positive, 
whereas negative health effects are found when outcomes are measured by intake 
of drugs and reported pain. Di Novi and colleagues (2015) claimed that the positive 
impact of informal care on self-assessed health could be the result of a bias related 
to reference points. They argued that spending time with a person who is in poor 
health could lead to an increase in self-assessed health because people may take the 
poor health of the care recipient as reference point, even though the objective health 
level of the caregiver could have decreased.
Next to differences with regards to the health outcomes studied, large heterogeneity 
exists with regard to the subgroup of caregivers for whom the effects are applicable. 
Many studies only estimated caregiving effects for females as they assumed that 
mostly women provide or are affected by informal care (Brenna & Di Novi, 2016; 
Di Novi et al., 2015; Do et al., 2015; Rosso et al., 2015; Schmitz & Westphal, 2015). 
Studies that did separately estimate health effects for males and females often found 
that health effects are larger or solely present for females (Heger, 2017; Stroka, 2014; 
De Zwart et al. 2017). Marital status also seemed to be of effect according to the study 
of Coe and Van Houtven (2009), which in most cases solely found health effects of 
informal care for married individuals.
The intensity of provided care appears to be another source of heterogeneity in the 
health effects of caregiving. Various studies compared average or moderate caregivers 
with intensive caregivers based on the hours of care provision. These studies (Brenna 
& Di Novi, 2016; Heger, 2017; Stroka, 2014) found larger health effects when more 
intensive care is provided.
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A clear conclusion regarding the longer-term effects of informal caregiving cannot 
yet be drawn. As all studies used survey data, many were unable to estimate longer-
term caregiving effects. Only five studies estimated effects over a longer period (Coe 
& Van Houtven, 2009; Kenny et al., 2014; Rosso et al., 2015; Schmitz & Westphal 
2015; De Zwart et al., 2017). Both Schmitz and Westphal (2015) and De Zwart et 
al. (2017) did not find any longer-term effects of informal caregiving on health. 
Schmitz and Westphal concluded that there might not be large scarring effects of 
care provision; De Zwart and colleagues mentioned that selective attrition may 
have biased their results. The other three studies estimating longer-term effects 
found mixed results, showing both positive and negative effects of informal care. 
Kenny and colleagues (2014) found negative health effects 2 years after the start 
of caregiving for working female caregivers and positive effects for non-working 
caregiving males. Rosso et al. (2015) grouped all persons who provide informal care 
at baseline and found that after 6 years low-frequency caregivers have greater grip 
strength (representing physical health) than non-caregivers. The authors, however, 
control for various health measures but not for baseline grip-strength and mention 
that the effect might be explained by existing pre-caregiving differences. The study 
by Coe and Van Houtven (2009) is the only one that compared persons who stopped 
providing care to persons who continued caregiving for two more years. They found 
negative mental health effects for females and negative physical health effects for 
males who continue caregiving.
2.4 Conclusion
Due to population ageing, most OECD countries have to deal with a growing demand 
for LTC. As often both formal and informal care can meet this demand, the key is to 
find the right balance between the two types of care. This paper aimed to provide 
insight into this trade-off by summarizing both theoretical and empirical literature 
regarding the costs and benefits of formal and informal LTC.
Our review provides two important insights. First, economic theory makes clear 
that not everyone is equally inclined to provide informal care. Both individual 
characteristics and the institutional context can shape a person’s caregiving decision. 
Particularly persons with a lower income or who are unemployed are more likely 
to provide informal care and may thus experience the negative consequences of 
caregiving.
Second, our systematic literature review shows that there is ample evidence of a 
negative impact of caregiving on the health of the provider. This caregiving burden 
can manifest itself both in mental and physical health effects. Interestingly, the 
presence and intensity of these health effects differ strongly per subgroup of 
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caregivers. Especially female, and married caregivers, and those providing intensive 
care appear to experience negative health effects of caregiving. These groups might 
have several other responsibilities on top of caregiving duties, thereby being more 
strongly affected by the caregiving tasks.
As individuals may not be able to fully insure themselves against the consequences 
of caregiving, there is a need for government intervention to take away the necessity 
to provide care or to compensate the caregiver. Public provision of LTC or private 
insurance subsidies could solve this problem, but they may drive up costs by crowding 
out too much of the informal care supply. The extent to which crowding out is 
a problem depends on the strength of the prevailing social norms and altruistic 
preferences in society.
While this study does not (and did not intend to) offer a conclusive answer regarding 
the optimal mix of formal and informal care, the paper does highlight the complex 
trade-off that policymakers face. Formal and informal care each have their own costs 
and benefits. Subsidizing formal care can be costly but might relieve individuals from 
the caregiver burden, while stimulating informal care might have the opposite effect. 
Policies affecting either of the two types of care should therefore always consider 
their impact on the other form of LTC.
To further improve our understanding of the trade-off between the two types of 
LTC, we propose the following additional research. First, further research is needed 
about the different impacts of informal care on various subgroups of caregivers, as 
current studies do not provide conclusive insight into these differences. Knowing 
which groups are most strongly affected by informal care and understanding 
the drivers behind these effects may help policymakers decide how to reduce the 
negative effects of informal care and to facilitate a better targeting of support 
for informal caregivers. Second, research is needed into the long-term effects of 
providing informal care, given that most empirical studies have only measured 
short-term effects. Third, more research is needed to disentangle the family and the 
caregiving effect, since the caregiving effect might be overstated in most empirical 
studies as the family effect was not accounted for. Fourth, it would be worthwhile 
to gain enhanced insight into the impact of the various types of caregiving and their 
intensity. Next, given the potentially important role of the institutional context 
on the caregiving decision, more research on the health effects of informal care in 
the Dutch LTC system is imperative, since the number of empirical studies of this 
specific context is very limited.
Finally, this overview of current literature also raises important questions about 
the trade-off between formal and informal care in a larger context. Societal trends 
such as increasing female labor force participation and delayed retirement ages 
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could affect the caregiving decision as well. Due to longer and increasing labor 
force participation, individuals may become less inclined to provide informal care, 
thus necessitating more formal care. However, when the provision of informal care 
mainly stems from a feeling of obligation (because of social norms or altruistic 
preferences), individuals would continue their caregiving duties, thereby facing a 
double burden of work and informal care. It would be interesting to explore these 
trends in future research.
Relevance for the Netherlands
Insights from this paper are relevant for the Dutch context. Dutch public long-term 
care expenditures are among the highest in the OECD and are expected to grow 
substantially in the coming decades (OECD, 2017b; Eggink et al., 2017). Aside from 
the increase in long-term care expenditures, we also observe a growing number of 
Dutch informal caregivers. Between 2012 and 2016 the number of caregivers in the 
Netherlands grew by 20%, and currently more than 3 million adults are estimated 
to provide informal care (Gezondheidsmonitor, 2012, 2016). This surge in the supply 
of informal care could be driven by population ageing but may also be the result of 
the policy changes related to the Social Support Act, which aim to stimulate reliance 
on social networks instead of governmental support (WMO, 2015).
An important empirical question is whether the burden of caregiving is equally 
shared among the Dutch population or whether it is primarily carried by specific 
subgroups with lower income and labor productivity, as predicted by economic 
theory. Data from the Health Monitors of 2012 and 2016, weighted to represent the 
entire Dutch population, show that some groups indeed provide care more often than 
others (see Table 2.1 in textbox 2.2). In 2016, almost 19% of people with a full-time 
job (more than 32 working hours a week) provide care compared to just over 26% 
of employees who work no more than 12 hours a week. Elderly persons also more 
often provide care than full-time employees, as about one fourth of retirees provide 
informal care. Although we see an increase in the propensity to provide care among 
nearly all identified subgroups, especially the participation of elderly rose sharply 
between 2012 and 2016. In contrast to theory, individuals in higher income groups 
provide care more often than individuals in lower income quintiles. Various variables 
may have confounded this result; richer individuals, for example, are often older and 
hence more likely to care for a spouse or parent. In terms of care intensity, lower 
income households do provide more hours of informal care.
The differences in the propensity to provide care between the various subgroups 
highlight the importance of considering the downsides of informal caregiving. After 
all, policies to stimulate informal care might only reach that part of the population 
that is already inclined to provide care. As a result, the costs of care affect only a 
specific part of the population.
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In light of the growing number of caregivers, an important question is how to 
minimize the caregiving burden. Under the Social Support Act (Wet Maatschappelijke 
Ondersteuning, 2015), Dutch municipalities are obliged to provide support to 
informal caregivers. Examples of such interventions for caregivers are respite care 
and support groups. Respite care offers caregivers a short break by temporarily 
providing formal care to the person in need. Support groups offer advice and enable 
the sharing of experiences with other caregivers. However, many municipalities find 
it difficult to target informal caregivers who need this support (VNG, 2016). As shown 
from our literature review, not all caregivers are similarly affected by their tasks, 
and hence not all require this type of support. Female and married caregivers, and 
those providing intensive care turn out to experience larger negative consequences 
of informal caregiving. Policymakers might therefore especially target interventions 
to those individuals who need these most.
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Abstract
Informal caregiving is a potentially attractive alternative to formal care but may 
entail health costs for the caregiver. We examine the mental and physical health 
impact of providing informal care and disentangle the caregiving effect – the effect 
of caring for someone in need – from the family effect – the effect of caring about 
someone in need. We account for the main sources of endogeneity in the caregiving 
decision using Arellano-Bond difference GMM models. We use four waves (2010-
2013) of panel data from the Dutch Study on Transitions in Employment, Ability and 
Motivation (STREAM).
We find that caregiving harms the mental health of caregivers; the effect is more 
prominent for spousal caregivers. On top of this, a negative health shock of a family 
member also has a direct negative effect on mental health, providing evidence of a 
family effect. Our findings thus highlight that the total effect of having a sick relative 
may be underestimated when the family effect is not adequately accounted for. As the 
caregiving effect differs substantially between various types of caregivers, policies 
to cushion these effects should specifically target those subgroups of caregivers that 
carry the largest burden of informal caregiving.
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3.1 Introduction
In most Western countries, the demand for long-term care (LTC) is expected to keep 
rising in the decades to come. For instance, in the Netherlands the demand for LTC 
is projected to grow at an average annual rate of 1.6% between 2014 and 2030 (Eggink 
et al., 2017). Part of this growing demand is likely to be met by informal care, i.e. by 
unpaid care provided by relatives and friends. While the costs of informal caregiving 
are typically low for the recipient, they may be substantial for the caregiver and 
society. Various studies found that the stress and physical strain involved in informal 
caregiving risks hurting the health of caregivers (e.g. Pinquart & Sörensen, 2003). 
Many of these studies, however, used non-representative samples or focused on the 
provision of care for a specific disease (Hirst, 2004).
While the recent literature has moved towards estimating the impact of informal 
caregiving using larger, representative datasets, two main challenges of adequate 
empirical identification of these effects have emerged. A first challenge relates to the 
potential endogeneity between the decision to provide informal care and one’s own 
health. Persons with lower health expectations might for example be more inclined 
to take up the caregiver role for their parents (Schulz, 1990). The other way around, 
a minimum level of health is required to be able to carry out caregiving tasks, which 
prevents individuals in very poor health from providing care. In addition, omitted 
variables may lead to bias when unobserved variables like personality affect both the 
propensity of providing care and the health of the caregiver.
A second challenge, which has received limited attention thus far, is dealing with 
the notion that two distinct effects may be present in situations of ill-health of a 
relative: the family effect and the caregiving effect. The family effect refers to the 
impact of caring about a person and, if living together, the consequences of taking 
over regular household chores. It is different from the caregiving effect, which is the 
effect of caring for a person in need. Irrespective of care provision, experiencing a 
health decline of a loved one can have a negative effect on one’s own health or well-
being (Amirkhanyan & Wolf, 2006; Bobinac et al., 2010).
It is important to make this distinction between the caregiving effect and the 
family effect, as addressing them adequately would require different government 
interventions. Respite care, for instance, could alleviate the caregiving effect, but 
offers no solution to the family effect of worrying about an ill family member. 
As the caregiving effect and the family effect often occur simultaneously, it is 
difficult to disentangle them. Yet, not controlling for the family effect might lead 
to overestimation of the caregiving effect.
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This paper aims to improve understanding of the health effects experienced by 
informal caregivers by separately estimating both effects. In contrast to some earlier 
studies, we do not apply instrumental variables to estimate the caregiving effect 
because the validity of the instruments used in previous work can be questioned, 
and strong and valid instruments are not readily available. Instead, we reduce 
endogeneity concerns by using Arellano-Bond difference GMM models to control 
for existing health differences in a first-differences regression.
While most papers focus on either parental or spousal caregiving, we separately 
estimate the caregiving effect and the family effect for various groups of caregivers. 
There may be various reasons why the impact of caregiving differs between these 
care types. As spousal caregivers tend to be older, they often have fewer physical 
and psychological resources to deal with stress related to caregiving (Pinquart & 
Sörensen, 2003a). Furthermore, differences in the level of care provision can be large 
drivers of differences in stress between spousal and parental caregivers (Pinquart 
& Sorensen, 2011).
3.2 Earlier work on health effects of informal caregiving
A number of studies have attempted to address endogeneity problems when evaluating 
the health effects of informal caregiving by using instrumental variables (IVs), fixed 
effects (FE) methods or statistical matching (see Table A3.1 in the Appendix for an 
overview). The first group of studies used IVs to estimate the impact of informal 
care provision (Coe & Van Houtven, 2009; Do et al., 2015; Heger, 2017) and found 
significant negative effects of informal caregiving on the caregiver’s health. The IVs 
employed in these studies all relate to the health of one’s parents. The risk of these 
instruments lies in their potential violation of the exclusion restriction; when a 
family effect is present, a health shock of a family member is correlated directly to 
the caregiver’s health. Using health of a family member as IV for informal caregiving 
could therefore overestimate the effect of caregiving on health by attributing the 
entire difference in health between individuals with and without ill family members 
to caregiving.
The second group of studies, most closely linked to the set-up of the current paper, 
aims to estimate a causal impact by controlling for or matching on a large set of 
covariates. These studies rely on the assumption that they are able to capture all 
covariates that affect the caregiving decision to make the conditional independence 
assumption hold. While this is a strong assumption, it might be preferable considering 
worries related to the validity of IVs. Van den Berg et al. (2014) used FE models on an 
Australian dataset and found significant negative effects of caregiving on subjective 
well-being. Using FE models they controlled for time constant heterogeneity, however 
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they did not consider selection into caregiving based on time-variant elements such 
as previous health. The studies making use of matching (Brenna & Di Novi, 2016; de 
Zwart et al., 2017; Schmitz & Westphal, 2015), addressed endogeneity of caregiving 
by statistically matching caregivers and non-caregivers on observable characteristics. 
By matching on pre-treatment variables, these papers make it credible that treatment 
is random conditional on controls and hence that an average treatment effect on 
the treated can be identified. All three papers found negative effects of caregiving 
on mental health.
Thus far, two studies specifically considered the family effect. Do et al. (2015) aimed 
to avoid picking up the family effect by only focusing on (i) physical health effects and 
(ii) females providing care to their parents-in-law. They found negative health effects 
of providing informal care, but might face difficulties in isolating the family effect 
from the caregiving effect. For example, as mental and physical health could affect 
each other, stress related to the family effect may induce physical health problems. 
Heger (2017) estimated the family effect by including an indicator of poor health of 
a parent in the model and found a negative effect of poor health of family members 
on the health of the potential caregiver.
3.3 Methods
To deal with the potential endogeneity between caregiving and own health, we start 
from the economic intuition behind the caregiving decision as presented by De 
Zwart et al. (2017). According to their model, a set of elements affect the caregiving 
decision. The first one relates to personal ability, both reflected in wage and health. 
Persons with a higher ability might, for example, prefer paid work to providing 
informal care. Second, availability of other types of informal and formal care might 
affect the caregiving decision. Household income and size could for example reflect 
someone’s possibilities to purchase formal care or to transfer caregiving duties to 
family members. Lastly, non-monetary factors such as cultural factors might affect 
the caregiving decision.
We account for these factors that shape the caregiving decision in three ways. First, 
we use a first-difference model to control for time-invariant personal characteristics, 
like personality traits and education.
Second, we deal with differential selection into caregiving by health status by 
conditioning on the lagged health status. Controlling for lagged health not only 
deals with reverse causality but also helps to mitigate the issue of unobserved 
characteristics (cf. Lechner, 2009a). Variations in time-variant factors that are 
potentially affecting current health status of the respondents occurring in t–1 and 
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earlier are likely to have also affected lagged health and thus need not to be controlled 
for anymore. Hence, we assume that no event affected both the propensity to care 
and one’s own health in the past year.
To include a lagged variable while controlling for time-invariant unobservables, we 
use the Arellano-Bond (1991) (A-B) estimation technique. Including pre-treatment 
health status in a regular FE or first-difference model is not possible as the lagged 
dependent variables correlate with the fixed effects in the error term and would 
give rise to dynamic panel bias. This bias could affect our estimates of the lagged 
dependent variable, as well as the coefficients of our other independent variables, 
especially when the dataset contains few waves but many observations (Nickell, 
1981). In the A-B first-differences model, the lagged difference in health status H 
(ΔHit-1) is instrumented by deeper lags of health (starting with health two waves 
earlier: Hit-2). We can use Hit-2 as an instrument for ΔHit-1 because Hit-2 is correlated 
with ΔHit-1 but not with Δ𝜀it as long as the error terms are not serially correlated. 
Following Arellano and Bond (1991), we do not only use the second lag of health, but 
all available deeper lags of health as instruments. As we have four waves of data, we 
can include the second and third lag.
Third, we control for remaining observed time-varying factors related to the 
caregiving decision and own health by including covariates (such as income and 
marital status) into our models. The main difference between this study and prior 
studies is that we include measures to capture the family effect in the model. Based 
on the existing literature, we cannot conceive other important, time-varying factors 
affecting own health and the caregiving decision.
The resulting dynamic panel data model is estimated using a difference Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) regression.7 The model is specified as follows:
ΔHit-1 = 𝛽1ΔHi,t-1 + 𝛽2ΔICit + 𝛽3ΔHFit + 𝛽4ΔXit + Δ𝜀it  (1)
The change in health ΔHit is dependent on the change in one’s health status 
observed one year before, ΔHi,t-1; on ΔICit , which indicates the change of the 
informal care provision status; on ΔHFit, which refers to a change in the health 
state of the individual’s partner or close family member,8 as well as a vector of 
changes in individual time-varying characteristics, ΔXit. All time-invariant individual 
7 We present robust twostep estimates using the Stata command xtabond2 (Roodman, 2006).
8 The caregiving effect and the family effect might reinforce each other, for example, when care 
provision becomes more challenging due to severe illness of the care recipient. Adding an interaction 
term to the model, we indeed observe a positive interaction between the two effects. We do not 
include this interaction term in the models presented in this paper, as the approach is highly data 
demanding.
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characteristics are factored out by differencing. Our main parameters of interest are 
𝛽2 indicating the caregiving effect, and 𝛽3 indicating the family effect.
3.4 Data
We use the Dutch Study on Transitions in Employment, Ability and Motivation 
(STREAM) panel survey, which includes four annual waves of data ranging from 
2010 to 2013. It collects extensive information on determinants of transitions 
into and out of employment and of work productivity among persons aged 45-64 
years. This is also the age group providing most informal care in the Netherlands 
(Gezondheidsmonitor, 2016). The STREAM sample is stratified at baseline on age 
and work status and is drawn from an existing internet panel (Ybema et al., 2014). In 
the first wave, 15,118 persons responded to the survey. In later waves, this original 
sample was invited to participate again without replacement. Attrition is fairly low: 
in total almost two-thirds (64%) of the sample responded to all four surveys. The 
panel data are linked at the individual level to administrative data for all registered 
inhabitants in the Netherlands obtained via Statistics Netherlands.9
Sample
From the 15,118 first wave respondents, we select a subsample of individuals who 
could potentially provide informal care to their parent or partner. We do so by 
only including respondents who have a living parent or partner at baseline. As the 
difference GMM regression requires at least three waves of data, we solely include 
individuals who responded at least three times to the survey. Table A3.2 in the 
Appendix provides an overview of the inclusion criteria. Our sample at baseline 
consists of 4,400 males and 3,528 females; across all waves we have 17,055 male and 
13,693 female observations.10
Health measurement
The panel data enable us to use four complementary, validated self-reported health 
outcomes. The first two measures are derived from the SF-12 health survey, which 
contains questions regarding health during the past four weeks. From this survey, we 
derive two subscales: the Physical Component Summary Scale (PCS) and the Mental 
9 We use non-public microdata which, when adhering to various conditions, can be accessed via a 
secured remote access connection.
10 We consider this sample a random subsample, no large discrepancies in observable characteristics 
between the subsample and total sample were detected.
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Component Summary Scale (MCS).11 Both scales range from 0 to 100, a higher score 
equals a better health status (Ware et al., 1995).
In addition to these general mental and physical health scores, we use two measures 
that capture specific aspects of health that are particularly likely to be affected by 
caregiving; fatigue and depression. Informal caregiving often leads to caregiver 
fatigue because caregivers may prioritize the patient’s needs over their own (Schulz 
et al., 1990). Additionally, the stress involved in caregiving (Pinquart & Sörensen, 
2003a), as well as the stress caused by illness of family members (Amirkhanyan & 
Wolf, 2006), can lead to an increase in depressive symptoms. Fatigue is measured 
using the SF-36 vitality subscale (0-100) based on responses to four items12, where a 
higher score relates to lower fatigue/higher vitality (Ware et al., 1993).13 To measure 
depression, we use the CES-D-10 scale (0-30). A higher score relates to increased 
presence of depressive symptoms (Andresen, Malmgren, Carter, & Patrick, 1994). 
Following scoring instructions (Andresen et al., 1994; Ware et al., 1993; Ware et al., 
1995), health scores were reported as missing in case the respondent failed to answer 
any (MCS & PCS), >1 question (CES-D-10) or >2 questions (vitality scale).
Measurement of informal caregiving
The main variable of interest is a binary variable indicating whether someone 
provided informal care (IC) in the past year. Respondents were asked: ‘Did you in the 
past 12 months spend part of your time on any of the following activities?’ When they 
answer ‘Giving informal care’ affirmatively, they are considered informal caregivers.14 
In the last two waves of the survey, respondents were also asked to indicate to whom 
they provided care. To analyze differences in the type of care provided, we distinguish 
between spousal, parental and other types of caregiving in subgroup analyses. Based 
on the 2012 and 2013 observations, we impute the type of care in the first two waves 
assuming that the care recipient (parent or spouse) remains the same throughout 
the years.15 In Table A3.3 in the Appendix an overview of the number of informal 
caregivers is given, specified by care recipient. As our sample is limited to respondents 
aged 45-65 we do not capture the entire caregiving population, especially spousal 
caregivers tend to be older and hence underrepresented in our data. Our results 
11 The scales consists of the following sub-scales: Physical functioning (2 questions), Role-Physical 
(2 questions), Bodily Pain and General Health, Vitality, Social Functioning, Role-Emotional (2 
questions) and Mental Health (2 questions).
12 The past four weeks: (1) Did you feel full of life? (2) Did you have a lot of energy? (3) Did you feel worn 
out? (4) Did you feel tired?
13 Although the vitality subscale was developed as part of a broader health measure, the subscale is 
used in isolation in various patient populations (e.g. Hewlett et al., 2011).
14 Informal care (in Dutch: Mantelzorg) refers to providing non-professional care for a person in need 
in your own close environment, it does not include looking after healthy family members.
15 This assumption seems credible, between 2012 and 2013 the care recipient changed in only 4% 
(spouses) and 7% (parents) of the cases.
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might therefore underestimate the average health effect for the full population of 
caregivers, as older caregivers might be more prone to the negative health effects of 
caregiving (Pinquart & Sörensen, 2003a).
Covariates
As explained in section 3.3, we take first-differences and control for lagged health. 
We furthermore estimate the family effect by including a variable indicating whether 
the respondent indicated that a spouse or close family member has become severely 
ill within the past year. Furthermore, we include the following individual-level 
covariates: age, age-squared, self-reported financial difficulties16, percentile group 
of standardized household income, marital status, having children living at home, 
employment status17, and whether or not the father or mother is alive. Finally, we 
include wave dummies to capture time trends affecting all respondents, including 
for instance any trends in formal LTC use.18
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 3.1 presents descriptive statistics for our sample at baseline, stratified by 
respondent caregiver status. Caregivers are more often females, and have a lower 
health status at baseline. As expected, informal caregivers more often have ill family 
members. Table A3.4 in the Appendix presents the descriptive statistics for the 
sample stratified by gender.
16 This variable equals 1 when the respondent indicated that their household is currently very short 
or a bit short on money.
17 Next to health effects, informal care might also affect someone’s work situation. Including 
income and employment as control variables might therefore bias results when these variable act 
as dependent variables (‘bad controls’) in the model (Angrist & Pischke, 2008). However, Rellstab 
et al. (2020) show that, as the Dutch LTC system is generous and comprehensive, there are no 
direct employment and income effects and hence we include these control variables in the model. 
When testing this decision empirically, we do not observe large differences in our main estimations 
dependent on inclusion of these variables.
18 There are no differences across regions or between households in formal care availability that we 
need to account for. In general, co-payments are low and income-related and there are virtually no 
waiting lists for formal care use (Mot, 2010).
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics of baseline sample
Never informal caregiver Ever informal caregiver
Mean SD Mean SD
1 2 3 4 3-1
Health outcomes
SF-12 physical score 49.27 9.75 48.82 9.98 *
SF-12 mental score 52.64 8.26 51.24 9.46 ***
SF-36 vitality scale 66.31 19.11 63.85 19.79 ***
CES-D-10 depression index 5.03 4.83 5.70 5.30 ***
Health family
Severe illness of spouse/family 
member 0.14 0.34 0.27 0.45 ***
Severe illness of spouse 0.02 0.15 0.07 0.25 ***
Severe illness of close family 0.12 0.32 0.22 0.41 ***
Personal characteristics
Age 53.74 5.52 53.94 5.20
Age Squared 2,918.66 596.09 2,936.92 562.26
Gender 0.35 0.48 0.57 0.49 ***
Married/registered partnership 0.87 0.34 0.83 0.38 ***
Children living at home 0.47 0.50 0.44 0.50 ***
Employed 0.89 0.32 0.85 0.35 ***
Perc. group household income 68.20 22.71 67.92 23.33
Financial difficulties 0.19 0.39 0.20 0.40 *
Father alive 0.53 0.50 0.66 0.47 ***
Mother alive 0.31 0.46 0.35 0.48 ***
Informal caregiving
Average care duration (# waves) - - 2.25 1.25 ***
Number of observations in T1 4,654 3,273
Total number of observations 17,981 12,758
Note: SF-12 PCS and MCS and SF-36 Vitality range from 0-100 (lowest - highest level of health). CES-D-10 ranges 
from 0-30. A score ≥ 10 is considered a sign of depression. *p<0.10, ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 indicate differences 
between never and ever informal care sample.
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3.5.2 Health effects
The estimation results of the A-B models presented in Table 3.2 suggest that informal 
caregiving only has a negative effect on mental health as measured by the MCS. The 
effect is small compared to the mean MCS score (only about 1%). We also observe 
significant family effects on mental health: a severe illness occurring to a family 
member leads to a significant decrease in the mental health score of about the same 
size as the caregiving effect and to a significant increase in depressed feelings.19 Only 
changes in a few other covariates (i.e. having financial difficulties, being employed, 
and mother alive) are associated with health changes.
The family effect is important in itself, but also because omitting it from a regression 
may lead to an upward bias of the estimate of the caregiving effect. To examine the 
importance of not considering the family effect on the magnitude of the caregiving 
effect, we reran our analysis while excluding the family effect. The estimated 
coefficients of the health effect of informal caregiving in both models are presented 
in Table 3.3. It shows that ignoring the family effect in these models would, compared 
to our main model, yield a slightly higher estimate for the caregiving effect for mental 
health scores, though the difference is not significant. We do not find an effect for 
the physical health score.
The family effect and the caregiving effect differ by gender (see: Table A3.5 in the 
Appendix); both the caregiving effect and the family effect only affect the mental 
health of females.20 Males, by contrast, experience a physical health decline in 
response to informal caregiving. This difference does not seem to be driven by hours 
spent caring, since male and female caregivers in the sample devote roughly the same 
amount of time to care.
19 In additional regressions we verified whether the family effect differed when including hours of 
care instead of a dummy for informal care. This turned out not to be the case (results available upon 
request).
20 The differences in the caregiving effects by gender are significant for PCS, MCS and CESD at the 
0.05, 0.10 and 0.05 level, respectively.
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Table 3.2: Arellano-Bond difference GMM regressions
A-B Both genders
SF-12 PCS SF-12 MCS SF-36 vitality
CES-D-10 
depression
Informal care -0.07 (0.19) -0.45** (0.22) -0.49 (0.35) 0.14 (0.10)
Severe illness spouse/family 0.14 (0.15) -0.43*** (0.17) -0.29 (0.27) 0.16** (0.08)
Lagged health 0.10*** (0.02) 0.11*** (0.02) 0.09*** (0.02) 0.09** (0.02)
Employed 0.46 (0.29) -0.23 (0.31) -1.74*** (0.54) -0.01 (0.16)
Financial difficulties -0.22 (0.21) -0.18 (0.25) -1.14*** (0.40) 0.32*** (0.12)
Perc. group household inc. -0.01 (0.01) 0.01* (0.00) 0.01 (0.01) -0.00 (0.00)
Age 0.43 (0.53) -0.68 (0.54) -0.20 (0.97) 0.29 (0.27)
Age Squared/100 -0.47 (0.48) 0.61 (0.48) 0.08 (0.86) -0.23 (0.24)
Married/Reg. partnership -0.58 (0.54) 1.18 (0.77) 1.26 (1.11) -0.65* (0.36)
Children living at home -0.07 (0.30) -0.30 (0.33) -0.48 (0.56) 0.14 (0.16)
Mother Alive 0.10 (0.39) -0.98** (0.43) -0.84 (0.70) 0.06 (0.20)
Father Alive 0.54 (0.40) -0.21 (0.51) -0.22 (0.74) 0.21 (0.22)
Hansen J-test (p-value) 0.50 (0.78) 0.96 (0.61) 3.2 (0.21) 2.86 (0.24)
Number of instruments 3 3 3 3
N 13,626 13,626 14,824 14,822
Unique individuals 7,430 7,430 7,892 7,893
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions include wave dummies. *p<0.10, ** p<0.05 
*** p<0.01. Depending on the model that is estimated, lagged health refers to the lag of the corresponding 
dependent variable.
Table 3.3: Coefficients caregiving effect in model with or without family effect
A-B Both genders
SF-12 PCS SF-12 MCS SF-36 vitality
CES-D-10 
depression
Informal care (in model with 
family effect)
-0.07 (0.19) -0.45** (0.22) -0.49 (0.35) 0.13 (0.10)
Informal care (in model 
without family effect)
-0.05 (0.19) -0.49** (0.22) -0.52 (0.34) 0.15 (0.10)
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Included controls: lagged health, age, age2, financial difficulties, 
married, children at home, employed, standardized household income, mother alive, father alive, wave dummies. 
Regressions include wave dummies. *p<0.10, ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.
Our A-B models rely on deeper lags of health to instrument the lagged first-difference 
in health. The first stage results show the relevance of these instruments (Table 
A3.6): the excluded lagged levels of health are strongly correlated with the lagged 
difference in health. This is confirmed by the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F-statistics for 
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the excluded instruments, indicating that the instruments are strong. The Hansen 
(1982) J-test statistics for overidentifying restrictions provide an indication of the 
validity of our instruments: for all models, we cannot reject the null-hypothesis that 
all instruments are valid.21
3.5.3 Heterogeneous effects: subsample analyses
In order to assess whether the caregiving effect and the family effect differ for 
various types of caregiving, we carry out several subsample analyses. These subgroup 
analyses are of interest in themselves, but also facilitate an easier comparison with 
prior studies which often focused on subgroups only. First, we analyze whether the 
provision of more informal care also leads to larger health damage. There indeed 
appears to be a dose-response relationship: for individuals that start providing at 
least 8 hours of care per week22 (31% of the caregivers provide at least this amount 
of care), the impact of informal care on mental health and vitality is considerably 
larger than for the group providing less than 8 hours of care per week (Table 3.4).
Table 3.4: A-B estimates for subgroups stratified by caregiving intensity
A-B intensive care Both genders
SF-12 PCS SF-12 MCS SF-36 vitality
CES-D-10 
depression
1-7 hours of informal care -0.09 (0.20) -0.32 (0.23) -0.26 (0.37) 0.13 (0.11)
≥8 hours of informal care 0.01 (0.29) -0.89*** (0.32) -1.25** (0.52) 0.17 (0.15)
Illness family member 0.14 (0.15) -0.42** (0.17) -0.27 (0.27) 0.16** (0.08)
Hansen J-test 0.5 (0.78) 0.98 (0.61) 3.2 (0.20) 2.85 (0.24)
Number of instruments 3 3 3 3
N 13,626 13,626 14,824 14,822
Unique individuals 7,430 7,430 7,892 7,893
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Included controls: lagged health, age, age2, financial difficulties, 
married, children at home, employed, standardized household income, mother alive, father alive, wave dummies. 
*p<0.10, ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.
21 The difference GMM model furthermore relies on the assumption of no serial correlation among 
the errors, which can be assessed using the test proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). This test 
focuses on finding autocorrelation among the differenced error terms. We cannot test for second 
order autocorrelation, as it requires five waves of data. In the absence of any formal test for this 
assumption, we rely on Coe and Van Houtven (2009) and Roy and Schurer (2013) who did not find 
any second order serial correlation of the residuals for mental health in a similar model. We also 
estimated our model using a deeper lag of health (Hit-3) instead of both Hit-3 and Hit-2, which would 
solve the problem in case any second order correlation was present. Use of this deeper lag of health 
hardly affected our estimates, supporting the validity of our assumption.
22 We use the threshold of ≥8 hours following the definition of informal care of Statistics Netherlands 
(2016).
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The caregiving effect is larger when caring for a spouse instead of someone else 
(Table 3.5). Spousal caregiving especially affects vitality and depression scores. These 
effects are substantial; caregiving relates to a change of for example more than 10% 
of the average CES-D-10 score. We also observe a difference in terms of the family 
effect; a severe illness of a spouse has a negative effect on mental health and vitality 
scores and increases depression scores, but these effects are absent when a parent or 
other close family member falls ill.
For all subgroup analyses, the results stratified by gender can be found in the 
Appendix. Tables A3.7 and A3.8 show that all effects (except for the physical health 
effect) are larger for females and often significantly different by gender.23
Table 3.5: A-B estimates for informal care to various types of care receivers
A-B different caregivers Both genders
SF-12 PCS SF-12 MCS SF-36 vitality
CES-D-10 
depression
Informal care to spouse -0.82 (0.61) -1.05 (0.73) -1.85* (1.04) 0.71** (0.28)
Informal care to parent 0.02 (0.26) -0.50* (0.30) -0.09 (0.46) 0.06 (0.15)
Informal care to other 
person
0.01 (0.28) -0.29 (0.29) -0.56 (0.49) 0.08 (0.13)
Spouse severely ill -0.18 (0.16) -1.04** (0.43) -1.51** (0.65) 0.45** (0.19)
Close family member 
severely ill
0.18 (0.16) -0.22 (0.18) 0.00 (0.29) 0.10 (0.08)
Hansen J-test 0.53 (0.47) 0.95 (0.33) 3.15 (0.08) 2.85 (0.09)
Number of instruments 3 3 3 3
N 13,626 13,626 14,824 14,822
Unique individuals 7,430 7,430 7,892 7,893
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Included controls: Lagged health, age, age2, financial difficulties, 
married, children at home, employed, financial difficulties, standardized household income, wave dummies. 
*p<0.10, ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.
3.5.4 Robustness analyses
Results for several tests of robustness of our model estimates are presented in the 
Appendix. To test whether the GMM model is able to overcome the dynamic panel 
bias, we first compare the A-B output with OLS and FE estimation results (Tables 
A3.9 and A3.10). As OLS (not controlling for individual fixed effects) and FE (suffering 
23 The caregiving effect of 1-7 hours of care differs by gender for PCS, MCS and CESD at the 0.05, 0.10 
and 0.05 level, for intensive caregiving this difference is present for PCS and vitality at the 0.05 and 
0.10 level. The difference in the parental caregiving effect is significantly different by gender for 
vitality and depression at the 0.01 and 0.10 level. The difference in the spousal caregiving effect by 
gender is significantly different for PCS, MCS and depression at the 0.05, 0.05 and 0.10 level.
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from dynamic panel bias), lead to biases in different directions, the estimates of 
both models represent upper and lower bounds for our autoregressive coefficient 
(Bond, 2002). Our A-B estimate of lagged health is indeed bounded by the OLS and 
FE estimates. The estimated caregiving effect and family effect in both models do 
not differ substantially from the A-B estimates.
Second, in all our models, we rely on self-reported information regarding health 
shocks of family members. This variable could be prone to justification bias: 
caregivers may justify their decision to provide care (and possibly their withdrawal 
from the labor market) by overstating the need of their family member (Bound, 1991). 
To rule this out, we rerun all models using a variable indicating the occurrence of 
a negative health shock of a family member (i.e. parent or spouse) as obtained from 
administrative data. For this test, we use a variable indicating whether a parent or 
spouse has become eligible for formal LTC in the current year because this indicates 
a substantial health decline that causes functional limitations and thus a need for 
both professional and informal help. The estimated coefficients for the family effect 
do not differ much between both indicators, except for the coefficient for the MCS 
which becomes insignificant and positive (Table A3.11). We use severe illness instead 
of LTC eligibility in the main analyses, as this variable covers a broader set of health 
problems.
Furthermore, our model might overestimate the caregiving effect when our indicator 
of the family effect does not capture all family health shocks. To test this, we include a 
selection of variables regarding the health of spouses and parents from administrative 
data. These administrative data include annual outpatient prescription drug use at 
the ATC 3 level, eligibility for publicly funded formal home care and nursing home 
care, and various types of health insurance spending such as GP care, hospital care 
and nursing care. As these data contain a very large number of potential indicators 
that would reduce any omitted variable bias, we use LASSO regression to select 
the most relevant variables (Belloni et al., 2012). The caregiving effect on mental 
health persists after adding these additional health variables, which suggests that the 
effect in the main analysis is robust to more extensive control for the family effect 
(Table A3.12). As including multiple measures of family health shocks means that 
the family effect is no longer easy to interpret, we rely on the health shock indicator 
in our main models.
Finally, we test the robustness of our results using a different methodology. Instead of 
the A-B method, we use a bias-correction estimation method to correct for the dynamic 
panel bias. For this test we make use of the Stata command xtlsdvc (Bruno, 2005). The 
estimated caregiving and family effect closely match our initial results (Table A3.13). 
We prefer to rely on difference-GMM methods in our main models as it is better suited 
towards models where the number of observations is large (Bruno, 2005).
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3.6 Discussion and conclusion
Illness and frailty may have health consequences for individuals who care for and 
care about spouses and parents in bad health, i.e. the caregiving effect and the family 
effect. Most of the literature to date did not distinguish between these two. Using 
a Dutch panel survey of respondents aged 45-65, we find evidence for both effects, 
particularly on mental health. Our estimates of the caregiving effect on mental 
health are smaller than those of previous studies such as De Zwart et al. (2017) and 
Schmitz & Westphal (2015). For example Schmitz & Westphal (2015) reported an 
impact of caregiving on mental health of -2 on the MCS for female caregivers, in 
contrast to -0.8 in this study.
Our findings contribute to the literature on informal caregiving in a number of ways. 
First, they highlight the importance of estimating the family effect separately: the 
onset of an illness of a family member has spillover effects to both caregiving and 
non-caregiving family members that can add to the burden of providing informal 
care. Thus, considering the family effect is important, even though in this study 
controlling for the family effect does not have implications for the estimated 
caregiving effect itself. Additionally, ignoring the family effect and using health of 
a family member as an instrument for informal caregiving is problematic because 
the direct negative effect of the health of a family member on the caregiver’s health 
means that the exclusion restriction of the instrument is likely to be violated.
Second, we conducted interesting subgroup analyses. These indicate that female 
caregivers experience larger caregiving effects on mental health than male caregivers. 
Explanations could be that females are more often the primary caregiver and more 
likely to experience social pressure to become a caregiver (Pinquart & Sörensen, 
2003a). The caregiving effect is also especially large for spousal caregivers. This 
finding may derive from a different intensity of caregiving; descriptive statistics 
show that spousal caregivers often provide more hours of informal care than other 
types of caregivers.
The findings of significant negative caregiving effects and family effects on mental 
health indicate that policymakers who seek to mitigate the negative spillovers 
from illness of an elderly person should focus on relieving the burden of caregiving 
activities but should not neglect the other family members. Furthermore, the findings 
show that the impact of caregiving is not the same for all subgroups of caregivers. 
Especially female and spousal caregivers experience large negative mental health 
effects of caregiving. Policymakers could specifically aim to support these groups 
of caregivers with targeted interventions.
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Table A3.2: Sample size and sample selection criteria
Inclusion criteria Overall sample
(% of total)
Total respondents at T1 (2010) 15,118
Agreement to be linked to administrative data 13,672 (90.4)
Identified in administrative data 13,398 (88.6)
Did not submit survey twice in same wave 13,218 (87.4)
Having at least one parent alive and/or having a spouse (married or reg. 
partnership) at T1
10,855 (71.8)
Fully completed ≥3 surveys 7,928 (52.6)
Total number of respondents included T1 7,928
Table A3.3: Number of informal caregivers, specified by care recipient
Males Females
2010 2011 2012 2013 2010 2011 2012 2013
Total informal caregivers (includes 
other care recipients)
653 699 697 867 1,156 1,202 1,267 1,168
Started providing informal care 277 320 322 310 337 304
Stopped providing informal care 231 228 168 263 270 253
Average number of hours of informal 
care per week
8.24 8.19 8.48 8.13 9.01 8.47 8.53 7.97
Providing informal care to close 
family member (parent)
238a 292a 394 433 625a 686a 804 732
Providing informal care to spouse 94a 112 a 140 174 114 a 128 a 134 131
a: Imputed based on care recipient in 2012-2013.
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Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Health outcomes
SF-12 physical score 50.35 8.39 50.35 8.52 47.28 11.59 47.67 10.81
SF-12 mental score 53.15 7.69 51.72 9.26 *** 51.70 9.15 50.88 9.59 **
SF-36 vitality scale 68.24 17.87 66.38 19.58 *** 62.79 20.73 61.96 19.74
CES-D-10 depression scale 4.61 4.49 5.17 5.15 *** 5.80 5.31 6.09 5.38
Health family
Severe illness spouse/family 0.14 0.34 0.25 0.43 *** 0.14 0.35 0.29 0.45 ***
Severe illness spouse 0.02 0.15 0.08 0.27 *** 0.02 0.15 0.06 0.23 ***
Severe illness close family 0.11 0.32 0.18 0.38 *** 0,12 0,32 0,25 0,43 ***
Personal characteristics
Age 54.05 5.49 54.54 5.07 *** 53.18 5.54 53.50 5.24
Age Squared 2951.4 594.2 2999.9 551.3 *** 2858.9 595.1 2890.2 565.9
Married/registered 
partnership
0.89 0.31 0.88 0.33 *** 0.82 0.38 0.79 0.41 ***
Children living at home 0.49 0.50 0.46 0.50 *** 0.44 0.50 0.42 0.49
Employed 0.93 0.26 0.91 0.29 *** 0.81 0.39 0.81 0.39
Perc. group household 
income
69.08 21.83 69.16 22.57 66.58 24.14 67.00 23.84
Financial difficulties 0.17 0.38 0.20 0.40 *** 0.22 0.41 0.20 0.40
Father alive 0.53 0.50 0.62 0.49 0.53 0.50 0.69 0.46 ***




2.02 1.14 *** 2.42 1.22 ***
Number of observations 
in T1
3,006 1,394 1,648 1,880
Note: SF-12 PCS and MCS and SF-36 Vitality range from 0-100 (lowest - highest level of health). CES-D-10 ranges 
from 0-30, a score ≥10 is considered a sign of depression. *p<0.10, ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 indicate differences 
between never and ever IC sample.
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3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
N 7,588 7,588 8,228 8,222 6,038 6,038 6,596 6,600
Unique indiv. 4,127 4,127 4,377 4,375 3,303 3,303 3,515 3,518
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Included controls: lagged health, age, age2, financial difficulties, 
married, children at home, employed, standardized household income, mother alive, father alive, wave dummies. 
*p<0.10, ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.
Table A3.6: First stage statistics of A-B estimations
1st Stage Both genders
1.Lag ∆ SF-12
PCS
1.Lag ∆ SF-12 
MCS




2.Lag Health indicatora -0.25*** (0.01) -0.46*** (0.01) -0.30*** (0.01) -0.33*** (0.01)
2.Lag Health indicator -0.34*** (0.01) -0.48*** (0.02) -0.47*** (0.01) -0.52*** (0.01)
3.Lag Health indicator 0.13*** (0.01) 0.11*** (0.01) 0.31*** (0.01) 0.32*** (0.02)
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk 
F-statistic
446.29 726.89 755.6 624.7
N 13,626 13,626 14,824 14,822
Note: a. As the instrument matrix is not collapsed, we have separate instruments dependent on whether only 
the 2nd lag, or both the 2nd and 3rd lag of health can be used as instruments. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. These regressions also include: informal care, severe illness of spouse/family member, age, age2, 
financial difficulties, children at home, married, employed, financial difficulties, standardized household income, 
mother alive, father alive, wave dummies. *p<0.10, ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. Depending on the model that is 
estimated, lagged health refers to the lag of the corresponding dependent variable.
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3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
N 7,588 7,588 8,228 8,222 6,038 6,038 6,596 6,600
Unique indiv. 4,127 4,127 4,377 4,375 3,303 3,303 3,515 3,518
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Included controls: lagged health, age, age2, financial difficulties, 
married, children at home, employed, standardized household income, mother alive, father alive, wave dummies. 
*p<0.10, ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.






























































































































3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
N 7,588 7,588 8,228 8,222 6,038 6,038 6,596 6,600
Unique indiv. 4,127 4,127 4,377 4,375 3,303 3,303 3,515 3,518
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Included controls: Lagged health, age, age2, financial difficulties, 
married, children at home, employed, financial difficulties, standardized household income, wave dummies. 
*p<0.10, ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.
Table A3.7: A-B estimates for higher intensity informal caregiver 
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Table A3.9: OLS estimates of main model
OLS Both genders



































































































N 21,539 21,539 22,789 22,787
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions include wave dummies. *p<0.10, ** p<0.05 
*** p<0.01. Depending on the model that is estimated, lagged health refers to the lag of the corresponding 
dependent variable.
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Table A3.10: Fixed effects estimates of main model
Fixed Effects Both genders



































































































N 21,539 21,539 22,789 22,787
Unique individuals 7,906 7,906 7,957 7,958
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions include wave dummies. *p<0.10, ** p<0.05 
*** p<0.01. Depending on the model that is estimated, lagged health refers to the lag of the corresponding 
dependent variable.
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Table A3.11: Robustness check, using LTC eligibility as health shock
A-B Both genders



























Number of instruments 3 3 3 3
N 13,485 13,485 14,657 14,656
Unique individuals 7,376 7,376 7,830 7,831
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Included controls: Lagged health, age, age2, financial difficulties, 
married, children at home, employed, financial difficulties, standardized household income and wave dummies. 
*p<0.10, ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.






































































Spouse – prescription for drugs used in diabetes 2.81**
(1.20)
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Father – health expenses abroad 0.00*
(0.00)
Spouse - prescription for psycho-analeptics -1.51
(0.94)




Mother - prescription for muscle relaxants 0.37
(0.84)










Number of instruments 3 3 3 3
N 12,791 12,791 13,922 13,919
Unique individuals 6,595 6,595 6,990 6,990
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions include wave dummies. *p<0.10, ** p<0.05 
*** p<0.01. Depending on the model that is estimated, lagged health refers to the lag of the corresponding 
dependent variable.
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N 21,539 21,539 22,789 22,787
Unique individuals 7,906 7,906 7,957 7,958
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions include wave dummies. *p<0.10, ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. 
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Abstract
We estimate the longer-term and dynamic effects of providing informal care on 
caregivers’ health in the United Kingdom. Using propensity score matching to 
address the endogeneity of informal care provision, we estimate static and sequential 
matching models exploring health effects at the extensive and intensive margin of 
informal caregiving and their persistence for up to five years. Further, we account for 
the family-effect, whether individuals suffer because they care about someone, when 
estimating the caregiving-effect for a subsample of within-household caregivers. Our 
results suggest substantial negative health effects confined to the mental domain and 
asymmetrically experienced by caregivers providing more than 20 hours of weekly 
care. These effects are independent from the family effect. Further, our dynamic 
sequential matching results indicate that for caregivers providing multiple years of 
care the negative effects persist.
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4.1 Introduction
Ageing populations pose a serious challenge to health care systems in developed 
economies. The United Kingdom (UK) is an exemplary case, by 2050 more than 
a quarter of its population is expected to be 65+ and over 10% is predicted to be 
80+ (OECD, 2019a), drastically increasing the long-term care (LTC) demand (de 
la Maisonneuve & Martins, 2015). One solution to meet this demand is to rely on 
informal care, care provided by friends or relatives. Informal care is often preferred 
by the care-recipient and is from a governmental perspective a low-cost alternative 
to formal care. In addition, there is evidence that (partially) substituting formal 
by (unskilled) informal care does not jeopardize care-recipients’ health. Receiving 
informal care can lower medical expenditures (van Houtven & Norton, 2004, 2008), 
decrease the likelihood of infections and bedsores (Coe et al., 2019) and improve 
recipients’ mental health (Barnay & Juin, 2016). In the UK, informal care already 
plays a crucial role in meeting current care demand with more than 18% of the 
50+ population providing informal care in contrast to the OECD average of 13.5% 
(OECD, 2019a).
Despite these benefits there are concerns regarding the impact of informal care 
on caregivers’ labor market and health outcomes. To make informed decisions on 
adapting current policies to future demands a thorough understanding of such 
effects is crucial. Previous studies either found no or negative effects of informal 
care provision on labor market outcomes (see Lilly et al. (2007) and Bauer and Sousa-
Poza (2015) for reviews) and considerable health effects for the caregiver due to the 
mental and physical strain (see Bom et al., 2019a for a review).
Up to now most literature has focused on the immediate impact of care provision, 
whereas it is also important to understand how these effects develop over time as 
many caregivers provide several years of care. According to the 2011 UK Census men 
and women at age 50 can expect to spend 4.9 and 5.9 years of their remaining life 
providing care (ONS, 2017). It is furthermore important to focus on health outcomes 
as conflicting hypotheses regarding the impact of duration of caregiving on health 
exist.24 There are three opposing hypotheses regarding the association between 
the duration of informal care provision and the impact of care provision (see for 
overviews: Townsend et al. 1989, Haley & Pardo, 1989; Pinquart & Sorensen, 2003b). 
24 A related literature focuses on the longer-term impact of caregiving on labor market outcomes. 
Schmitz & Westphal (2017) studied the German context and found informal care provision to have 
a longer-term impact on labor market outcomes, this effect did not differ dependent on the duration 
of care provision (e.g. individuals that provided 1 year of care compared to multiple years of care 
provision). Rellstab et al. (2020) studied the Dutch context and did not find any impact of care 
provision on labor market outcomes, which they argue might be attributable to the generous formal 
support system in the Netherlands.
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The first hypothesis is called the wear-and-tear hypothesis implying the impact of 
care provision will worsen over time as coping resources decline and care needs 
increase. For example, a prolonged exposure to stress arising from care tasks might 
deplete caregivers’ resources to deal with the care strain. The trait hypothesis, on 
the other hand, suggests that the caregiving burden is constant. Even when health 
of the care-recipient deteriorates, caregivers maintain a constant level of adaptation. 
The care providers namely have pre-existing coping skills and resources which 
remain present during the care task. Lastly, the adaptation hypothesis argues that 
individuals learn to adapt to the situation. Following this theory, the negative impact 
of care provision will decline when care tasks are prolonged as caregivers develop new 
coping strategies or become less affected by the stress involved in their care tasks.
Some studies already investigated how longer-term or high intensity informal 
caregiving is associated with health. In the UK for example, Hirst (2005), Legg et al. 
(2013), Vlachantoni et al. (2016) and Lacey et al. (2019) found a correlation between 
either long-term or high intensity care and negative health outcomes. These studies 
are, however, unable to make causal claims: is poor health caused by the act of 
providing informal care or do individuals in poor health more often provide informal 
care? To study the causal impact of care provision on health one must account for 
endogeneity concerns resulting from the selection of individuals into informal 
caregiving. To our knowledge thus far only Schmitz and Westphal (2015) and De 
Zwart et al. (2017) have studied longer-term health effects of informal caregiving in 
a causal framework. Using German panel data and focusing on female caregivers, 
Schmitz and Westphal (2015) find negative mental health effects persisting for up to 
three years after care provision. De Zwart et al. (2017) used panel data from multiple 
continental European countries to explore the effect of spousal caretaking among 
the elderly population. They report negative effects on mental health and increased 
medical consumption in the first year after care provision. The disappearance 
of health effects over time could mean that caregiving effects do not last or that 
individuals find ways to cope with them, however, it might also result from selective 
attrition as individuals with demanding caregiving tasks are more likely to drop out 
of the panel.
To better understand the longer-term health effects of care provision we explore 
the health effects of providing informal care in the UK context using data from 
the Understanding Society (USoc) longitudinal survey. We estimate both (i) the 
immediate and longer-term health effects of providing informal care for up to 5 years 
after the initial caregiving decision and (ii) the effect of providing additional years of 
care. These effects, and their relation to care intensity and caregiver characteristics, 
help policymakers to gauge the potential consequences of informal care provision 
and to identify those subgroups tin largest need of support.
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Our study extends the literature on the longer-term health effects of providing 
informal care for the caregiver in several ways. First, the detailed individual-level 
information on caregivers and recipients available allows us, unlike most previous 
studies focusing often on female or spousal caregivers, to explore the heterogeneity of 
caregiving effects across different groups of caregivers (e.g. by gender, care-recipient 
and intensity of care). In addition, we can explore whether these caregiving effects 
are partly explained by the family effect. The family effect refers to the mental strain 
associated with caring about a close relative in need of care, which is distinct from 
the caregiving effect that results from providing informal care (Bobinac et al., 2010). 
Second, we estimate the health effects of multiple years of care provision using a 
dynamic matching approach (Lechner, 2009b). The added benefit of this approach is 
that we can investigate the impact of additional years of care provision to determine 
how health effects evolve with continued caregiving. Lastly, to our knowledge we 
provide the first causal estimates for caregiving effects for the UK context. While 
the UK is similar to Germany (studied by Schmitz & Westphal, 2015) with regards to 
the prominent role of informal caregivers in delivering social care services (Comas-
Herrera et al., 2010), the countries differ in their generosity of caregiver allowances 
and formal care alternatives (Curry et al., 2019). Our results thereby provide new 
evidence on the existence of caregiving effects and their magnitude from a different 
institutional context.
We find strong negative effects on mental health that are concentrated among 
high-intensity caregivers and remain persistent for multiple years. Additionally, 
our analyses suggest that these effects are not primarily driven by the deteriorating 
health of a relative or the relationship between caregiver and recipient, and hence are 
independent from the family effect. Lastly, the estimates from our dynamic matching 
procedure indicate that the mental health effect of care provision seems to persist 
over longer care trajectories. Using alternative outcome measures we confirm the 
consistency of our results and their economic relevance.
4.2 Institutional background
Formal LTC in the UK is organized in a mixed-system combining universal and 
means-tested benefits. Health services provided by the National Health Service 
(NHS) are free at the point of delivery and predominantly financed from taxation. 
The health-related components of LTC, which mostly entail nursing services, are 
funded via the NHS when granted by the GP (Comas-Herrera et al., 2010). Other 
types of LTC, such as residential care and help with personal tasks at home, are the 
responsibility of local authorities (Glendinning, 2013). Access to these services is 
dependent on locally determined needs-assessments. This care is offered via a safety-
net structure requiring individuals to deplete their wealth before becoming eligible 
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for publicly funded care (Colombo et al., 2011).25 This system ensures that publicly 
funded LTC services are only provided to those with severe needs and unable to pay 
themselves (Fernández et al., 2009).26 In 2015 the UK spent about 1.5% of its GDP on 
LTC with 23% of these expenditures related to social care (ONS, 2015).
As public LTC services are means-tested, a large part of LTC is provided informally 
with more than 18% of the UK 50+ population providing care (OECD, 2019a). 
Additionally, more than a third of all caregivers do so for more than 20 hours per 
week according to data from the 2011 UK Census (ONS, 2013). In response to this 
large dependence on informal care, various policies to support informal caregivers 
(e.g. by providing information or support groups) are in place. The 2014 Care Act gave 
caregivers the right to receive a needs-assessment and corresponding support services 
(European Commission, 2018). However, reaching caregivers with the designated 
support is difficult. Only six percent of caregivers receive any form of local authority 
support (Yeandle, 2016). Financial support is offered to informal caregivers via a 
“carer’s allowance” (Carers UK, 2016). This allowance, amounting to £66.15 a week 
(approximately $86) in 2020 (UK Government, 2020) is paid to caregivers who meet 
restrictive conditions.27 As the take-up of the allowance and its monetary value is 
low (Colombo et al., 2011) it is not a potent incentive to take up informal care for 
the related monetary gain.
4.3 Methods
The decision to provide informal care is not random. Individuals ‘select into’ informal 
caregiving, thereby creating endogeneity when studying its impact on health. We 
aim to overcome this problem by matching individuals on observable characteristics 
affecting health outcomes and the decision to provide informal care. To do so, we 
follow the intuition regarding the caregiving decision as proposed by Schmitz and 
Westphal (2015) who define three areas affecting the transition into informal care. 
The first are care obligations, as the most important determinant of informal care 
provision is the presence of a family member in need and the presence of alternative 
25 Income and assets (including under certain circumstances housing wealth) are considered. 
Individuals with assets above GBP 23.250 are ineligible for support. Those with assets between 
GBP 14.250 - GBP 23.250 (approximately $18.448 - $30.100) are required to contribute to the costs 
while individuals with assets below GBP 14.250 have their costs completely covered (NHS, 2018a).
26 In case of self-funding expected costs are about £15/hour (approximately $19) for home care (Age 
UK, 2019a) and £600 and £800/week (approximately $777 and $1036) for care homes and nursing 
homes (Age UK, 2019b).
27 Individuals can receive the carer’s allowance when they (i) are aged 16 or over (ii) provide at least 35 
hours of care a week; (iii) earn less than £123 per week (approximately $152); (iv) are not full-time 
students or studying for more than 21 hours a week; (v) normally live in the UK and have been in 
the UK for at least two of the last three years (UK Government, 2020).
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potential caregivers. The second category, willingness to provide care, refers to 
personality traits and socio-economic characteristics, as these affect individuals’ 
inclination towards providing care. Lastly, the ability to provide care refers to 
individuals’ own health status.
Our empirical strategy builds upon the potential outcomes framework by Rubin 
(1974) and addresses the endogeneity of providing informal care using regression 
adjusted propensity score matching (Rubin, 1979). The main assumption underlying 
propensity score matching is the conditional independence assumption (CIA). The 
CIA in our context states that after conditioning on a set of observable variables the 
potential health outcomes for both caregivers and non-caregivers are the same in 
the absence of informal care provision at all considered time periods. This implies 
that differences in health outcomes between caregivers and non-caregivers can be 
attributed to the provision of informal care. Following Lechner (2009), we exploit the 
panel structure of our data to match individuals upon information from the period 
directly preceding informal care provision to make this assumption more credible. 
The advantages of this strategy are that (i) providing care cannot affect the covariates 
and (ii) the previous caregiving status captures most of the unobserved heterogeneity.
4.3.1 Static matching
Our first aim is to estimate the longer-term impact of becoming an informal 
caregiver, abstracting from the question of the number of years someone provides 
care for. This static approach means that we match starting caregivers with non-
caregivers and follow these two groups over time. We identify individuals as treated 
when we observe their transition into caregiving, everyone who does not report any 
care-episode is included in the control group (untreated).28
Propensity scores of providing informal care are estimated using probit models. We 
estimate the propensity of providing care at t0 conditional on the variables affecting 
the transition into care provision at t–1. We use these propensity scores to match 
treated to untreated individuals. To make use of the large amount of information 
available in the dataset we use a kernel matching approach that uses weighted 
28 Future informal caregivers, although an ideal pool of suitable control group members, are not 
included in the control group due to the way our data is structured. To maximize the number of 
observable treated individuals we pool starting caregivers from across waves (more information in the 
data section). To assess the robustness of this decision we also considered a situation where we only 
include caregivers in the treatment group if they started to provide care within the first three years of 
their survey participation. Doing so we include 2,877 individuals in the treatment group and include 
the remaining future informal caregivers in the control group. The results from this specification 
show a highly similar pattern to our baseline estimates, although the confidence intervals for the 
medium and high intensity treatment groups are notably wider (results available upon request).
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averaging on the untreated sample to form the counterfactual group.29 In contrast 
to alternative matching algorithms, this approach includes nearly all untreated 
individuals therefore using more information and lowering variance (Caliendo & 
Kopeining, 2008). This approach is furthermore preferred over for example nearest 
neighbor matching due to the large number of control variables we match upon 
and our treated to control ratio. We assess the common support, whether there is 
sufficient overlap in characteristics between the treated and untreated individuals, 
as the risk of kernel matching lies in the increased chance of including “bad 
matches”, untreated individuals that are highly dissimilar to the treated group, in 
the estimation (Caliendo & Kopeining, 2008). Furthermore, as we do not match on 
actual covariates but on propensity scores, we assess whether balance of covariates 
is achieved after the matching procedure. We do so by using the standardized bias 
(Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1985).
Finally, the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) is estimated by regressing 
health outcomes on the treatment indicator (providing care) and all control 
variables used in the propensity score estimation with individuals in the control 
group weighted by their estimated kernel weights. By regressing on the control 
variables alongside the treatment indicator we aim to correct for remaining residual 
differences in the covariate distributions between the treatment and control group 
(Lechner, 2009b; Rubin 1973). We do not use the covariates from later waves as 
these might be affected by the treatment. The health impact of providing care is 
estimated for the immediate time after first reported care provision and up to five 
years afterwards. Figure 4.1 provides a graphical representation of the static and 
dynamic matching designs.
4.3.2 Dynamic sequential matching
The static matching approach aims to answer the question “If an individual starts to 
provide informal care in period t0 (for an undefined time spell) does it change their health 
outcomes thereafter?”. The treatment group hence contains individuals who stopped 
providing care in t–1 and those who continued caregiving for various years. This 
might bias the treatment effect estimates for periods past t0 as they are partially 
based on individuals that no longer provide care. To explore to what extent the 
longer-term treatment effects are driven by multi-period caregivers we use a dynamic 
matching approach following the work of Lechner & Miquel (2010) and Schmitz & 
Westphal (2017).
29 We use the Stata command psmatch2 (Leuven & Sianesi, 2003) using an Epanechnikov kernel with 
a 0.03 bandwidth. The bandwidth choice is a trade-off between a small variance and an unbiased 
estimate of the true density function (Caliendo & Kopeining, 2008). While not reported in detail 
we have tested varying bandwidths, e.g. higher and lower bandwidth values of 0.01 and 0.06, with 
negligible impact on our results.
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Figure 4.1: Static and dynamic matching designs. (Own illustrations following Schmitz & Westphal 2017)
Static Matching Design Dynamic Matching Design
Note: D refers to the decision to either: (1) provide informal care or (0) not to provide informal care at a certain 
decision node. Y refers to the health outcomes, X refers to the included covariates.
In contrast to the static approach, the dynamic matching explicitly estimates the 
effect of providing a second (third) year of care while considering a potential effect 
of caregiving in t0 (t1) on health and other endogenous covariates that influence 
the decision to care provision in subsequent years, such as labour market status. It 
therefore helps to understand how the health effect of care provision is affected by 
duration of care and whether the static treatment effects over time are representative 
for the population of multi-period caregivers. Further it allows us to answer the 
question whether caregivers adapt to their caregiving responsibilities over time.
The dynamic matching is computationally demanding. It requires the estimation of 
treatment probabilities at all possible decision nodes, thereby leading to 2T possible 
treatment paths where T is the maximum possible treatment duration. Further, it 
requires the availability of all health outcomes and covariates at the time-period prior 
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to (continued) caregiving as the matching is repeated at all decision nodes. We limit 
ourselves to the case of T = 3 (see Figure 4.1). This is motivated by two considerations. 
First, for our sample this time-window seems sufficient as the broad majority of 
caregivers provides a maximum of 3 years of consecutive care.30 Second, in the 
dynamic framework time t is not defined relative to the first individual caregiving 
episode but fixed to allow for all potential treatment pathways to be observed, leading 
to less observable starting caregivers at t0.
To illustrate the approach in more detail we provide an example showing the steps 
undertaken to estimate the marginal effect of providing two years of care instead of 
one. The treatment group in this example comprises everyone that provided informal 
care in both waves (t0 and t1), whereas the control group consist of everyone that 
provided care in the first wave (t0) but not in the second (t1). In the dynamic matching 
design in Figure 4.1 this refers to comparing the group that followed the path 0-1-1 
with the group following the route 0-1-0.
Consider a binary indicator Dt encoding care provision in period t. As in the static 
estimations, we start our analysis by estimating the propensity of providing informal 
care at the first node (D0 = 1) conditional upon not providing care in the period 
before, and pre-treatment health outcomes and other covariates using a probit model. 
The propensity of providing informal care at the first node is: Pr(D0 = 1 | X–1,Y–1).
Therefore the resulting estimate is equivalent to the immediate effect (t0) estimated 
in the static matching framework.
In extension we also estimate the decision taken at the second node (D1 = 1) where 
caregivers decide to (dis-)continue caregiving. We estimate the propensity scores 
of both options conditional upon already being a caregiver and on health and the 
other observables both at the first and the second node. The propensity of providing 
informal care at the second node after providing care in the first period is: Pr(D1 = 
1 | D1 = 1, X–1, Y–1, X0, Y0) . The propensity of discontinuing care provision is: Pr(D1 = 
1 | D0 = 1, X–1, Y–1, X0, Y0)
We use these scores to calculate inverse probability weights (IPW). IPW estimates 
might be sensitive to very high or low weights from individuals with very high or 
low propensity scores (Robins et al., 2000). As mentioned by Lechner (2009b) the 
commonly used solution to this problem is to remove observations with extreme 
30 Among the caregivers approximately 46.8% provide one year of care, 20.6% provide two and 13.0% 
provide three years of care. This leaves 19.6% of the caregivers providing more than three years of 
consecutive care. These numbers are based on caregivers starting in USoc waves 2-4 allowing all 
included respondents, in theory, to be able to have a caregiving spell of five or more years. Naturally, 
caregivers discontinuing their survey participation but continue to provide informal care are not 
observed.
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weights. We do so by dropping all scores for the first decision that are smaller than 
5% or larger than 95% of the estimated propensity score distribution.31 Furthermore, 
for all scores we condition upon common support: in case no untreated counterparts 
with a similar propensity score for our treated respondents are present, these treated 
observations are excluded from the analysis.
Based on the estimated propensity scores we calculate inverse probability weights 
for both the treatment and the control group. These are defined as follows:
1
  for the treatment group
Pr(D0 = 1 | D1 = 1, X–1, Y–1)) * Pr(D1 = 1 | D0 = 1, X–1,Y–1, X0, Y0)
1
  for the control group
Pr(D0 = 1 | D1 = 1, X–1, Y–1)) * Pr(D1 = 0 | D0 = 1, X–1,Y–1, X0, Y0)
We estimate the dynamic average treatment effect on the treated (those who provide 
two years of care) by regressing health on the treatment while controlling for 
remaining differences by adding all covariates from the previous wave and weighting 
the data using the calculated inverse probability weights. We hence estimate, in 
this example, the health effects at t1 of providing care in t0 and t1, compared to only 
providing care at t0.
This sequential matching strategy was proposed by Lechner (2009b) to estimate 
treatment effects in settings with dynamic treatment durations. While it follows 
a similar intuition as the static matching procedure, identification is based on 
an augmented version of the CIA: the weak dynamic conditional independence 
assumption. Consider the case above comparing outcomes of two and one years 
of informal care. The weak conditional independence assumption combines two 
parts. Firstly, the initial conditional independence assumption stating that potential 
outcomes in t0 and t1 are independent of treatment status in t0 once we match upon 
observables at t–1. Secondly, that potential outcomes in t0 and t1 are independent of 
continued treatment in t1 once we condition on control variables and outcomes at 
both t–1 and t0 and treatment status at the initial node t0.
31 To check the robustness of this approach we also estimate our results while (1) dropping scores for 
the first decision that are smaller than 1% or larger than 99% of the estimated propensity score 
distribution and (2) dropping scores for all decision nodes that are smaller than 1% or larger than 
99% of the estimated propensity score distributions. Qualitatively our results are robust to these 
different specifications (results available upon request).
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4.4 Data
We use data from the Understanding Society (USoc) dataset, also known as the UK 
Household Longitudinal Study (UKHLS; University of Essex, 2019); an annually 
conducted representative panel survey of the adult UK population (aged 16+). It 
started in 2009 with approximately 40,000 respondents across 30,000 households 
as the successor of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), which ended in 2008. 
In 2010, members of the last BHPS-wave were invited to join the USoc after which 
an additional 8,000 individuals joined. This paper uses all nine completed waves 
conducted between 2009 and 2019.32
Informal caregivers are identified using the question “Is there anyone living with you 
who is sick, disabled or elderly whom you look after or give special help to (for example a 
sick, disabled or elderly relative/husband/wife/friend etc.)?”. Individuals providing care 
outside their own household are identified based on the question “Do you provide 
regular service or help for any sick, disabled or elderly person not living with you? [Exclude 
help provided in course of employment]”. Apart from being able to identify individuals 
providing care inside and outside their own household the questionnaire also covers 
care intensity (hours per week) and the relationship between the caregiver and care-
recipient.
We explore differences in the impact of caregiving dependent on the reported 
hours of care per week. Based on these reported hours of care we split our sample 
of caregivers in three; low intensity (<10 hours of care per week), medium intensity 
(between 10 – 20 hours) and high intensity caregivers (more than 20 hours). When 
evaluating our results, one however must be aware of a potential downward bias in 
our estimates due to an underrepresentation of caregivers in the upper end of the 
intensity distribution. The share of high intensity caregivers in our sample (12.8%) 
is lower compared to the UK Census of 2011 which indicates that nation-wide about 
37% of the caregivers provide care for more than 20 hours a week (ONS, 2013) or the 
17% reported in the 2014 European Social Survey (ESS, 2014).
4.4.1 Health outcomes
Various studies report the impact of care provision on mental and physical health 
(e.g. Pinquart & Sörensen, 2003b). To identify potential changes in both health 
domains we use the SF-12 health questionnaire in which individuals self-report on 
12 questions related to various aspects of their own health in the past four weeks. 
From the survey we derive the physical (PCS) and mental (MCS) component summary 
32 It follows an overlapping panel structure where waves cover two years but overlap for one and 
individual respondents are surveyed every 12 months. Therefore, nine waves are available for the 
10-year time period.
Chapter 4   |    93
scores which are constructed using different subscales related to physical and mental 
health.33 The two health scales are validated for the UK context and range from 0 to 
100, where a higher score represents better health. By construction MCS and PCS 
scores have a mean of 50 and standard deviation of 10 (Ware et al., 1995).
4.4.2 Time structure
For the static matching procedure, we define a relative time variable depending on 
an individual’s first reported care-episode. Figure 4.2 provides a visualization of 
this time structure. Among caregivers t–1 is defined as the period before the first 
reported caregiving episode. For everyone in the control group t–1 is the individual’s 
first appearance as a survey participant in absence of any care episode during their 
participation. This time structure is chosen to maximize the number of observable 
treated individuals and is the reason that we are able to study almost 7000 caregivers 
in our main sample that we can subdivide into different subgroups. However, because 
of this approach we less precisely identify the estimated treatment effects in the 
later time points.
Figure 4.2: Static Dataset – Time structure example (Own visualization)
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33 The PCS comprises the subscales: Physical functioning, Role-Physical, Bodily Pain and General Health. The MCS 
comprises the subscales: Vitality, Social Functioning, Role-Emotional and Mental Health. 
The analysis sample for the dynamic specification uses an augmented time-structure 
to allow for the modeling of all decision nodes between t–1 and t0 and the comparison 
of various care trajectories. The time variable is normalized to t–1 being the entry 
wave of an individual into the panel for those who provide no care at any time-point 
and caregivers who start providing care within the first four participation waves. To 
33 The PCS comprises the subscales: Physical functioning, Role-Physical, Bodily Pain and General 
Health. The MCS comprises the subscales: Vitality, Social Functioning, Role-Emotional and Mental 
Health.
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increase the number of observable caregivers in the different caregiving trajectories 
we additionally include individuals whose caregiving trajectory starts after at least 
four periods of not providing informal care. For these the fifth participation is 
defined as t–1 .We therefore somewhat emulate the time-structuring in the static 
design by pooling caregivers from different starting waves but allowing these to 
have caregiving spells of up to three years. The important difference is that not 
all care-giving trajectories start at t0 and at all decision nodes the control group 
contains individuals who will transition into a (multi-period) caregiving spell in 
future periods.
4.4.3 Sample selection
We construct two distinct datasets to implement the static and dynamic matching 
procedures. Individuals who identified as caregivers in their first observation period 
are excluded as transition into caregiving is not observed. For the static estimation 
we include all individuals that provide information on their health outcomes (t–1 and 
t0) for at least two time points and provide full information on all covariates used in 
the propensity score estimation at t–1. Individuals here predominantly drop out of the 
sample because they are proxy respondents or fail to provide sufficient information 
on their health outcomes or existing family members.34 Individuals remain in the 
sample during the subsequent time points t1 to t5in case information on the outcome-
variables is available. For the dynamic estimation procedure, data requirements are 
more restrictive as we re-estimate propensity scores at each decision node. For this 
analysis, only individuals with complete information on all control variables for 
three waves (t–1 to t1) and full information on outcome variables for four consecutive 
periods are included in the sample. Table A4.1.1 in the Appendix provides a overview 
of the exclusion criteria applied to all analysis samples.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Matching quality
The descriptive statistics for the static matching sample are depicted in Table 4.1. 
Before the propensity score matching there is strong covariate imbalance between the 
control and treatment groups. The matching corrects this imbalance.35 For a detailed 
overview of the results of the propensity score estimation and the distribution of 
34 Co-habiting family members are observed at every wave but family networks outside of respondents’ 
households are only inquired about every second wave.
35 We calculate the standardized bias for each covariate by taking the difference in means between 
the treatment and control group and dividing it by the standard deviation of the control group 
(Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1985). We follow the rule of thumb suggested by Caliendo & Kopeinig (2008) 
which states that there is sufficient balance when the bias is below 3-5%.
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estimated scores please see Appendix A4.3. Four caregivers are identified as off-
support and therefore dropped from the analysis.
4.5.2 Static matching results – Treatment effects by care intensity
The results of the static matching procedure will be presented graphically. All 
underlying estimates are reported in Appendix Tables A4.1.2, A4.1.3 and A4.1.4. 
While the graphs depict the overall results by caregiving intensity, we will in text 
also discuss the results by gender. In the baseline analysis we estimate the effect of 
any informal care provision irrespective of the reported intensity. Figure 4.3 depicts 
the estimated ATTs on both the (a) mental and (b) physical health scores across time. 
Throughout the paper, point estimates are depicted by the connected dots while 
the corresponding confidence interval is indicated by the correspondingly colored 
lines. In the mental domain we estimate small immediate negative effects of -0.421 
(p<0.01) at t0 and -0.624 (p<0.001) at t1 . These effects persist also in latter periods up 
until t5 while ranging between -0.383 (p<0.05) at t2 and -0.672 (p<0.001) at t4. In the 
physical domain baseline estimates indicate a small positive effect of 0.327 (p<0.001) 
at t0 but no effects thereafter. The separate analyses by gender show that the results 
are predominantly driven by female caregivers. Female caregivers experience small 
and persistent negative mental health effects of -0.556 (p<0.01) at t0 to -0.624 (p<0.05) 
at t5. Male caregivers, do not experience consistent mental or physical health effects 
except for a negative impact on the MCS of -0.558 (p<0.05) at t2.






Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Unmatched Matched
Care Obligations
Mother alive 0.587 0.492 0.697 0.460 0.586 0.492 -23.0 0.1
Age of mother 66.717 9.911 61.140 9.717 66.585 9.627 38.2 0.7
Father alive 0.446 0.497 0.631 0.482 0.441 0.497 -25.5 0.6
Age of father 66.500 8.208 62.529 8.846 66.248 7.569 30.8 1.9
Both parents alive 0.388 0.487 0.596 0.491 0.384 0.486 -28.4 0.5
Living siblings 0.865 0.342 0.885 0.319 0.864 0.343 -4.1 0.2
Living partner 0.703 0.457 0.635 0.481 0.700 0.458 9.6 0.3
Age of partner 51.662 12.387 45.609 11.552 51.517 11.947 34.2 0.6
Willingness to Care
Age 50.666 16.157 41.288 17.146 50.589 16.296 37.4 0.2
Female 0.592 0.491 0.527 0.499 0.591 0.492 8.8 0.1
Tertiary Education 0.354 0.478 0.386 0.487 0.346 0.476 -4.4 1.0







Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Unmatched Matched
Secondary Education 0.431 0.495 0.439 0.496 0.433 0.496 -1.0 -0.2
Primary Education 0.215 0.411 0.175 0.380 0.221 0.415 6.7 -0.9
Employed 0.485 0.500 0.567 0.496 0.471 0.499 -11.0 1.7
Self-Employed 0.078 0.268 0.067 0.250 0.077 0.266 2.8 0.2
Working Full-Time 0.397 0.489 0.502 0.500 0.382 0.486 -14.1 1.8
Unemployed 0.045 0.208 0.051 0.219 0.048 0.215 -1.6 -0.9
Retired 0.261 0.439 0.141 0.348 0.264 0.441 21.0 -0.4
Student 0.034 0.181 0.102 0.303 0.034 0.182 -17.2 -0.2
Homecarer 0.060 0.238 0.049 0.216 0.065 0.247 3.3 -1.2
Disabled 0.037 0.189 0.023 0.150 0.040 0.197 5.7 -1.0
Income (logarithmic) 7.258 0.610 7.231 0.624 7.228 0.634 2.9 2.8
HH Income Fraction 0.549 0.313 0.518 0.327 0.550 0.321 6.3 -0.3
Single 0.154 0.361 0.249 0.433 0.153 0.360 -15.5 0.2
Partnership 0.108 0.311 0.160 0.367 0.110 0.313 -10.0 -0.4
Separated/Divorced 0.099 0.298 0.073 0.260 0.101 0.302 6.3 -0.5
Widowed 0.044 0.205 0.043 0.202 0.045 0.208 0.4 -0.4
Married 0.595 0.491 0.475 0.499 0.590 0.492 16.1 0.5
Children in Household 0.310 0.463 0.395 0.489 0.315 0.465 -11.8 -0.6
Children < 14 in 
Household
0.275 0.447 0.356 0.479 0.278 0.448 -11.6 -0.4
Region: North-East 0.043 0.204 0.037 0.189 0.044 0.206 2,21 -0.2
Region: North-West 0.103 0.304 0.114 0.318 0.102 0.303 -2.4 0.1
Region: Yorkshire 0.069 0.253 0.077 0.267 0.067 0.249 -2.1 0.5
Region: East-Midlands 0.082 0.274 0.077 0.266 0.082 0.274 1.3 0.0
Region: West-Midlands 0.085 0.279 0.074 0.262 0.088 0.283 2.8 -0.6
Region: East England 0.095 0.294 0.092 0.289 0.095 0.293 0.9 0.1
Region: South-East 0.124 0.330 0.136 0.342 0.126 0.332 -2.3 -0.3
Region: South-West 0.100 0.299 0.089 0.284 0.103 0.304 2.5 -0.6
Region: Wales 0.074 0.262 0.067 0.250 0.073 0.260 1.9 0.2
Region: Scotland 0.084 0.278 0.090 0.287 0.082 0.275 -1.5 0.4
Region: Northern Ireland 0.054 0.226 0.046 0.211 0.052 0.222 2.3 0.6
Region: London 0.087 0.281 0.101 0.301 0.087 0.281 -3.3 0.0
Living in Urban Area 0.726 0.446 0.758 0.428 0.728 0.445 -4.9 -0.2
Big-5: Openness 4.577 1.325 4.592 1.272 4.566 1.314 -0.8 0.5
Big 5: Conscientiousness 5.570 1.097 5.444 1.086 5.543 1.110 7.7 1.4







Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Unmatched Matched
Big 5: Extroversion 4.618 1.289 4.588 1.299 4.630 1.345 1.6 -0.6
Big 5: Agreeableness 5.691 1.018 5.573 1.027 5.680 1.003 7.7 0.6
Big 5: Neuroticism 3.532 1.447 3.556 1.432 3.526 1.473 -1.2 0.2
Ability to Care
Self-Assessed Health 2.578 1.054 2.423 1.054 2.607 1.131 9.9 -1.6
SF-12 Mental Score 50.006 9.860 51.109 9.080 49.832 10.436 -7.9 1.0
SF-12 Physical Score 49.435 10.854 51.568 9.970 49.140 11.751 -13.9 1.6
Chronic-Illness/Disability 0.374 0.484 0.287 0.453 0.384 0.486 12.5 -1.2
Functional Limitations 0.552 1.296 0.441 1.221 0.589 1.345 5.9 -1.6
Satisfaction with Health 4.729 1.722 5.091 1.599 4.691 1.764 -14.7 1.3
Satisfaction with Income 4.505 1.689 4.639 1.637 4.455 1.741 -5.5 1.7
Satisfaction with Leisure 4.788 1.676 4.773 1.622 4.779 1.728 0.6 0.3
Satisfaction with Life 5.198 1.472 5.369 1.370 5.165 1.547 -8.1 1.3
GHQ Score 10.250 3.019 10.412 2.729 10.226 2.990 -3.8 0.5
Number of Individuals 6,852  12,970 12,970
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Figure 4.3: Baseline results (any care intensity)
a) Mental Health
Source: USoc Waves 1-9, own calculations. Note: The graph shows the ATT of individuals who start to provide 
any type of informal care compared to matched non-caregivers from the start of care provision up to 5 years 
afterwards.
b) Physical Health
Source: USoc Waves 1-9, own calculations. Note: The graph shows the ATT of individuals who start to provide 
any type of informal care compared to matched non-caregivers from the start of care provision up to 5 years 
afterwards.
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To explore heterogeneities in the estimated treatment effects we subdivide caregivers 
into treatment groups according to the reported weekly hours of care. Figure 4.4 
plots the results by care intensity for mental (a) and physical health (b). Low intensity 
caregiving for less than 10 hours per week is depicted in light grey, medium intensity 
between 10 and 20 hours per week in dark grey, and high intensity caregiving of 
20 hours and more in black. Low intensity care is the most commonly observed 
with 5,069 individuals (74%), followed by 895 high (13%) and 792 (12%) medium 
intensity caregivers.36 By construction, effects in latter periods are less precisely 
estimated as not all caregivers are observed for all years. At t5 only 1,852 low and 
289 medium intensity caregivers (ca. 37%) are observable and only 285 (32%) high-
intensity caregivers.
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The large heterogeneity in the estimated treatment effects underline the importance 
of care intensity. In the mental domain we find small effects for low intensity 
caregivers. Although the coefficient is nearly zero and insignificant at t0 we find 
a negative effect of -0.423 (p<0.01) at t1 and -0.622 (p<0.01) and -0.462 (p<0.05) 
at t4 and t5 with coefficients for the intermediate years being of similar size and 
direction but not significantly different from zero. For medium intensity caregiving 
the coefficients closely mirror those for low intensity care but are insignificant due 
to considerably larger standard errors. Among individuals caring for more than 20 
hours per week we observe strong initial negative effects of -2.591 (p<0.001) at t0 
and -2.221 (p<0.001) at t1. While these effects decrease for subsequent periods, they 
remain largely persistent with -0.984 (p<0.05), -1.374 (p<0.01), and -1.565 (p<0.01) 
at t2 to t4. The coefficient remains negative at t5 with -0.964 but is only significant 
at the 10% level. The previously apparent differences in caregiving effect by gender 
decrease when stratifying the samples by care-intensity. Both male and female high-
intensity caregivers experience negative mental health effects; -2.734 (p<0.001) for 
females and -2.197 (p<0.001) for males at t0.
In the physical domain the pattern across care intensity levels is different. For low 
intensity caregivers we find a small positive immediate effect of 0.314 (p<0.05) at 
t0 while for the other intensity groups the coefficient is similar but insignificant. 
At subsequent periods the estimated effects vary considerably. For low intensity 
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caregivers the estimated coefficients are insignificant while varying around zero. 
For medium intensity care coefficients are larger and consistently negative, ranging 
from -0.476 to -0.773, with a significant effect of -0.760 (p<0.05) at t2, while for high 
intensity caregivers they follow a similar pattern but are larger in size and indicating 
negative effects of -1.040 (p<0.05) and -1.479 (p<0.05) at t2 and t5. Especially the 
coefficients for high intensity care seem to follow a downward trend with differences 
emerging not immediately after care provision started, but in subsequent periods. In 
the Appendix we provide evidence that this pattern seems driven by age-dependent 
physical health trends captured inadequately in the matching (see Figures A4.2.1 
and A4.2.2).37 For the remainder of the discussion of our static matching results 
we will focus on the mental health outcomes. We do so as the observed pattern 
across specifications indicates that health effects disproportionally occur in the 
mental health domain. All corresponding results for physical health outcomes are 
reported in the Appendix. Additionally, in Appendix A4.1 we show that the reported 
heterogeneous health effects of care provision seem indeed driven by differences in 
care-intensity not the relationship between the caregiver and care-recipient.
4.5.3 Static matching results – Family effect
Our results indicate strong negative caregiving effects in the mental health domain 
among high intensity caregivers. However, an alternative explanation could be that 
these effects are not caused by the act of caregiving itself but rather the health state 
and/or well-being of the care-recipient. This confounding effect has been identified 
as the family effect (Bobinac et al., 2010), the impact of individuals caring about the 
care-recipients rather than caring for them. From a policy perspective this distinction 
is highly important as both would require fundamentally different responses from 
policymakers.
To explore to what extent the estimated effects are driven by the caregiving effect 
or the family effect, we attempt to account for the family effect when estimating 
the caregiving effect. To achieve this, we slightly adjust the approach as applied in 
our main analyses. In this specification we run a model in which we estimate the 
caregiving effect while considering the family effect. This is achieved by regressing 
mental health outcomes on the treatment indicator (care provision) and an indicator 
of the family effect (health shock to a family member) and all control variables used 
in the propensity score estimation with individuals in the control group weighted by 
37 As propensity scores are a summary measure estimated using many covariates, these age-related 
trends are not guaranteed to be perfectly captured. For example, a younger individual might receive 
a high propensity score due to his/her physical health being low and/or other strong predictors but 
would be faced with an entirely different physical health trajectory in the short and medium term 
compared to an older individual. As illustrated in the Appendix this age-dependent trend is not 
present for mental health.
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their estimated kernel weights. Additionally, we use health information of partners 
and parents provided at t–1 when estimating the propensity scores.
38
We are only able to run this model for individuals for whom we have information 
regarding the health status of family members. In USoc this information is solely 
available for cohabiting family members. We hence restrict our analysis sample to 
those cohabiting with living parents and/or a partner, with no parents alive outside 
their household. Among these we only include individuals for which there is health 
information for living partners and parents available at time points t–1 and t0. Based 
on the provided information we create a binary variable, representing the family 
effect, that indicates whether a cohabiting family member experienced a health shock 
between these two periods. Health shocks are defined as a drop in MCS or PCS of 
at least 10 points, equivalent to one standard deviation. If family members provide 
health information at t–1 and are not self-reporting in t0 due to illness or old-age as 
reported by a proxy respondent this is also considered a health shock.
The outlined approach allows us to account for the family effect to the best of our 
abilities given the available data. However, this means that we are not estimating 
both effects separately or quantifying their relative magnitude. Instead, the family 
effect is decomposed into an unobservable component related to the latent health 
of family members, captured in the propensity score estimation, and the observable 
health shock. The analysis sample is reduced considerably as we drop propensity 
scores below the 5th and above the 95th percentile to ensure covariate balance. This 
leaves us with 2,878 individuals in the control group and 501 caregivers of which 
165 provide high intensity care.
Figure 4.5 depicts the estimated caregiving effects for high-intensity caregivers while 
accounting for a family member’s health shock. The estimated caregiving effects 
depict a similar pattern as before. The coefficient indicates a strong initial negative 
effect of -3.151 (p<0.001) at t0 and -2.855 (p<0.01) at t1. The coefficient for the family 
health shock indicator is consistently negative but remains insignificant throughout 
all periods.39 Due to the limited sample size we refrain from estimating the results 
by gender.
38 The health information used includes MCS, PCS, self-assessed health, number of functional 
limitations, and the presence of a long-standing illness or disability for cohabiting partners/parents.
39 Ideally, we would also like to explore whether the caregiving effect is reinforced when caring for 
someone experiencing a health shock by using an interaction term. However, as correctly identifying 
the coefficient of the interaction term is highly data demanding it is not feasible given the reduced 
sample size.
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Figure 4.5: Caregiving and family effects (high intensity care)
Source: USoc Waves 1-9, own calculations. Note: For this analysis the sample is restricted to individuals 
cohabiting with living parents and/or a partner, with no parents alive outside their household. The graph 
shows the ATT of individuals who start to provide high intensity informal care (≥20 hours a week) to their 
cohabiting family members compared to matched non-caregivers from the start of care provision up to 
5 years afterwards. Additionally, the family effect is measured as a dummy variable indicating whether a 
cohabiting family member experienced a health shock, a drop in MCS or PCS of at least 10 points, between 
t–1 and t0. Please note that results are not comparable to the main-model as an augmented sample is used.
4.5.4 Dynamic matching results – Treatment effects by care intensity
Next to estimating the impact of at least one year of care provision, we aim to 
investigate the impact of providing additional years of informal care. For this 
dynamic matching approach, we estimate the propensity of (not) providing informal 
care at every decision node and drop scores in case the observation is off support or 
out of range. In Appendix A4.4 we report the propensity scores for the different care-
trajectories as well as an overview of the excluded individuals. Further, we estimate 
the treatment effects using the static matching approach for the same sample used in 
the dynamic matching to provide a comparison between both estimation strategies. 
For the dynamic matching we merged the groups of medium and high intensity 
caregivers due to concerns about statistical power. Further we excluded individuals 
with unstable care trajectories to not wrongfully capture the impact of increasing 
care intensity among continuing caregivers. The results for both mental and physical 
health are depicted in Table 4.2.
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The first column of Table 4.2 depicts the estimated caregiving effect at t0 for the first 
period of informal care. For physical health there are again no negative effects found 
at this or any other time-point. For mental health both dynamic and static matching 
indicate a small and insignificant negative coefficient for any care provided of -0.332. 
When separating the different intensity levels there are no significant differences 
for low intensity caregivers while for medium or high intensity caregivers the static 
matching estimates are strongly negative and significant with -1.370 (p<0.05).
At t1 the static matching, which pools both continuing and discontinuing caregivers 
together, again indicates a continuing negative mental health effect of -1.697 (p<0.01). 
The dynamic matching estimates, which account for the impact of previous-period 
caregiving on covariates and health outcomes, indicate that the health effects among 
continuing caregivers are larger. When focusing on the group of continuing caregivers 
the difference is -1.952 (p<0.01) when using the never caregivers as a control group. 
Explicitly comparing one against two years of medium/high intensity care results in 
an estimated health impact of the second year of care provision that is again larger at 
-2.288 (p<0.05) although less precisely estimated as this matching is conducted using 
the small sample of caregivers at t0. When moving towards a third year of informal 
care provision the static results at t2 indicate a negative mental health effect of -1.049 
(p<0.05). However, when focusing only on the group of continuing caregivers and 
using the dynamic matching, which considers the health outcomes and covariates at 
t1, these significant differences vanish for both the comparison using never caregivers 
and those who provided two years of care. Please note, however, that here again is 
conditioned upon health at t1. This non-negative finding hence does not indicate 
that the health of individuals providing a 3rd year of care is restored to baseline, but 
that the 3rd year does not lead to a significant additional negative impact on health 
conditional on the health effects already experienced in the first two year of care 
provision.
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Any -0.332 -0.651** -0.624 -0.252 -0.268 -0.074 -0.145
(0.208) (0.222) (0.365) (0.461) (0.221) (0.393) (0.651)
Low Intensity -0.036 -0.366 -0.240 0.123 -0.033 -0.284 0.204
(0.224) (0.242) (0.388) (0.490) (0.248) (0.487) (0.734)
Medium/High 
Intensity
-1.370* -1.697** -1,952** -2.288* -1.049* 0.685 1.717















Any 0.052 -0.191 -0.133 0.172 0.037 0.118 0.007
(0.196) (0.214) (0.350) (0.463) (0.221) (0.396) (0.616)
Low Intensity 0.203 -0.118 -0.222 0.106 0.204 0.688 -0.008
(0.218) (0.245) (0.380) (0.519) (0.254) (0.437) (0.656)
Medium/High 
Intensity
-0.470 -0.365 0.466 1.000 -0.562 -0.515 -1.224
















































Note: The static and dynamic results at t=0 slightly differ at the second decimal as either matching or inverse 
probability weighting is used, the depicted results are the static results. The table provides the dynamic ATT, 
the additional effect of providing a second/third year of informal care compared to not providing informal care, 
one year of care only or two years of care. It solely compares the health of treated and matched controls based 
on the information from the directly preceeding wave. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Standard errors are 
in parentheses. Please note that the displayed static results are based on a different sample than the baseline 
static results as a differnty conditioned sample is used See the Appendix for more details. Source: USoc, own 
calculations.
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4.6 Robustness checks
To assess the sensitivity of our estimates to our empirical specification and violations 
of the identifying assumptions we performed multiple robustness checks.40 The 
observed mental health effects could be explained by an ongoing trend that started 
before informal care provision as individuals might anticipate future care-obligations 
based on observed deteriorating health states of family members. For a subset of 
caregivers, we observe their mental and physical health for multiple periods prior to 
providing care. Appendix Figure A4.2.1 plots the mean MCS and PCS for all intensity 
levels for up to four years prior to providing informal care. There is little evidence 
that the observed results are driven by a distinct negative trend in caregivers’ mental 
health starting before the actual onset of care provision. As explained in Appendix 
A4.2, for physical health a downward sloping trend seems to be present.
Another concern might be the occurrence of other external shocks, such as a 
deceased family member, that affects mental health outcomes in the periods after 
caregiving started. Including information on a deceased family member (mother, 
father or partner) does not explain the observed effects (see Appendix Table A4.2.1). 
Additionally, we conducted the simulation-based sensitivity analysis proposed by 
Ichino et al. (2008) to explore the robustness of our results to a violation of the 
CIA. The detailed procedure is outlined in the Appendix and Figure A4.2.4 plots our 
static matching results for mental and physical health effects of high-intensity care 
provision and their upper- and lower-bound ATT estimates based on the simulations. 
The results show that even in case of a severe violation of the CIA the initial health 
effect of intensive informal care provision remains negative and significant.
Further, we explore the existence of a potential downward bias underlying our results 
due to selective attrition. We follow De Zwart et al. (2017) by splitting our sample 
into two groups and re-estimating the initial treatment effects. For the first group we 
observe health states past t1, while for the second group we can only observe health 
immediately after providing informal care due to permanent survey attrition. Figure 
A4.2.5 plots the treatment effects for both groups and indicates that the attrition 
sample experiences more persistent negative effects directly before discontinuing 
their participation, but no physical health effects. These results indicate some 
evidence for a downward bias in our estimated treatment effects for mental health 
in later periods.
40 Appendix A4.2 additionally contains the results of a re-estimation of the treatment effects when 
separately matching by intensity of care and dropping the upper/lower 5% of propensity scores to 
explore the impact of the overall matching quality on our results. The results remain highly similar.
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While the SF-12 scores allow us to measure mental and physical health, the 
interpretation of effect sizes is not straightforward. To do so we use two additional 
outcome measures. We consider a general subjective well-being measure, life-
satisfaction, and a mental health screening questionnaire, the general health 
questionnaire (GHQ). Appendix Figure A4.2.7 and Table A4.2.5 present the 
corresponding results. When considering alternative outcome measures our results 
remain generally the same, indicating an asymmetric effect on subjective well-being 
and mental health especially among high-intensity caregivers. However, the results 
for GHQ scores depict a pronounced dose-response relationship, not observed when 
using MCS as the mental health measure. Further, these results also indicate that 
the decrease in mental health is economically relevant as the number of individuals 
with surpassing screening thresholds increases substantially by 4 to 8% depending 
on the used measure and applied threshold.
A concern for our dynamic matching approach stems from the fact that for the later 
waves we condition on a large set of covariates as all intermediate covariates at each 
node are included. To check whether our propensity score estimates are suffering 
from overfitting we follow Lechner (2008) and condition on a smaller set of covariates 
capturing the most recent information and limited information (socio-economic 
status and health outcomes) from the previous decision nodes. The results from this 
alternative specification which are presented in Table A4.2.6 are similar to our main 
analysis. Additionally, we check whether our results are sensitive to more stringent 
regression adjustment by, next to conditioning on the full set of covariates from 
the previous wave also conditioning on health-related covariates from all preceding 
waves. This does not substantially alter our estimates (Table A4.2.7).
4.7 Discussion & conclusion
Providing informal care can have negative health effects for informal caregivers. 
Based on the current literature there is an insufficient understanding of how 
these effects persist over time, differ by care-intensity and duration, and whether 
observed mental health effects are attributable to caregiving itself or the family 
effect. We answer these questions by estimating the long-term and dynamic effects 
of caregiving on caregivers’ health using a UK panel survey.
While early studies on cross-sectional data commonly report caregivers to have low 
physical health (Carretero et al., 2009), we only find mixed evidence for a causal 
relationship. Our estimates indicate that informal care leads to a small and short-
lived increase in physical health among caregivers providing less than 20 hours of 
weekly care. A potential alternative explanation for this finding could however 
be that self-reported physical health is prone to bias as caregivers might change 
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their opinion about their own health by taking the health of the care-recipient as a 
reference point (Di Novi et al., 2015). For caregivers providing more than 20 hours of 
care the physical health trajectory is downward sloping in the years after becoming 
a caregiver. However, we caution against interpreting these results as evidence for a 
cumulative negative effect of informal care on physical health. As shown in Appendix 
A4.2 this is partially driven by an age-related trend that is not fully captured by 
the matching estimator while in addition the dynamic matching results provide no 
indication that physical health effects increase over time.
For caregivers’ mental health outcomes, we find immediate and persisting negative 
effects of providing care. These effects are heterogeneous and mostly incurred by 
individuals providing more than 20 hours of care per week. The initial negative 
effects on mental health slowly decrease in size throughout the years but remain 
persistent up to four and five years after initial care provision depending on the 
specification. These effects are, potentially due to limited attrition, more persistent 
than estimates from previous studies that only found direct effects (De Zwart et al., 
2017) or effects up to the first three years of care provision (Schmitz & Westphal, 
2015). We however still find evidence for selective attrition among those experiencing 
the strongest initial health losses, suggesting that we might underestimate health 
effects in later periods (see Appendix Figure A4.2.5). Additionally, our estimates may 
be downward biased as high-intensity caregivers are underrepresented in our sample.
For these high intensity caregivers (individuals providing ≥20 hours a week) the 
estimated negative health effects are similar in magnitude compared to earlier results 
by Schmitz & Westphal (2015) who focus on individuals providing at least three 
hours of care on a weekday (≥15 hours). For intensive caregivers the results hence 
seem robust across different countries with different care systems. For low intensity 
caregivers this is however not the case: Schmitz & Westphal already find a strong 
negative effect of -1.9 on the MCS for individuals providing one hour of care per 
weekday, whereas we do not observe health effects for individuals providing less 
than 20 hours of care per week in the UK. There might be several explanations for 
this difference. The intensity levels of care provision are, first, not completely similar 
and the composition of caregivers within these groups might differ. Second, country 
differences in the long-term care system and support options might drive changes 
in the size of the caregiving effect as well as they influence both the selection into 
care as well as the caregiving experience.
Our results also suggest that it is not the family effect, the impact of caring about 
someone, but the caregiving effect, the impact of caring for someone, that is driving 
the observed mental health effects. These results are in line with the findings of 
Bom et al. (2019b), who used administrative data to identify the family effect among 
a sample of Dutch caregivers. However, we had to restrict our analysis sample to 
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a small subset of predominantly spousal caregivers to estimate caregiving effects 
while accounting for family-members’ health. This subsample is restricted but still 
highly insightful as it is especially this subgroup among which we would expect the 
largest potential for family effects driving the observed mental health differences.
Lastly, our dynamic matching results provide insights into the extent to which the 
static results, indicating decreasing mental health effects over time, are representative 
for the population of individuals that provide care for multiple consecutive years. 
There is evidence that the static results do not sufficiently capture that among 
individuals who provide care for more than one year the mental health effects do 
not improve over time. Rather for these multi-year caregivers’ mental health remains 
to be negatively affected. At the same time, we also find no clear evidence that the 
additional years of care past the second year increase the negative mental health 
effect if intensity remains stable over time. However, as we excluded individuals 
whose caregiving spells coincide with increasing (or decreasing) care intensity the 
results need to be interpreted with this caveat in mind.
Our study also has several limitations. First, one might question the use of self-
reported health measures and prefer, in our case unavailable, administrative 
information like medical claims or admission data. We believe that given the 
population we are studying, informal caregivers, these self-reported health 
measurements better capture changes in health than information regarding health 
care usage. For mental health this is especially the case as often not all individuals 
suffering from mental health problems receive or seek treatment. Additionally, 
administrative information can only capture actual consumption but highly 
burdened caregivers might forego medical care. Foregoing care could be directly 
caused by the intensity of caregiving as well as the potential stigma associated with 
seeking help as a caregiver itself. In addition, our results remain unchanged when 
using alternative outcome measures (see Appendix Figure A4.2.3) and indicate that 
the reported effects are economically relevant from the individuals’ perspective. 
This leaves us confident that the reported mental health effects are of interest 
to policymakers wishing to assess the extent of spillover effects arising from the 
reliance on informal care to meet social care demands.
While our rich dataset allowed us to explore the health effects of informal care 
provision along multiple dimensions not all desired information is available. The 
first one refers to our measure of care intensity: self-reported caregiving hours. 
Increased hours are likely to reflect a larger overall caregiving burden, however, 
the tasks performed by caregivers are highly disease-specific and play an important 
role in the experienced caregiving burden (Pearlin et al., 1990). Therefore, reported 
hours are an incomplete measure inadequately capturing an important source 
of the mental and physical strain associated with caregiving. A related cause for 
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uncertainty is the absence of information on why informal care was taken up and 
discontinued, a process that itself could affect especially mental health outcomes. 
Another concern refers to our focus on informal caregiving irrespective of whether 
this occurs alongside formal care as the USoc does not capture such services 
consistently. Therefore, we cannot explore to what extent these services might serve 
as a complement or substitute to informal care or help to mitigate the negative health 
effects in the medium and long run.41 Ideally future research would have insight into 
the type of caregiving tasks, formal care use and information on reasons for care 
take up and discontinuation.
Lastly, an important limitation of our study is its reliance on a matching-based 
identification strategy and the underlying assumptions. While we do test the 
robustness of our results to violations of the main identifying assumption ideal 
strategy would rely on exogenous variation in informal caregiving. Earlier studies 
exploring the short-term health effects of informal caregiving often relied on 
parental health shocks or the number of siblings as an instrumental variable. 
However, the exogeneity of parental health shocks is at least questionable (Schmitz 
& Westphal, 2015) while a general concern is whether the estimated local average 
treatment effects can be generalized for the entire treatment population (Angrist & 
Imbens, 1995). Recent studies such as Bakx et al. (2020b) or Fischer & Müller (2020) 
exploited institutional rules and reforms in countries’ LTC-sectors as a source of 
credible exogenous variation in the uptake of formal and informal care use. In our 
case, however, such an identification strategy was not feasible.
To conclude, our results confirm previous studies reporting negative mental health 
effects of informal care provision and show that the effects persist up to four or five 
years after initial care provision. Our estimates suggest that most UK caregivers do 
not experience adverse health outcomes after providing informal care. However, 
especially high-intensity and persisting caregivers show to be most strongly affected 
by informal caregiving. In addition, we document evidence that these effects are 
driven by the uptake of informal care and unlikely to be explained by the direct effect 
of family members’ poor health or experienced health shocks to the care-recipient. 
Given the increasing reliance on informal care, these results provide useful insights 
for policymakers facing difficult trade-offs regarding the allocation of limited 
resources to support caregivers. Our results indicate that especially high-intensity 
and long-term caregivers should be targeted to offset the substantial negative health 
effects. While informal care provides undisputable benefits to public health care 
41 USoc wave 7 did include a detailed survey module on informal and formal care sources for recipients; 
47% report informal care as the only source of care with 44% reporting a mix of formal and informal 
care and 8% formal care only. Hours of informal care received are highly similar irrespective of 
whether it is provided alongside formal care or not. Detailed results are available upon request.
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systems and care-recipients the consequences for those providing the care need to 
be accounted for.
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Appendix chapter 4
A4.1 – Dataset conditioning and detailed results
Table A4.1.1: Dataset conditioning
Description Observations (Individuals)
Merged USoc waves 1-9 (2009-2019) 407,722 (85,908)
Panel A: Static Matching Data Conditioning
Excluding individuals not providing caregiving information 374,903 (79,377)
Excluding respondents with single or non-consecutive initial first two 
observations.
314,124 (57,619)
Conditioning on non proxy respondents and full set of control variables 
at t=-1 and health outcomes in t>=0 at t=-1 and t=0
259,675 (54,796)
Excluding individuals starting as caregivers in their first wave. 228,478 (50,293)
Conditioning on non proxy respondents and full set of control variables 
at t=-1 and health outcomes in t>=0 for all time points (hence excluding 
observations in all time points in case of missing information at t=-1 or 
t=0).
137,313 (22,286)
Excluding individuals without consecutive observations at t=-1 and t=0 123,739 (19,822)
Analysis Dataset: 123,739 (19,822)
Panel B: Static Matching Family Effect Subsample
Static matching analysis sample - baseline specification 19,822
Reduce sample to individuals cohabiting with partner and/or parents. 7,554
Remove individuals without living parents and without partner. 5,626
Remove caregivers providing care outside their own household. 4,321
Remove individuals for which cohabitees health is not observed in t=-1 
and t=0
3,766
Analysis Dataset: 23,672 (3,766)
Panel C: Dynamic Matching Data Conditioning
Excluding individuals not providing caregiving information proxy 
respondents, and individuals without information on health outcomes
303,434 (73,052)
Excluding individuals not participating for at least four consecutive waves. 205,418 (33,000)
Excluding individuals without complete information on control variables. 106,004 (19,762)
Excluding individuals unstable care trajectories 99,540 (19,365)
Excluding individuals to ensure that individuals are not included twice (as 
individuals starting care provision are pooled forward)
77,460 (19,365)
Analysis Dataset: 77,460 (19,365)
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A4.2 – Additional analyses and robustness checks
Physical Health Effects and by Age-related Trends
Figure A4.2.1: Age distribution by caregiving status & health trends
Figure A4.2.3 plots the age-distribution of caregivers and non-caregivers as well 
as the mean mental and physical component scores by age in two-year groups 
and using information of all individuals before any caregiving occurs and for the 
unmatched sample. The figure illustrates why we suspect that the physical health 
effects documented among (high-intensity) caregivers are partially driven by the fact 
that our matching approach inadequately captures ageing-related physical health 
trends across the lifecycle.
We explore this explanation by separately re-estimating our main results by age 
group, splitting the sample into those aged 50+ and those below 50.42 The results 
indicate no physical health effects among older individuals while among younger 
individuals the results pattern persists.
42 We have also tried other splitting points (40, 45, 55, 60) with all results supporting the described 
relationship.
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Propensity score matching by intensity and selective propensity score inclusion
Figure A4.2.1: Static results by intensity and selective propensity score inclusion
a) Mental Health
b) Physical Health
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Pre-treatment trends
Figure A4.2.3: Mean MCS/PCS before informal care onset by intensity
a) Mental Health
b) Physical Health
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Bereavement effects
We use the available information on the living status of close family members 
(parents or partner) to explore whether the observed treatment effects are explained 
by the death of a family member. As the group of informal caregivers is older than 
the overall sample and more likely to have family members in poor health they are 
also more likely to experience a death in the family during the observation period. 
As in our main specification we do not account for such shocks this could lead 
to a wrongful attribution of the differences in (mental) health outcomes between 
treatment and control groups due to providing informal care and not the experienced 
loss of a family member. Indeed, high-intensity informal caregivers are more likely 
to experience the death of a close family member. While within the control group 
around 6.93% of all individuals experience the death of a close family member 
between t0 and t5. This rate is 11.15% among high-intensity caregivers. Table A4.2.1 
reports the static matching results when including a binary indicator for a given 
family member being reported deceased at a given t. In line with expectations such 
an event has no effect on physical health but strong negative effects on mental health. 
However, given that the estimated treatment effects remain largely unaffected 
the difference in health outcomes between caregivers and control group are not 
explained by such time-varying shocks.
Simulated violation of the conditional independence assumption
In this sensitivity analysis we focus on high-intensity caregivers and mental health 
outcomes to test the robustness of our main result. Our estimation strategy relies 
on the conditional independence assumption (CIA) stating that selection into 
treatment is driven only by observable variables. We use a rich set of covariates 
covering multiple dimensions relevant to the selection into informal caregiving and 
mental health in the propensity score estimation, hence we argue that the CIA is 
likely to hold. However, the CIA is untestable and unobserved variables might be 
influencing the selection into informal caregiving and mental health outcomes, 
thereby biasing our estimates. To assess the robustness of our estimates to such a 
violation we follow Ichino et al. (2008) who propose a simulation-based sensitivity 
analysis for matching estimators. We only roughly sketch the underlying procedure 
and intuition behind the procedure. A more elaborate discussion can be found in 
Ichino et al. (2008).
Consider the conditional independence assumption in our context:
Yt
0 ⫫ T | X–1, Y–1 ∀ t
After conditioning on a set of pre-treatment control (X–1) and outcome variables (Y–1) 
the potential outcomes in a given period t in absence of informal care provision (Yt
0) 
across treatment and control groups are the same. Now consider that this assumption 
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is violated due to a confounder U. If we additionally condition on this confounder 
the CIA would be satisfied:
Yt
0 ⫫ T | X–1, Y–1 , U ∀ t
Ichino et al. (2008) outline a sensitivity analysis that simulates a binary U in the 
context of a binary outcome variable. A binary U is attractive as its distribution 
can be expressed by four parameters pij where i indicates the treatment status (0,1) 
and j indicates the outcome status (0,1). For continuous outcomes they propose a 
transformation of the continuous outcome:
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where 𝑖𝑖 indicates the treatment status (0,1) and 𝑗𝑗 indicates the outcom  status (0,1). For continuous 
outcomes they propose a transformation of the continuous outcome: 
?̂?𝑌 = {1, 𝑌𝑌 >  ?̅?𝑌0, 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒  
In our case we set ?̅?𝑌 equal to the sample mean of MCS across high-intensity caregivers and the overall 
control group. The four 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 that determine the distribution of 𝑈𝑈 are defined as: 
𝑝𝑝01 = Pr(𝑈𝑈 = 1 | 𝑇𝑇 = 0, ?̂?𝑌 = 1)  
𝑝𝑝00 = Pr(𝑈𝑈 = 1 | 𝑇𝑇 = 0, ?̂?𝑌 = 0)  
𝑝𝑝11 = Pr(𝑈𝑈 = 1 | 𝑇𝑇 = 1, ?̂?𝑌 = 1)  
𝑝𝑝10 = Pr(𝑈𝑈 = 1 | 𝑇𝑇 = 1, ?̂?𝑌 = 0)  
These 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 describe the distribution of U:  
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑈𝑈 = 1) = 𝑝𝑝11 Pr(?̂?𝑌 = 1|𝑇𝑇 = 1) Pr(𝑇𝑇 = 1) + 𝑝𝑝10 Pr(?̂?𝑌 = 0|𝑇𝑇 = 1) Pr(𝑇𝑇 = 1)
+ 𝑝𝑝01 Pr(?̂?𝑌 = 1|𝑇𝑇 = 0) Pr(𝑇𝑇 = 0) + 𝑝𝑝00 Pr(?̂?𝑌 = 0|𝑇𝑇 = 0) Pr(𝑇𝑇 = 0)  
Ichino et al. (2008) propose to choose the values of 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 in such a way to deliberately control for the 
selection effect 𝑒𝑒 of 𝑈𝑈 on treatment uptake and the outcome effect 𝑑𝑑 of 𝑈𝑈 on the probability to observe 
?̂?𝑌 = 1. These effects are defined as: 
𝑒𝑒 = 𝑝𝑝1. − 𝑝𝑝0. 
where  
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖. = Pr(𝑈𝑈 = 1 | 𝑇𝑇 = 𝑖𝑖) = 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖0 ∗ Pr(?̂?𝑌 = 1|𝑇𝑇 = 𝑖𝑖) + 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖1 ∗ Pr(?̂?𝑌 = 1|𝑇𝑇 = 𝑖𝑖)  𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤ℎ 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {0,1} 
The outcome effect is defined as  
𝑑𝑑 = 𝑝𝑝01 − 𝑝𝑝00 
The sensitivity analysis is then conducted by choosing a set of 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 that model a confounder with 
specific selection and outcome effects. Given these values for 𝑒𝑒 and 𝑑𝑑 one has to assume a value for 
Pr(𝑈𝑈 = 1) and the relationship between 𝑝𝑝11 and 𝑝𝑝01 in order to be able to solve the equations for 
Pr (𝑈𝑈), 𝑑𝑑, and 𝑒𝑒 for all 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. We follow the example given by Ichino et al. (2008) by assuming Pr(𝑈𝑈 =
1) = 0.5 and 𝑝𝑝11 − 𝑝𝑝01 = 0 to solve for all of 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 given the empirically observed Pr(?̂?𝑌 = 𝑖𝑖|𝑇𝑇 = 𝑖𝑖) 
and Pr(𝑇𝑇 = 𝑖𝑖). 
As an example consider an unobserved confounder with negative selection (𝑒𝑒 < 0) and positive 
outcome effect (𝑑𝑑 > 0). This might be the unobserved availability of resources to purchase formal 
care services by the recipient itself. As informal care is largely done by family-members the 
In our case we set Ȳ equ l to the sample mean of MCS across high-intensity car givers 
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The sensitivity analysis is then conducted by choosing a set of pij that model a 
confounder with specific selection and outcome effects. Given these values for s 
and  d one has to assume a value for Pr(U = 1) and the relationship between p11 and 
p01 in order to be able to solve the equations for Pr(U), d, and s for all pij. We follow 
the example given by Ichino et al. (2008) by assuming Pr(U = 1) = 0.5 and p11 – p01 = 0 
to solve for all of pij given the empirically observed Pr(Ȳ = i |T = i) and Pr(T = i).
As an example consider an unobserved confounder with negative selection (s < 0) 
and positive outcome effect (d < 0). This might be the unobserved availability of 
resources to purchase formal care services by the recipient itself. As informal care 
is largely done by family-members the availability of resources is likely to decrease 
the likelihood of (high-intensity) informal care provision while increasing mental 
health in the absence of treatment. By not accounting for such a confounder our 
estimation would therefore underestimate the effect of informal care on mental 
health. By selecting the magnitude and direction of selection and outcome effects 
and the corresponding pij the effect of U is simulated by drawing repeatedly from a 
Bernoulli distribution with the desired distributional properties. Robust estimates of 
both the ATT and the corresponding standard errors are then given by their averages 
across these simulations.
To calibrate the sensitivity analysis, we need a starting point of selection and outcome 
effects to obtain the parameters pij for the distribution of a realistic confounder. 
Ichino et al. (2008) recommend inspecting the selection and outcome effects of 
important covariates in the propensity score estimation in order to find reasonable 
values for the simulation. Table A4.2.2 depicts the estimated effects (d and s) and 
the parameters (pij) for all covariates used in the estimation of propensity scores and 
using the mental component scores as the outcome of interest. These are obtained 
by using a customized version of the user-written command for Stata by Nannicini 
(2007) implementing the sensitivity analysis proposed by Ichino et al. (2008). Please 
note that continuous variables were adapted to comply with the binary nature of U 
by transforming them into categorical variables.
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Table A4.2.2: Estimated selection and outcome effects
Variable p11 p10 p01 p00 p1. p0. s d
Care Obligations
Mother alive 0.48 0.56 0.66 0.75 0.53 0.70 -0.17 -0.09
Mother aged <49 0.06 0.06 0.12 0.15 0.06 0.13 -0.07 -0.03
Mother aged 50-59 0.13 0.15 0.21 0.24 0.14 0.22 -0.08 -0.03
Mother aged 60-69 0.12 0.17 0.20 0.22 0.15 0.21 -0.06 -0.02
Mother aged 70-79 0.08 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.01 0.00
Mother aged 80-89 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.00
Mother aged >90 0.91 0.94 0.87 0.84 0.93 0.86 0.07 0.03
Father alive 0.36 0.48 0.60 0.68 0.43 0.63 -0.20 -0.08
Father aged <49 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.10 0.03 0.09 -0.06 -0.02
Father aged 50-59 0.10 0.13 0.17 0.21 0.12 0.19 -0.07 -0.04
Father aged 60-69 0.11 0.14 0.20 0.22 0.13 0.21 -0.08 -0.02
Father aged 70-79 0.05 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.11 -0.02 0.00
Father aged 80-89 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.01
Father aged >90 0.95 0.96 0.90 0.89 0.96 0.90 0.06 0.01
Both parents alive 0.32 0.41 0.56 0.64 0.38 0.60 -0.22 -0.08
Living siblings 0.84 0.86 0.87 0.90 0.85 0.88 -0.03 -0.03
Living partner 0.73 0.75 0.67 0.59 0.74 0.64 0.10 0.08
Partner aged <29 0.04 0.05 0.10 0.11 0.05 0.10 -0.05 -0.01
Partner aged 30-39 0.11 0.15 0.18 0.19 0.13 0.19 -0.06 -0.01
Partner aged 40-49 0.10 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.15 -0.01 0.00
Partner aged 50-59 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.12 0.08 0.04 0.02
Partner aged 60-69 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.05 0.12 0.08 0.04 0.05
Partner aged 70-79 0.15 0.12 0.04 0.02 0.13 0.03 0.10 0.02
Partner aged 80-89 0.08 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.00
Partner aged >90 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Willingness to Care
Own age <29 0.12 0.12 0.26 0.33 0.12 0.29 -0.17 -0.07
Own age 30-39 0.15 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.19 0.23 -0.04 -0.01
Own age 40-49 0.14 0.18 0.18 0.20 0.16 0.18 -0.02 -0.02
Own age 50-59 0.16 0.16 0.12 0.11 0.16 0.12 0.04 0.01
Own age 60-69 0.18 0.15 0.13 0.07 0.16 0.11 0.05 0.06
Own age 70-79 0.19 0.11 0.07 0.04 0.15 0.06 0.09 0.03
Own age 80-89 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.01
Own age >90 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Female 0.59 0.68 0.50 0.58 0.64 0.53 0.11 -0.08
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Table A4.2.2: Continued.
Variable p11 p10 p01 p00 p1. p0. s d
Education: Primary/Other lower 0.32 0.33 0.18 0.17 0.33 0.18 0.15 0.01
Education: Secondary 0.41 0.40 0.43 0.45 0.41 0.45 -0.04 -0.02
Educaiton: Tertiary 0.27 0.26 0.39 0.38 0.27 0.39 -0.12 0.01
Self employed 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.07 -0.02 0.01
Unemployed 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.02 -0.02
Employed 0.35 0.35 0.58 0.55 0.35 0.57 -0.22 0.03
Working full-time 0.28 0.24 0.51 0.49 0.25 0.50 -0.25 0.02
Retired 0.36 0.27 0.17 0.10 0.31 0.14 0.17 0.07
In education/other 0.04 0.02 0.09 0.12 0.03 0.10 -0.07 -0.03
Homecarer 0.09 0.15 0.04 0.06 0.13 0.05 0.08 -0.02
Disabled 0.03 0.10 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.05 -0.04
Income Quintile 1 (Lowest) 0.24 0.27 0.18 0.23 0.25 0.20 0.05 -0.05
Income Quintile 2 0.26 0.25 0.19 0.20 0.25 0.20 0.05 -0.01
Income Quintile 3 0.21 0.23 0.21 0.19 0.22 0.20 0.02 0.02
Income Quintile 4 0.16 0.16 0.21 0.20 0.16 0.20 -0.04 0.01
Income Quintile 5 (Highest) 0.14 0.10 0.22 0.19 0.12 0.21 -0.09 0.03
HH Income Fraciton > 0.5 0.51 0.50 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.49 0.01 0.02
Married 0.62 0.62 0.51 0.42 0.62 0.48 0.14 0.09
Single 0.14 0.12 0.22 0.29 0.13 0.25 -0.12 -0.07
Separated/Divorced 0.09 0.10 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.03 -0.01
Widowed 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 -0.01 0.00
Partnership 0.11 0.13 0.16 0.17 0.12 0.16 -0.04 -0.01
Children in HH 0.30 0.40 0.38 0.42 0.36 0.39 -0.03 -0.04
Young children in HH 0.28 0.38 0.34 0.38 0.33 0.36 -0.03 -0.04
Region: North-East 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.00
Region: North-West 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.01 -0.01
Region: Yorkshire 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.00
Region: East Midlands 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.00 -0.01
Region: West Midlands 0.05 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.00 -0.01
Region: East England 0.11 0.07 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.09 -0.01 0.01
Region: London 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.08 0.10 -0.02 -0.02
Region: South East 0.09 0.10 0.14 0.13 0.10 0.14 -0.04 0.01
Region: South West 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.09 -0.01 0.01
Region: Wales 0.11 0.10 0.06 0.07 0.11 0.07 0.04 -0.01
Region: Scotland 0.10 0.07 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.09 -0.01 0.02
Region: Northern Ireland 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.00
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Table A4.2.2: Continued.
Variable p11 p10 p01 p00 p1. p0. s d
Living in urban area 0.72 0.78 0.74 0.78 0.75 0.76 -0.01 -0.04
Big 5: Openness 0.55 0.48 0.55 0.53 0.51 0.55 -0.04 0.02
Big 5: Conscientiousness 0.62 0.49 0.57 0.45 0.55 0.52 0.03 0.12
Big 5: Extraversion 0.56 0.48 0.56 0.49 0.52 0.54 -0.02 0.07
Big 5: Agreeableness 0.67 0.62 0.60 0.55 0.64 0.58 0.06 0.05
Big 5: Neuroticism 0.36 0.64 0.38 0.68 0.52 0.50 0.02 -0.30
Ability to Care
Self-Assessed Health 0.46 0.67 0.37 0.52 0.59 0.43 0.16 -0.15
MCS 0.72 0.33 0.78 0.41 0.49 0.63 -0.14 0.37
PCS 0.52 0.43 0.72 0.66 0.46 0.69 -0.23 0.06
LSI 0.35 0.48 0.25 0.34 0.43 0.29 0.14 -0.09
Number of Functional Limitations 0.23 0.36 0.14 0.23 0.30 0.18 0.12 -0.09
Satisfaction with Health 0.52 0.30 0.65 0.44 0.39 0.57 -0.18 0.21
Satisfaction with Income 0.59 0.38 0.67 0.49 0.47 0.60 -0.13 0.18
Satisfaction with Leisure 0.70 0.49 0.69 0.50 0.58 0.62 -0.04 0.19
Life Satisfaction 0.69 0.38 0.73 0.46 0.51 0.63 -0.12 0.27
GHQ Score 0.80 0.50 0.83 0.52 0.62 0.72 -0.10 0.31
The largest outcome and selection effects in absolute terms are estimated for the 
set of pre-treatment health and well-being outcomes which is also precisely why we 
condition on pre-treatment outcomes. The second largest absolute selection and 
outcome effects are estimated for working full-time (s = –0.25) and scoring above 
four on the neuroticism seven-point scale (d = –0.30). For the sensitivity analysis we 
select two pairs of  and  to obtain upper and lower bounds for our ATT estimates. 
These are s ∈ {–0.25, 0.25} and d = 0.30 .43
Figure A4.2.4 plots our static matching results for mental health effects of high-
intensity care provision and their upper- and lower-bound ATT estimates based on 
the simulations.
43 The selection effects for physical health are analogous. The outcome effects differ in an expected 
manner with the largest effects occurring among own health outcomes and age-related covariates, 
representing the fact that physical health is more age-dependent than mental health. For both the 
maximum outcome and selection effects depict a similar range, hence we use the same simulated 
effects for both outcomes.
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Figure A4.2.4: Simulated violation of the CIA
a) Mental Health
b) Physical Health
The results show that even when simulating a hypothetical confounder that 
combines the largest selection and outcome effects observed among the rich pool 
of observed variables already used in our matching procedure the immediate 
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treatment effects would not vanish completely. These results provide additional 
confidence that the estimated negative mental health effects are not simply a chance 
finding or attributable to a conceivable violation of the CIA. It is crucial to note that 
this sensitivity analysis has an important drawback as it does operate under the 
assumption that the modelled effects are time-invariant. However, given that there 
are other concerns about the treatment effects in the longer-term, such as selective 
attrition driven by caregiving burden, we argue that to test our main finding this 
simulation is still insightful.
Selective attrition
Figure A4.2.5: Initial treatment effect (high intensity) by attrition
a) Mental Health
b) Physical Health
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Robustness checks dynamic sample















Any -0.332 -0.651** -0.627 -0.212 -0.268 -0.125 -0.590
(0.208) (0.222) (0.353) (0.449) (0.221) (0.373) (0.593)
Low Intensity -0.036 -0.366 -0.261 0.160 -0.033 -0.303 0.263
(0.224) (0.242) (0.372) (0.487) (0.248) (0.460) (0.686)
Medium/High 
Intensity
-1.370* -1.697** -1.893** -2,533* -1.049* 0.530 3.267















Any 0.052 -0.191 -0.146 0.159 0.037 -0.059 -0.055
(0.196) (0.214) (0.332) (0.437) (0.221) (0.368) (0.579)
Low Intensity 0.203 -0.118 -0.259 0.037 0.204 0.243 -0.179
(0.218) (0.245) (0.369) (0.497) (0.254) (0.424) (0.671)
Medium/High 
Intensity
-0.470 -0.365 0.642 1.672 -0.562 -0.588 -0.269















































Source: USoc, own calculations. *p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001, standard errors in parentheses.
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Any -0.332 -0.651** -0.624 -0.184 -0.268 0.040 -0.387
(0.208) (0.222) (0.367) (0.466) (0.221) (0.410) (0.684)
Low Intensity -0.036 -0.366 -0.270 0.146 -0.033 -0.169 -0.196































Any 0.052 -0.191 -0.111 0.262 0.037 0.131 -0.018
(0.196) (0.214) (0.350) (0.461) (0.221) (0.391) (0.628)
Low Intensity 0.203 -0.118 -0.163 0.200 0.204 0.526 -0.274
































































Source: USoc, own calculations. *p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001, standard errors in parentheses.
Alternative outcomes measures
We explore the existence and magnitude of treatment effects on mental health using 
two alternatives but closely related outcome measures to assess the robustness of 
our results and their economic relevance. Firstly, we explore the effect of providing 
informal care on individual’s life satisfaction. Life satisfaction is measured in the 
UKHLS by asking individuals about their overall level of satisfaction with their 
life in general and offering a discrete seven-point scale ranging from “completely 
dissatisfied” (1) to “completely satisfied” (7).44 The second alternative outcome measure 
44 For simplicity, we treat life satisfaction as a continuous variable in order to be able to conduct the 
analysis without having to switch from our regular matching adjusted regression framework to an 
ordered response model.
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is the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ). The GHQ is a screening device to 
identify individuals at high risk of developing a non-psychotic minor psychiatric 
disorder such as anxiety or depression in general population surveys or outside of 
clinical environments (Goldberg et al., 1997). Respondents’ answers to the 12 items 
are transformed to a single score on a 0 (best) to 12 (worst) scale. To ease the visual 
interpretation of results in line with the other outcomes measures we have inverted 
the scale to range from 12 (best) to 0 (worst) so that negative coefficients indicate 
negative mental health effects. Figure A4.2.6 plots mean life satisfaction and inversed 
GHQ scores prior and after informal care onset. Importantly, the mental health 
focused GHQ scores do not depict strong negative trends prior to informal care 
provision for high-intensity caregivers, however with the start of caregiving scores 
among this group fall drastically.
Figure A4.2.6: Mean life satisfaction and inversed GHQ scores
a) Life Satisfaction
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b) Inversed GHQ Scores
Figure A4.2.7 panel a) depicts the estimated treatment effects across the care-
intensity levels. The overall structure of results across time and care intensity is 
generally in line with the overall results based on the SF-12 MCS. Figure A4.2.7 panel 
b) depicts the caregiving effects across intensity levels on reported GHQ scores. 
Interestingly our results using the GHQ as an outcome measure indicate a clearer 
dose-response relationship between informal care intensity in hours per week and 
mental health effects than our results using the MCS to measure mental health. For 
low intensity caregiving the coefficient for t0 is zero but all subsequent coefficients 
are negative with those for t2 and t4 being significant with -0.170 (p<0.001) and -0.184 
(p<0.01). The mental health effects increase with higher intensity. Among medium 
intensity caregivers the estimated initial effects are -0.301 (p<0.01) and -0.441 
(p<0.001) at t0 and t1 while remaining similar in size and negative for later periods. 
The strongest and most persistent effects are found for high intensity caregivers 
with strong initial negative health effects of -0.663 (p<0.001) and -0.643 (p<0.001) 
at t0 and t1 that decrease to -0.355 (p<0.01) by t2 but remain negative and persistent. 
This previously non-existent dose-response relationship might be explained by the 
fact that the GHQ is a more precise mental health measure as its 12 questions are 
solely focused on the mental and not he physical domain.
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Figure A4.2.7: Treatment effects by intensity – Life satisfaction and GHQ
a) Life Satisfaction
b) Inversed GHQ Score
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To assess the practical implications of these results we convert the GHQ scores into 
a ‘caseness’ dummy. Following this definition, individuals scoring a 4 and above are 
identified as being a “case”, meaning that these individuals experience high mental 
strain and are at risk of developing a mental disease. This definition does not indicate 
the definitive presence of a minor psychiatric disease, however, individuals scoring 
a 4 and above on the GHQ survey in a primary care environment should be referred 
to a mental health specialist for further investigation due to concern for their long-
term mental health (Jackson, 2007).
Across non-caregivers 16.31% of individuals cross this threshold at the pre-treatment 
period while the share is identical among low-intensity caregivers. Among medium-
intensity caregivers the share is already considerably higher before care-provision 
(21.97%) and even more so for the high-intensity group (26.15%). In the period of 
first informal care provision these shares increase with caregiving intensity; for 
low intensity caregivers to 17.10%, for medium intensity to 23.99% and to 30.50% for 
high intensity caregivers. Table A4.2.5 depicts the dynamic results for the alternative 
outcome measures.















Any -0.016 -0.037 -0.04 0.01 0.015 -0.05 -0.10
(0.037) (0.037) (0.06) (0.08) (0.037) (0.07) (0.12)
Low Intensity 0.012 0.037 0.107 0.136 0.033 -0.033 -0.130
(0.041) (0.040) (0.056) (0.080) (0.042) (0.073) (0.123)
Medium/High 
Intensity
-0.127 -0.275*** -0.411** -0.377* -0.037 -0.044 -0.242















Any -0.091 -0.167* -0.12 -0.00 -0.118 -0.11 -0.17
(0.069) (0.069) (0.12) (0.15) (0.076) (0.12) (0.24)
Low Intensity 0.031 -0.061 -0.064 0.016 -0.053 -0.124 0.180
(0.073) (0.075) (0.128) (0.163) (0.084) (0.149) (0.253)
Medium/High 
Intensity
-0.487** -0.557*** -0.421* -0.369 -0.293 -0.058 -0.860
































































Source: USoc, own calculations. *p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001, standard errors in parentheses.
A4.3 – Static matching
Table A4.3.1: Propensity score estimation results
Coefficient Standard Error
Care Obligations
Mother alive 0.551*** (0.047)
Age of mother 0.010*** (0.002)
Father alive 0.450*** (0.058)
Age of father 0.010*** (0.002)
Both parents alive -0.734*** (0.062)
Living siblings -0.110*** (0.031)
Living partner 0.297*** (0.059)




Education: Tertiary (Ref: Secondary) -0.160*** (0.023)
Education: Primary/Other lower -0.192*** (0.029)
Job Status: Self-Employed (Ref: Employed) 0.086* (0.038)
Job Status: Unemployed 0.069 (0.054)
Job Status: Retired 0.077 (0.045)
Job Status: Homecarer 0.168** (0.050)
Job Status: Disabled 0.131 (0.073)
Job Status: Student/Other -0.174** (0.058)
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Table A4.3.1: Continued
Coefficient Standard Error
Working Full-Time -0.183*** (0.031)
Income (logarithmic) 0.111*** (0.020)
HH Income Fraction 0.071 (0.042)
Marital Status: Partnership (Ref: Married/Widowed) 0.028 (0.033)
Marital Status: Single 0.321*** (0.069)
Marital Status: Sperated/Divorced 0.234*** (0.062)
Children in Household -0.015 (0.054)
Children < 14 in Household 0.042 (0.055)
Region: North-East (Ref: London) 0.181** (0.059)
Region: North-West 0.014 (0.044)
Region: Yorkshire 0.027 (0.049)
Region: East-Midlands 0.145** (0.048)
Region: West-Midlands 0.153** (0.047)
Region: East England 0.061 (0.046)
Region: South-East -0.010 (0.042)
Region: South-West 0.112* (0.046)
Region: Wales 0.164** (0.048)
Region: Scotland 0.046 (0.047)
Region: Northern Ireland 0.279*** (0.055)
Living in Urban Area 0.037 (0.023)
Big-5: Openness 0.011 (0.008)
Big 5: Conscientiousness 0.026** (0.010)
Big 5: Extroversion 0.026** (0.008)
Big 5: Agreeableness 0.029** (0.010)
Big 5: Neuroticism -0.004 (0.008)
Ability to Care
Self-Assessed Health -0.083*** (0.014)
SF-12 Mental Score -0.019*** (0.002)
SF-12 Physical Score -0.013*** (0.002)
Chronic-Illness/Disability 0.057* (0.026)
Number of Functional Limitations -0.128*** (0.012)
Satisfaction with Health -0.063*** (0.008)
Satisfaction with Income -0.024** (0.008)
Satisfaction with Leisure Time -0.005 (0.008)
Satisfaction with Life 0.003 (0.010)
GHQ Score 0.023*** (0.005)






Prob > Chi^2 0.000
Pseudo R^2 0.1204
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001, standard errors in parentheses. Source: USoc, own calculations.
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Figure A4.3.1: Propensity score distribution and bias reduction – Static matching
a) Propensity Score Distribution
b) Standardized Bias Reduction after Matching
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A4.4 – Dynamic sequential matching
Figure A4.4.1: Estimated propensity scores
a) Propensity to start IC (Pr (D0=1|X-1, Y-1)) b) Propensity of IC after IC in year 1 (Pr(D1=1 | 
D0=1, X-1, Y-1, X0, Y0)
c) Propensity of no IC after no IC in year 1 
(Pr(D1=0 | D0=0, X-1, Y-1, X0, Y0)
d) Propensity of no IC after IC in year 1 (Pr(D1=0 | 
D0=1, X-1, Y-1, X0, Y0)
e) Propensity of IC after 2 years of IC (Pr(D2=1 | 
D1=1, D0=1, X-1, Y-1, X0, Y0, X1, Y1)
f) Propensity of no IC after 2 years of no IC 
(Pr(D2=0 | D1=0, D0=0, X-1, Y-1, X0, Y0, X1, Y1)
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g) Propensity of no IC after 2 years of IC (Pr(D2=0 
| D1=1, D0=1, X-1, Y-1, X0, Y0, X1, Y1)
h) Propensity of no IC after IC in t=0 and no IC in 
t=1 (Pr(D2=0 | D1=0, D0=1, X-1, Y-1, X0, Y0, X1, Y1)
Table A4.4.1: Overview excluded propensity scores
Informal Care Trajectory Off support
Initial informal care (Pr (D0=1|X-1, Y-1)) 0
2nd year of care provision (Pr(D1=1 | D0=1, X-1, Y-1, X0, Y0) 5
2nd years of no care provision (Pr(D1=0 | D0=0, X-1, Y-1, X0, Y0) 27
Informal care at t0 but not t1 (Pr(D1=0 | D0=1, X-1, Y-1, X0, Y0) 27
3rd year of care provision (Pr(D2=1 | D1=1, D0=1, X-1, Y-1, X0, Y0, X1, Y1) 25
3rd year of no care provision (Pr(D2=0 | D1=0, D0=0, X-1, Y-1, X0, Y0, X1, Y1) 310
Informal care at t0 and t1 but not t2 (Pr(D2=0 | D1=1, D0=1, X-1, Y-1, X0, Y0, X1, Y1) 107
Informal care at t0 but not t1 and t2 (Pr(D2=0 | D1=0, D0=1, X-1, Y-1, X0, Y0, X1, Y1) 18
Note: Additionally, 1774 propensity scores at the first node are excluded as a results of being out of range (<5% 
or >95%).
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CHAPTER 5
Is the grass greener on the other side? The health 
impact of providing informal care in the UK and the 
Netherlands
With Jannis Stöckel
Published in: Bom, J., & Stöckel, J. (2021). Is the grass greener on the other side? The 
health impact of providing informal care in the UK and the Netherlands. Social Science 
& Medicine, 269, 113562.
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Abstract
Facing rapidly ageing populations, many Western countries aim to stimulate 
informal care provision as a way to meet the growing long-term care (LTC) demand. 
While various studies report the impact of providing informal care on the health 
of caregivers, it is less clear whether and to what extent this impact differs across 
countries. Using propensity score matching we match caregivers to similar non-
caregiving individuals using four waves of the Dutch Study on Transitions in 
Employment, Ability and Motivation and the UK Household Longitudinal Study. The 
samples consist of 8,129 Dutch and 7,186 UK respondents, among which respectively 
1,711 and 1,713 individuals are identified as caregivers.
We explore whether the health impact of providing informal care differs by country 
once similar caregivers, in terms of the intensity of provided care, are compared. In 
both countries we find negative mental health effects of providing informal care. 
While these effects slightly differ by country, the main differences arise between 
subgroups of caregivers. Individuals that provide more than 20 hours of informal 
care per week, and those who face a double burden of care and full-time employment 
experience the most severe negative mental health effects. These results indicate 
that health effects of providing informal care are mediated by the specific caregiving 
context, allowing policymakers to use information on this context to provide 
targeted aid. In addition, it suggests that previously reported differences of caregiving 
effects across countries could be driven by differences in the population of informal 
caregivers which are shaped by countries’ LTC policies.
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5.1 Introduction
Facing rapidly ageing populations, many Western countries search for ways to meet 
the growing long-term care (LTC) demand. Informal care, care provided by friends 
and family members, is one of the ways in which this demand can be (partially) 
met while limiting direct monetary costs. Reliance on informal care, however, is 
not without disadvantages. Next to its potential impact on caregivers’ labor market 
participation, various studies indicate that the provision of informal care negatively 
affects informal caregivers’ health (see Bom et al., 2019a for a review). These health 
effects are not the same for all caregivers. Individual and contextual elements like 
age, the intensity of care provided and other responsibilities like formal employment 
may affect the care burden (e.g. Pearlin et al. 1990, Pinquart & Sorensen, 2011). At 
the same time, country-level factors like welfare state generosity and cultural norms 
might also influence the impact of caregiving as they shape the societal environment 
in which informal care is provided (Brandt, 2013).
The country specific context can affect the health impact of providing informal 
care in various ways. First, country specific elements could influence the type and 
intensity of provided care (Brandt, 2013). The specialization theory hypothesizes 
that in countries with a generous welfare state, division of labor between formal 
and informal caregivers is higher (Motel-Klingebiel et al., 2005; Igel et al., 2009). 
While formal LTC professionals provide intensive, highly skilled care services, 
informal caregivers can dedicate themselves to lower intensity care activities. In 
less generous welfare states, on the contrary, family members are required to provide 
highly intensive care themselves. Accordingly, this implies that the generosity of 
LTC schemes directly shapes the population of informal caregivers, both regarding 
the care intensity as well as who provides care in the light of other obligations, such 
as childcare or paid work. There is evidence for the LTC system generosity directly 
influencing the population characteristics of informal caregivers (Bakx et al., 2015a). 
Differences in the composition of the caregiver population could lead to differences 
in the average and aggregate health impact of relying on informal caregivers as highly 
intensive and specialized care tasks are often more stressful for caregivers (Pearlin 
et al., 1990).
A second way in which the country context might affect the relationship between 
informal care and caregivers’ health points towards social norms and expectations 
about the family’s role in meeting care demand. In countries where caregiving is 
considered a duty of family-members, informal caregivers might feel more pressured 
to provide care (Verbakel, 2014). This role-captivity, the feeling of being obliged to 
provide care, might influence the impact of care tasks on well-being (Pearlin et al., 
1990). Additionally, the availability of formal care could influence one’s experience 
of informal care. Knowing that formal care would be available if needed might affect 
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the perceived control and hence the ability to deal with the situation (Wagner & 
Brandt, 2018). Furthermore, countries could differ in the depth and efforts to identify 
and help caregivers in need of support, which might affect the experience of care 
provision as well (Kaschowitz & Brandt, 2017).
Some studies investigated the relation between informal caregiving and health from 
a cross-country perspective using cross-sectional data. Dujardin et al. (2011) for 
example compared the health differences between informal caregivers and non-
caregivers in the UK and Belgium using census data and found that high intensity 
British caregivers have better health than their Belgian counterparts.
More recently, various studies used the European SHARE panel dataset to estimate 
the cross-country health effect of informal caregiving with differing conclusions. 
Brenna & Di Novi (2016) estimated the effect of informal care to mothers on 
caregiving daughters’ health using propensity score matching methods to address 
endogeneity concerns. Their results indicate a North-South-gradient in the mental 
health effects of caregiving with negative effects only occurring within the context 
of Southern-European countries where LTC schemes provide little public support. 
Uccheddu et al. (2019) studied transitions into and out of spousal caregiving in 
Europe using fixed-effects models and again found that health effects are strongest 
in Southern and Eastern European countries. Kaschowitz & Brandt (2017) use 
the same dataset in combination with comparable panel data from the UK to 
estimate a set of fixed-effects models. Contrary to the results mentioned above, 
they find that caregiving negatively affects mental health across most European 
countries, irrespective of the specific policy context. Instead, the caregiving context, 
whether care is provided inside or outside the household, and the likely associated 
differences in care intensity seem to be the main determinant of the size of the 
observed differences. However, as informal care intensity is not captured in the 
SHARE data Kaschowitz & Brandt (2017) cannot test this hypothesis. Lastly, Van 
den Broek & Grundy (2018) studied the difference between caregiving effects in 
Sweden and Denmark by using a difference-in-differences approach to explore the 
impact reduced formal LTC availability in Denmark. Using the respective SHARE 
country samples, their results indicate that the reduced LTC availability led to lower 
quality of life among Danish caregivers. Hence, they conclude that LTC coverage 
directly shapes the impact of caregiving on caregivers’ mental health, however again 
unavailable information on care intensity obstructs a more in-depth analysis that 
would allow policymakers to identify those groups of caregivers most vulnerable to 
insufficient LTC coverage.
A limitation of the current studies is hence that they incorporate little information 
on the caregiving intensity. As a result, they cannot determine whether the observed 
average differences in health effects are driven by differences in the caregiving 
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population (e.g. a higher share of high-intensity caregivers) or whether other country 
differences (like support options and social norms) play a role as well. The current 
study combines two independent panel datasets from the Netherlands and the 
UK which contain detailed information on the caregiving context. This allows us 
to explore whether caregiving effects differ by country once compared at similar 
intensity levels. Additionally, similarity and size of both datasets facilitates a two-
country comparison, instead of grouping several countries with different long-term 
care systems together. Lastly, we focus on starting informal caregivers. This allows 
us to measure the causal impact of becoming an informal caregiver on individuals’ 
health without the potential bias that results from jointly analyzing longer-term 
and starting caregivers. We therefore contribute to the ongoing debate on the 
cross-country differences in caregiving effects by disentangling these effects at the 
intensive and extensive margin, an important distinction for LTC policymakers.
5.2 Background
To study the difference in caregiving effects between the Netherlands and the UK it 
is important to understand the differences in their LTC systems. Table 5.1 provides 
an overview of their LTC systems. Both countries are relatively similar in terms of 
the share of (dependent) elderly within the population, with slightly more elderly in 
the Netherlands. However, they differ strongly in terms of LTC expenditures.
5.2.1 Generosity of LTC systems
The difference in public LTC-spending reflects the generosity of their LTC systems. 
The Netherlands has a universal and comprehensive LTC system, irrespective of age 
or income, everyone requiring care is entitled to the benefits of this scheme (Mot, 
2010). The system is largely publicly funded, copayments contribute only a small 
fraction (Maarse & Jeurissen, 2016). These copayments depend on type and duration 
of care, age, household composition, income, and (as of 2013) wealth. The payments 
are capped and cannot exceed the household income (Bakx et al., 2020a).
In the UK LTC is organized in a mixed-system combining universal and means-tested 
benefits. Health services and health related LTC components, such as nursing care, 
are provided for free by the National Health Service (NHS) (Colombo et al., 2011). 
Home care, day care and nursing home care are the responsibility of local authorities 
(Glendinning, 2013). This care is offered via a safety-net structure requiring users 
to deplete their wealth before obtaining publicly funded care (Colombo et al., 2011). 
Individual income and assets determine whether a service is (partly) covered (NHS, 
2018b). Currently only individuals with assets below GBP 14,250 (approximately 
€16,886) will receive full-coverage (NHS, 2018a).
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5.2.2 Role of informal carers in the system and available support
In both countries informal care is common: about 17-18% of the 50+ population 
identified him/herself as an informal caregiver (OECD, 2019a). However, the average 
time spent caring strongly differs. According to the European Social Survey of 2014, 
17% of the UK caregivers provides more than 20 hours of care per week compared 
to 8% in the Netherlands. This higher number of intensive informal caregivers in 
the UK seems to reflect the country’s strong reliance on informal caregivers, which 
can be a result of only publicly funding non-health related formal LTC in case of 
low income/wealth and primarily directing formal care at people who do not receive 
informal care (Comas-Herrera et al., 2010). Both countries offer a wide range of 
support to informal caregivers and are among the few countries that have a national 
policy that targets this group. Furthermore, both countries offer (under different 
regulations) financial support, respite care, training and counseling for caregivers 
(Courtin et al., 2014).
5.2.3 Hypotheses concerning the impact of informal care
Facing a different context, we formulate the following hypotheses regarding the 
differences in caregiving effects between the Netherlands and the UK: (i) As it 
offers more generous formal LTC compared to the UK, we expect caregivers in 
the Netherlands to ‘specialize’ and provide more low intensity care which might 
have a lower impact on their health. (ii) Additionally, norms and caregiving support 
might affect the relation between informal care provision and health, irrespective 
of the type of care that is provided. Whereas both countries offer a relatively 
comparable level of support for caregivers, norms potentially differ. Responses to 
the Eurobarometer (2007) for example indicate that UK citizens more often consider 
elderly care the responsibility of the family. More recent studies, although not 
using identical questions, also indicate different norms between the UK and the 
Netherlands. In 2016, 9% of the UK population stated that care to older individuals 
should be primarily provided by family and friends (British Social Attitudes Survey, 
2016), while only 4% of Dutch respondents indicated that care for a dependent parent 
was predominantly a task for the family (De Klerk et al., 2017). These different 
attitudes might make caregivers in the UK feel more pressured towards providing 
care. Therefore, we expect a larger caregiving burden among UK caregivers compared 
to similar Dutch caregivers.
5.3 Methods
It is not possible to study the impact of informal care provision on health by 
comparing the health of caregivers and non-caregivers as certain individuals, 
for example those with lower health, might be more likely to provide informal 
care. To account for these selection effects, we use propensity score matching. 
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Table 5.1: Key figures regarding the LTC systems in the Netherlands and the UK
Netherlands United Kingdom
Share of population aged 65+1 18.7% 18.1%
Share of 65+ reporting some/
severe limitations in daily 
activities2
47.9% 44.9%
LTC expenditures (health 
and social components) 
governmental and compulsory 
schemes (% GDP)3
3.7% 1.4%
Beds in LTC facilities per 1000 
65+ inhabitants4
74.8 45.6
% informal caregivers among 
50+ population5
16.8% 18.2%
% of caregivers providing at 
least 20 hours of care per week6
8% 17%
Care services available to 
informal caregivers7
Carers and care receivers 
allowance, additional benefits, 
paid leave, unpaid leave, flexible 
work arrangements, training/
education, respite care, 
counseling
Carers and care receivers 
allowance, additional benefits, 
unpaid leave (for couple days 
under emergency situations), 
flexible work arrangements, 
training/education, respite 
care, counseling
Note: Data concerning 2017 from 1. OECD (2020d); 2. OECD (2019a); 3. OECD (2020c) and 4. OECD (2020b). 
5. Data for 2017 from SHARE/ELSA from OECD (2019a), UK in this case refers to England. 6. European Social 
Survey (2014). 7.Data from Colombo et al. (2011) for 2010.
Following Schmitz & Westphal (2015) we construct a score of someone’s propensity 
of providing informal care. This propensity score of informal caregiving is based on 
various elements that might affect the caregiving decision. The variables included 
can be grouped into three categories. The first, care obligations, covers information 
on parents and spouses to capture the presence of individuals in potential need of 
care. We further include whether both parents are alive and whether siblings are 
present to capture alternative informal care sources. The second category contains 
information on respondents themselves such as personal characteristics (age, 
sex), socio-economic status (marital and employment status, household income) 
and household structure. The third category contains information on individuals’ 
health status and the self-reported presence of long-standing illnesses/disability. 
The complete list of variables used can be found in Table 5.2 as well as Appendix 
Table A5.1 and A5.2.
By matching caregivers and non-caregivers based on their propensity of providing 
informal care we assume that the remaining difference in health is due to caregiving. 
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Or phrased differently, in absence of informal care provision the health of caregivers 
and matched non-caregivers would be similar and differences are causally 
attributable to informal caregiving. This assumption of conditional independence 
is the main assumption underlying our estimation strategy. To make it more credible, 
we follow Lechner (2009b) and match upon control variables reported in the year 
before caregiving starts as the previous caregiving status captures most unobserved 
heterogeneity and to ensure that informal caregiving cannot affect the covariates.
The propensity scores are calculated using probit models that estimate the propensity 
of starting informal care provision conditional upon all variables potentially affecting 
the care decision in the preceding wave. We separately estimate these propensity 
scores for the Dutch and UK sample using the same approach and covariates.
After estimating the propensity scores, we match starting caregivers to non-
caregivers using a kernel matching approach. We make use of the Stata command 
psmatch2 (Leuven & Sianesi, 2003) using an Epanechnikov kernel with a bandwidth 
of 0.03. Using alternative specifications with higher and lower bandwidth values (0.01 
and 0.06) led to highly similar results (results available upon request). We regress 
informal care provision on health while adding all covariates from the pre-treatment 
wave. Adding the covariates to the regression next to matching based on the same 
covariates is referred to as double-robust. This corrects for remaining differences 
in covariates distributions between the two groups (Lechner, 2009b; Rubin, 1979). 
With this analysis we estimate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT). 
The ATT represents the mean difference in health between the group of informal 
caregivers (the treated) and the matched non-caregiving individuals.
We assess whether our matching strategy achieved its goal of balancing covariates 
using the standardized bias (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1985). The standardized bias can 
be calculated for each covariate in the model by taking the difference in means 
between the treatment and control group and dividing it by the standard deviation 
of the control group.
5.4 Data
We use two similar datasets providing representative samples of the Dutch and 
UK population. The Study on Transitions in Employment, Ability and Motivation 
(STREAM) panel survey was carried out in the Netherlands. We include the first 
four waves of data annually collected via self-completion online surveys from 2010 
to 2013 among the Dutch population aged 45-64 years. This sample is drawn from 
an existing internet panel (Ybema et al., 2014). For the UK we use the first four 
waves of the United Kingdom Household Longitudinal Survey, commonly known 
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as Understanding Society (USoc; University of Essex, 2019). Data from the USoc 
is collected online or via face-to-face interviews among the 16+ population, data 
collection is annually and started 2009. Ethics approval has been obtained by the 
USoc and STREAM researchers and therefore no further ethical approval was 
required.
5.4.1 Informal care definition
We construct a binary variable indicating whether an individual provides informal 
care. In the Dutch survey informal caregivers are identified in case they positively 
answered to the following question and answer option: ‘Did you in the past 12 months 
spend part of your time on any of the following activities?’ answer option: ‘Giving 
Informal Care’. In the UK sample individuals are identified as caregivers in case they 
affirmatively answered to at least one of the following two questions: ‘Is there anyone 
living with you who is sick, disabled or elderly whom you look after or give special help 
to (for example a sick, disabled or elderly relative/husband/wife/friend etc.)?’ or ‘Do you 
provide regular service or help for any sick, disabled or elderly person not living with you? 
[Exclude help provided in course of employment]’. Both studies furthermore ask for care 
intensity, the average number of hours someone provides informal care per week. 
For both we construct dummy variables indicating low intensity (less than 10 hours 
of care per week), medium intensity (between 10 – 20 hours of care per week) and 
high intensity caregivers (more than 20 hours of care per week).
5.4.2 Health outcomes
To capture the health effect of informal caregiving we use the 12-item Short Form 
Health Surveys (SF-12). This health survey consists of 12 self-reported questions 
related to health in the past four weeks. Based on these questions the Physical 
Component Summary (PCS) and the Mental Component Summary (MCS) can be 
derived, relating to physical and mental health. Both scales are validated and range 
from 0 (lowest health) to 100 (optimal health) and transformed to have a mean of 50 
and a standard deviation of 10 (Ware et al., 1995).
5.4.3 Other covariates
We estimate the individual’s propensity of providing informal care based on a broad 
set of variables that might affect someone’s caregiving decision and health status. 
Variables related to the health and demographics of the respondent are present in both 
datasets and in most cases easily comparable as (a) they use the same instruments 
(e.g. the MCS and PCS) or (b) because the questions are straightforward and highly 
similar in both countries (e.g. age or employment status of respondent). We however 
want to match on a broad set of variables that also contains information about the 
income and family structure of the respondent. This information is available in 
the USoc but not in STREAM. We therefore enrich the Dutch survey dataset with 
information from administrative sources covering information on: personal and 
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household income from the tax authority and information about the family structure 
from the municipal register.
For the variables related to family structure we argue that the differences between 
the self-reported versus administrative data are minimal. Comparing self-reported 
and tax-registered income we however must be careful as self-reported income might 
suffer from reporting bias. However, we use the variables to predict informal care 
provision separately for both countries, hence no direct comparison between both 
values is needed. For our analysis we assume that any reporting bias in the income 
variable is stable throughout the income distribution of the respective country 
sample. An overview of the definition and source of all used variables is available in 
the Supplementary material.
5.4.4 Sample selection
In order to make both datasets comparable we restrict the samples as follows: (i) We 
include respondents aged 45-65 in the first wave; (ii) we use information from the 
first four waves of the surveys ranging from 2009/2010 – 2013/2014. These selection 
criteria are motivated by the fact that the Dutch dataset only covers individuals 
aged 45-65 and we have access to its first four waves spanning 2010 to 2013, hence 
we use a similar subset of the USoc data. Further, (iii) we condition the datasets on 
availability of all control variables in the first wave and all needed outcome variables 
in the first and second wave; (iv) we exclude all individuals that already provided 
informal care in the first wave as we only look at starting caregivers. Eventually the 
samples consist of 8,141 Dutch and 7,187 UK respondents.
5.4.5 Time structure
For both datasets we define a relative time variable (t) whose value depends on an 
individual’s first reported care-episode (see figure 5.1 for a graphical representation). 
Within the control group t–1 is normalized to the individuals first appearance in the 
survey as these respondents do not report any care episode during their participation. 
Among caregivers t–1 is defined as the period before the first reported caregiving 
episode. For example, an individual entering the panel in 2010 and responding to the 
survey for four consecutive waves but only starting to provide informal care in wave 
4 is included for two periods, t–1 (wave 3) to t0 (wave 4). This time structure is chosen 
to maximize the number of informal caregivers that we can observe.
5.5 Results
5.5.1 Descriptives & matching results
Table 5.2 provides an overview of the composition of caregivers in both datasets. 
These samples are constructed to maximize the number of starting caregivers and 
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hence contain all individuals who started care provision in 2011-2013. There are 
slightly more starting caregivers in the UK where about 24% of the sample starts care 
provision compared to 21% of the Dutch sample. The share of female and parental 
caregivers is higher in the UK than in the Netherlands and a larger share of the 
caregivers in the UK provides medium or high intensity care compared to the Dutch 
sample. About half of the caregivers in both countries have a full-time job next to 
their caregiving duties.
Figure 5.1: Visualization of the constructed time structure of the sample (Own visualization)
Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics of both samples
Dutch Sample UK Sample
Starting caregiver (% of sample) 1,711 (21.1%) 1,713 (23.8%)
Female caregivers (% of caregivers) 865 (50.6%) 1,019 (58.5%)
Low Intensity caregivers 1,378 (80.5%) 1,302 (76.0%)
Medium Intensity caregivers 181 (10.6%) 205 (12.0%)
High Intensity caregivers 135 (7.9%) 177 (10.3%)
Spousal caregivers1 203 (12.0%) 214 (12.0%)
Parental caregivers1 688 (40.0%) 954 (56.0%)
Full-time employed (% of sample) 4,634 (57.0%) 3,863 (53.8%)
Full-time employed & caregiver (% of caregivers) 856 (50.0%) 844 (49.3%)
Number of Individuals 8,129 7,186
Note: 1. Dutch values are imputed as information on care recipient for the Dutch data is only available in 
2012-2013. Sources: STREAM Wave 1-4 & USoc Wave 1-4.
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To match caregivers and non-caregivers we estimate propensity scores of providing 
informal care. Table 5.3 provides an overview of the propensity score estimations. 
In both samples especially the variables related to care obligations are strongly 
correlated to someone’s propensity of providing informal care. As parents tend to 
provide care to each other, the presence of both parents is negatively associated with 
informal care. The age of these parents, which acts as a crude proxy for the rate of 
dependency of the individual, increases the informal care propensity. Furthermore, 
females and more highly educated individuals are more likely to provide care whereas 
the presence of young children is negatively related to informal care provision. For 
an overview of the distribution of the propensity scores, please see Figure A5.1.
In both countries informal caregivers differ from non-caregivers. As can be seen in 
Appendix Tables A5.1 and A5.2 there is a strong imbalance between the individuals 
that started to provide care and those who did not do so. This imbalance is depicted 
in Figure 5.2 by plotting the pre-matching (black) and post-matching (grey) 
standardized bias values for each control included. Before the matching there is 
considerable imbalance between the non-caregiver and caregiver samples with many 
variables exceeding the 3-5% standardized bias threshold (grey bar). The matching 
succeeds in correcting this imbalance with the standardized bias between the 
matched control group and the treatment group falling below the thresholds for all 
considered variables. For all analyses we exclude respondents that were identified as 
off support, this equals to 1 in the UK and 12 in the Dutch sample.
Table 5.3: Propensity score estimates
Dutch sample UK sample
Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error
Care Obligations
Mother alive 0.425*** (0.044) 0.451*** (0.047)
Father alive 0.429*** (0.069) 0.428*** (0.071)
Both parents alive -0.259** (0.084) -0.459*** (0.085)
Living partner 0.103* (0.042) 0.063 (0.043)
Living siblings -0.003 (0.051) -0.061 (0.056)
Age of mother 0.023*** (0.005) 0.026*** (0.005)
Age of father 0.022*** (0.006) 0.023*** (0.006)
Age of partner -0.000 (0.004) 0.008* (0.003)
Personal Characteristics and Socio-Economic Status
Age 0.014** (0.005) -0.003 (0.005)
Female 0.309*** (0.043) 0.113** (0.039)
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Table 5.3: Continued.
Dutch sample UK sample
Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error
Secondary Education 
(Ref. Primary education)
0.154*** (0.041) 0.156*** (0.044)
Tertiary Education 0.232*** (0.045) 0.098* (0.048)
Self-employed (Ref. Employed) -0.138 (0.064) 0.036 (0.057)
Unemployed 0.118 (0.104) 0.064 (0.087)
Retired 0.396*** (0.094) -0.016 (0.065)
Homecarer 0.109 (0.153) 0.124 (0.093)
Disabled 0.121 (0.084) -0.167 (0.093)
Studying or other activities -0.273 (0.437) 0.003 (0.260)
Working Full-Time -0.071 (0.047) -0.167** (0.049)
Income quintile 2 (Ref. 
Income quintile 1)
-0.007 (0.050) 0.066 (0.053)
Income quintile 3 -0.038 (0.052) 0.066 (0.055)
Income quintile 4 0.054 (0.054) -0.051 (0.059)
Income quintile 5 0.158** (0.057) 0.072 (0.060)
HH Income Fraction -0.066 (0.084) -0.034 (0.070)
Children<14 in household -0.097 (0.057) -0.146** (0.052)
Health
SF-12 Mental Score -0.001 (0.002) -0.006** (0.002)
SF-12 Physical Score 0.001 0.002 0.000 (0.002)
Longstanding illness 0.107** (0.038) -0.033 (0.040)
Observations 8141 7187
Pseudo R^2 0.06 0.05
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001, standard errors in parentheses. Sources: STREAM Wave 1-4 & USoc 
Wave 1-4.
5.5.2 Main results
Our baseline analysis estimates the impact of any informal care provision on health. 
Throughout the main text we present our results graphically, results tables can be 
found in Appendix A5.3 to A5.5. Figure 5.3 presents the impact of any care provision 
on (a) mental and (b) physical health. The bar presents the ATT, the confidence 
intervals are depicted at 95%. Dutch caregivers experience a direct negative mental 
health effect of -0.70 (p<0.001), whereas the negative impact of care provision in the 
UK is considerably smaller and insignificant. For physical health, on the contrary, 
informal care provision has a positive effect of 0.69 (p<0.01) in the UK whereas no 
significant impact is present among the Dutch caregivers.
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Figure 5.3: Impact of any informal caregiving on mental/physical health
(a) Mental health (b) Physical health
Confidence intervals at 95%, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Sources: STREAM Wave 1-4 & USoc Wave 1-4.
As some studies indicate potential differences in the caregiving effect between males 
and females, we separately estimate the caregiving effect for both genders. When 
stratifying Dutch caregivers by gender we find a negative mental health effect of 
-1.06 (p<0.001) for females and no significant impact on males. In the UK, the mental 
health impact of care provision is larger for females than for males although both 
estimates are insignificant at a 95% level. Turning to physical health, we observe a 
different pattern. In both countries any informal care provision has a positive effect 
on the physical health of female caregivers. For male caregivers no effects are found 
in the physical health domain in either of the two countries.
Figure 5.4: Impact of any informal care on mental/physical health by gender
(a) Mental health (b) Physical health
Confidence intervals at 95%, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Sources: STREAM Wave 1-4 & USoc Wave 1-4.
By comparing the health impact of any care provision between both countries we 
ignore underlying differences in the composition of the caregiver population. This 
158    |     
composition might however differ per country, for example as a result of differences 
in the LTC system. As presented in Table 5.2, there are for example slightly more 
medium and high intensity caregivers in the UK. To compare similar caregivers, we 
construct three groups based on the hours of care provided.
Figure 5.5 presents the treatment effects when separately estimated for low, 
medium and high intensity caregivers. The figure clearly depicts that the impact of 
care provision strongly differs by the amount of care provided. In both countries, 
high intensity caregivers experience the largest mental health effects. This health 
impact of providing more than 20 hours of informal care per week is similar in both 
countries with an impact of -2.11 (p<0.01) on the MCS in the Netherlands compared 
to -2.32 (p<0.01) in the UK. The pattern of the impact of informal care provision by 
care intensity however slightly differs between the two countries. In the Netherlands, 
a clear dose-response relationship is visible; all caregivers experience negative mental 
health effects that grow in response to care intensity. In the UK, low and medium 
intensity care providers are not affected, only high intensity caregivers experience 
a strong decline in their mental health.
The intensity-patterns also differ when focusing on physical health. In the 
Netherlands, no health effects are present when separating the sample by care 
intensity. In the UK, an initial positive physical health effect is present for low 
intensity caregivers and absent for medium intensity caregivers. For individuals 
providing more than 20 hours of care per week the estimates seem to point again to 
a positive effect although the results are insignificant.
Figure 5.5: Impact of informal caregiving on mental/physical health by care intensity
(a) Mental health (b) Physical health
Confidence intervals at 95%, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Sources: STREAM Wave 1-4 & USoc Wave 1-4.
Next to the intensity of care provided, other contextual elements could influence 
the care burden. Individuals might for example experience increased caregiving 
strain when providing informal care in combination to full-time employment. 
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Facing multiple responsibilities might namely lead to cross-pressures, like fatigue or 
dissatisfaction about decreased productivity at work due to caregiving tasks (Pearlin 
et al., 1990). Using German data, Schmitz & Stroka (2013) found that individuals 
experiencing a double burden of care and work were more likely to use antidepressant 
drugs and tranquillizers. Again, country differences in terms of available alternatives 
and norms and support could make this situation more prevalent or straining.
To estimate the impact of care provision for individuals experiencing a double burden 
we compare the health impact of care provision between individuals in full-time 
employment to those not working full-time. We solely focus on individuals with 
stable workforce participation to exclude individuals that overcome the double 
burden of care and work by cutting down on working hours. In our samples this 
relates to excluding 7% (Netherlands) to 10% (UK) of our sample as these individuals 
experience changes in their work participation (from full-time to no work/part-time 
and vice versa). Starting informal caregivers seem slightly more likely to adjust their 
work participation than the control group of non-caregivers. In the UK, 10.7% of the 
starting caregivers change work participation compared to 9.6% in the control group. 
In the Netherlands these numbers equal 7.6% and 6.8%. Additionally, due to sample 
size limitations we solely compare employment status by individuals providing either 
low or medium to high intensity care provision (>10 h of care per week).
Figure 5.6 shows that the experienced mental health effect of providing low 
intensity informal care slightly differs by employment status. In the Netherlands, 
the estimates of the caregiving effect point in the negative direction for all low 
intensity caregivers. The impact is however larger and significant (-0.93, p<0.01) 
among full-time workers. In the UK no mental health effects are present for either of 
the two groups. With regards to physical health effects we observe larger differences 
between full-time working individuals and those who work less hours or not at all. 
In both countries, the latter group experiences a positive physical health effect of 
caregiving of respectively 0.73 (p<0.05) and 1.32 (p<0.001). This effect on physical 
health is absent or even negative among full-time working individuals.
A double burden might especially be present for individuals who next to a full-time 
job provide many hours of informal care. Figure 5.7 shows that in both countries 
indeed the mental health effect of providing more than 10 hours of informal care per 
week is larger for individuals working full-time. Interestingly the mental health effect 
of medium or high-intensity care even becomes insignificant among individuals who 
do not work full-time. For physical health, the initial positive effects disappear when 
focusing on intensive informal care.
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Figure 5.6: Impact of low informal caregiving on mental/physical health by employment
(a) Mental health (b) Physical health
Confidence intervals at 95%, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Sources: STREAM Wave 1-4 & USoc Wave 1-4.
Figure 5.7: Impact of mid/high intensity informal caregiving on mental/physical health by employment
(a) Mental health (b) Physical health
Confidence intervals at 95%, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Sources: STREAM Wave 1-4 & USoc Wave 1-4.
5.6 Robustness checks
To assess the robustness of our results we perform various robustness checks First, 
we assess whether our results are robust to our choices in the matching strategy. 
We check whether our results are driven by extreme propensity scores by excluding 
the highest/lowest 5%. Additionally, we check whether our results differ when re-
estimating the propensity scores for the intensity groups separately. The results are 
highly comparable to those presented in the main specification (detailed results are 
available upon request).
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Second, we test how sensitive our results are with regards to a violation of the 
main identifying assumption of conditional-independence. We follow Ichino et 
al. (2008) who propose a simulation-based sensitivity analysis for propensity-score 
based treatment effects to unobserved variables that should have been included in 
the propensity score estimation. In the given context such an unobserved variable 
might be personality characteristics or norm perceptions that would influence an 
individual’s likelihood to provide care (selection effect s) and their mental health in 
absence of providing care (outcome effect d). Another motivation for such a sensitivity 
analysis is the fact that we only observe caregivers before care provision (t–1) and when 
they report to have started caregiving (t–0). We therefore cannot observe the actual 
moment of caregiving onset while additionally the actual cause for caregiving onset 
might have a direct effect (e.g. a health shock to a family member).
The method simulates a confounder with specific values for s and d in order to assess 
the sensitivity of estimated treatment effects to the inclusion of such unobserved 
confounders. Table 5.4 depicts our estimated treatment effects when simulating a 
confounder that combines the strongest observed selection and outcome effects. As 
the estimated values illustrate, our results are robust to such a simulated confounder. 
Table S5.2 in the Supplementary Material depicts the estimated selection and 
outcome effects for all our covariates.
Table 5.4: Mental Health Effects of High Intensity Caregiving - Sensitivity Analysis
Dutch Sample UK Sample
MCS PCS MCS PCS
Confounder with properties: s=-0.2 d=0.15 -2.716*** -1.109 -2.478*** 0.408
(0.849) (0.743) (0.789) (0.779)
Confounder with properties: s=0.2 d=0.15 -2.875*** -1.103 -2.910*** 0.073
(0.843) (0.728) (0.784) (0.757)
Confounder with properties: s=-0.2 d=0.45 -2.548*** -1.143 -2.149*** 0.646
(0.863) (0.766) (0.824) (0.814)
Confounder with properties: s=0.2 d=0.45 -3.131*** -1.124 -3.519*** -0.418
(0.868) (0.739) (0.789) (0.761)
Control 6418 5473
Treatment 135 177
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001, standard errors in parentheses. Sources: STREAM Wave 1-4 & USoc 
Wave 1-4.
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5.7 Discussion & conclusion
While several studies have reported negative health effects of informal care provision 
on the caregivers’ health, there remains uncertainty with regards to their causal 
nature and the differences of these effects across countries and caregiver subgroups. 
Using a propensity score matching approach and two comparable panel-data sets, we 
estimated the health impact of providing care in the UK and the Netherlands. Doing 
so, we investigated whether observed average health differences between informal 
caregivers and non-caregivers within and across countries are attributable to the 
composition of the caregiver populations in each country.
First, our results highlight the link between the generosity of LTC systems and the 
hours of informal care provision. We hypothesized that the share of high intensity 
caregivers would be higher in the UK than in the Netherlands as the LTC system is 
less generous. In our samples this is indeed the case with slightly more caregivers 
providing more than 10 hours of weekly care in the UK compared to the Netherlands. 
However, it is noteworthy that our samples seem to understate the true differences 
that become apparent when looking at population wide estimates (ONS, 2013; de 
Klerk et al., 2017) or results from the ESS (2014) which indicate that the share of 
intensive caregivers is much higher in the UK.
Second, we show the importance of considering care-intensity when comparing 
average caregiving effects across countries. In both countries especially individuals 
providing more than 20 hours of weekly care experience large negative mental 
health effects. Individuals providing less intensive care do not experience any mental 
health effect (United Kingdom) or a similar negative but considerably smaller one 
(Netherlands). These findings are consistent with the findings of Kaschowitz & 
Brandt (2017) who hypothesized that differences between groups of caregivers (like 
care intensity) determine the average impact of caregiving.
Third, our results uncover interesting patterns regarding the physical health effects 
of caregiving. We observe small positive physical health effects among caregivers 
who provide less than 10 hours of care per week and (for the Dutch sample) do not 
work full-time. While these small positive effects disappear with increasing care 
intensity, they indicate that low intensity caregiving might lead to small increases 
in physical health, possibly due to increased physical activity. However, these results 
should be taken with a pinch of salt. Di Novi et al. (2015) point out that self-reported 
health measures are prone to bias as individuals might change their judgement by 
taking the care-recipients health as a reference point. Although our use of a multi-
item physical health measure that emphasizes the ability to perform certain tasks 
should mitigate this concern, it cannot be ruled out.
Chapter 5   |    163
Lastly, our analyses indicate that especially caregivers who combine caregiving with 
full-time employment experience large negative mental health effects. These results 
are estimated only on those individuals who are in stable full-time employment 
and hence exclude individuals who, potentially as a result of their caregiving tasks, 
changed their employment status. This could for example be the case when someone 
reduced working hours due to caregiving-related health issues. While this might 
introduce a downward bias and raise concerns about the external validity of our 
results, recent evidence suggests that there is no effect of informal caregiving on 
labour force participation in both countries (Heitmüller, 2007; Rellstab et al., 2020). 
In the UK, intensive caregiving might however affect the number of hours worked 
(Heitmüller & Inglis, 2007). As across countries the relationship between informal 
care and labour market outcomes is diverse (for a review see Bauer & Sousa-Poza, 
2015), there is nonetheless a need for further research into the complex relationship 
between health, labour market outcomes and the long-term care system.
The bulk of our results suggests that once the focus is narrowed to specific subgroups 
of caregivers the effects of informal caregiving are similar despite large differences 
across country’s LTC systems. However, some differences between both countries 
still emerge. Dutch low-intensity caregivers experience small negative mental health 
effects whereas this is not the case in the UK. In turn, only UK caregivers experience 
small positive health effects among low-intensity caregivers while in the Netherlands 
this only occurs among unemployed or part-time working individuals. Lastly, there is 
some suggestive evidence that women in the Netherlands experience a larger mental 
health burden. These differences can be driven by variation in support options or 
attitudes towards care provision, but also by differences in the type of care provided 
(e.g. personal care, household help) or the associated social norms. The country-
specific differences in effect size are however considerably smaller compared to 
differences between subgroups of caregivers.
While our study provides important insights, there are several limitations that need 
to be taken into account when interpreting our results. First, we rely on a matching 
based empirical strategy aimed at estimating the causal effect of informal care on 
health. Matching estimators require the conditional independence assumption to 
hold and while we attempt to explore the impact of a potential violation of this 
assumption, an ideal empirical strategy would rely on plausible exogenous variation 
in informal caregiving status. As pointed out by Schmitz & Westphal (2015) many of 
the commonly applied instrumental variables in this literature, such as the presence 
of siblings or health shocks, are not without their own drawbacks. A more credible 
source of variation could be obtained from policy variation as recently done by 
Bakx et al. (2020b). However, given our cross-country perspective such an empirical 
strategy is not feasible.
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A second limitation is that we cannot disentangle the caregiving effect, the impact 
of caring for someone, from the family effect, the impact of caring about someone 
(Bobinac et al., 2010). Possibly the observed mental health effects are driven by 
severe illness of a family member instead of the act of caring itself. Previous studies 
investigating the caregiving and family effect in the Netherlands (Bom et al., 2019b) 
and the UK (Stöckel & Bom, 2020) however found that inclusion of an indicator of the 
family effect does not affect the estimates of the caregiving effect. In addition, the 
absence of strong negative health effects among high-intensity caregivers who are 
not in full-time work seems to contradict that the effects we find are driven by the 
family effect. Importantly though this does not mean that there is no direct mental 
health effect associated with concerns regarding family members’ health. Rather it 
seems likely that such an effect is already captured when conditioning on the mental 
health outcomes in the year prior to providing informal care.
Lastly, while the used datasets allow for similar matching, we still lack some 
important information that ideally should be considered. We rely on self-reported 
hours as our measure of care intensity. While this measure seems sufficient to 
capture the general differences between intensity levels it would be ideal to not 
only observe hours but also the specific tasks that were conducted as they are highly 
disease-specific and differ with regards to their perceived burden (Pearlin, 1990). In 
addition, we cannot observe the consumption of formal care.
Concluding, our results provide insights for both researchers and policymakers. 
First, they indicate that especially differences in caregiver characteristics drive 
the differences in observed health effects of care provision across countries. These 
insights can be used to specifically target support to those caregivers who experience 
the largest burden: those who provide most hours or care and those experiencing 
a double burden of care and full-time employment. Second, while we do not find 
large differences in health effects between both countries when comparing similar 
caregivers, this does not mean that country characteristics do not play a role. In 
countries with more generous LTC systems, and hence more formal care alternatives 
to informal care, less individuals seem to provide highly intensive care. As a result, 
less individuals experience severe health effects of care provision. It is important 
for policymakers to be aware of this relation between the coverage of LTC systems 
and the composition (and hence experienced health effects) of caregivers in order 
to make deliberate trade-offs between the aggregate costs of formal care versus the 
implications of informal care.
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Mother alive 0.56 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.56 0.50 25.40 -0.30
Father alive 0.34 0.47 0.29 0.46 0.34 0.47 10.20 0.50
Both parents alive 0.26 0.44 0.24 0.42 0.25 0.43 4.80 0.70
Living partner 0.67 0.47 0.65 0.48 0.67 0.47 4.80 0.80
Living siblings 0.90 0.31 0.90 0.30 0.90 0.30 -1.50 -0.30
Age of mother 78.32 4.85 77.01 4.37 78.30 4.96 28.30 0.10
Age of father 78.76 3.52 77.97 3.25 78.72 3.50 23.30 0.60
Age of partner 54.4 6.87 53.55 7.22 40.71 24.11 12.00 0.70
Willingness to Care
Age 53.99 5.76 53.82 5.99 53.97 5.77 2.90 0.30
Female 0.60 0.49 0.52 0.50 0.58 0.49 15.80 2.10
Secondary Education 0.40 0.49 0.36 0.48 0.40 0.49 7.20 -0.70
Tertiary Education 0.38 0.48 0.36 0.48 0.37 0.48 2.50 1.40
Primary Education 0.23 0.42 0.28 0.45 0.23 0.42 -10.90 -0.70
Self-Employed 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.20
Unemployed 0.06 0.23 0.05 0.22 0.06 0.23 2.80 -0.40
Retired 0.14 0.35 0.14 0.34 0.14 0.35 2.40 0.90
Homecarer 0.05 0.22 0.03 0.18 0.05 0.21 8.00 0.10
Disabled 0.06 0.23 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.23 -5.00 -0.50
Education_other 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.07 0.70 -1.80
Employed 0.59 0.49 0.61 0.49 0.59 0.49 -3.90 -0.10
Full-time employee 0.49 0.50 0.55 0.50 0.50 0.50 -11.90 -0.80
Income quintile 1 0.23 0.42 0.25 0.43 0.21 0.41 1.80 -0.70
Income quintile 2 0.21 0.41 0.20 0.4 0.20 0.40 1.70 -0.70
Income quintile 3 0.20 0.4 0.19 0.39 0.17 0.37 -5.20 0.40
Income quintile 4 0.17 0.38 0.19 0.39 0.19 0.39 5.70 1.40
Income quintile 5 0.19 0.40 0.17 0.38 0.23 0.42 -3.80 -0.30
HH Income Fraction 0.54 0.31 0.57 0.31 0.54 0.31 -10.00 -0.40
Children < 14 in 
Household
0.14 0.35 0.18 0.38 0.14 0.35 -10.60 -0.80
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Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Unmatched Matched
Ability to Care
SF-12 Mental Score 50.60 9.61 51.13 9.59 50.58 9.87 -5.50 0.00
SF-12 Physical Score 49.48 11.1 49.09 11.57 49.33 11.44 3.40 1.00




Source: USoc Wave 1-4.





Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Unmatched Matched
Care Obligations
Mother alive 0.56 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.56 0.50 25.80 1.40
Father alive 0.32 0.47 0.25 0.43 0.30 0.46 14.50 2.00
Both parents alive 0.24 0.42 0.19 0.39 0.22 0.42 11.00 2.60
Living partner 0.72 0.45 0.70 0.46 0.73 0.44 5.10 -1.70
Living siblings 0.88 0.33 0.84 0.37 0.88 0.33 10.40 0.60
Age of mother 80.52 4.71 79.44 4.57 44.96 4.83 23.40 0.70
Age of father 80.39 37.64 79.74 3.10 24.94 3.12 20.50 0.50
Age of partner 54.47 5.63 54.60 5.56 39.73 5.66 15.00 -0.20
Willingness to Care
Age 54.83 5.31 54.22 5.56 54.83 5.38 11.30 -0.70
Female 0.51 0.50 0.38 0.49 0.51 0.49 25.20 -0.10
Secondary Education 0.38 0.49 0.38 0.48 0.38 0.48 0.90 0.00
Tertiary Education 0.37 0.48 0.32 0.47 0.37 0.44 11.00 0.60
Primary Education 0.25 0.43 0.31 0.46 0.25 0.27 -12.60 -0.70
Self-Employed 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.28 0.08 0.17 -0.80 -0.40
Unemployed 0.03 0.17 0.02 0.16 0.03 0.21 2.90 0.20
Retired 0.05 0.22 0.02 0.16 0.04 0.12 13.30 0.00
Homecarer 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.27 2.80 -0.50
Disabled 0.08 0.27 0.06 0.24 0.08 0.03 6.3 -0.20
Education_other 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.43 -1.50 0.10
Employed 0.75 0.43 0.79 0.41 0.75 0.50 -11.00 0.40
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Full-time employee 0.50 0.50 0.59 0.49 0.49 0.40 -18.50 1.20
Income quintile 1 0.21 0.41 0.24 0.43 0.19 0.40 -6.60 -0.80
Income quintile 2 0.19 0.39 0.22 0.41 0.19 0.40 -0.90 -0.30
Income quintile 3 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.41 0.20 0.40 3.30 0.20
Income quintile 4 0.20 0.40 0.18 0.39 0.20 0.40 12.10 0.60
Income quintile 5 0.20 0.40 0.15 0.36 0.21 0.41 -6.80 0.30
HH Income Fraction 0.76 0.30 0.81 0.27 0.76 0.30 -18.30 1.00
Children < 14 in 
Household
0.10 0.31 0.14 0.35 0.10 0.30 -12.10 0.50
Ability to Care
SF-12 Mental Score 52.19 8.70 52.31 8.56 52.11 8.79 -1.40 0.70
SF-12 Physical Score 48.43 9.99 48.95 9.87 48.36 10.40 -5.20 0.60




Source: STREAM Wave 1-4
Figure A5.1: Propensity score distributions
(a) The Netherlands (b) United Kingdom
Sources: STREAM Wave 1-4 & USoc Wave 1-4.
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Table A5.3: Estimation results by care intensity
Dutch Sample UK Sample
MCS PCS MCS PCS
Any care -0.698*** 0.197 -0.211 0.687**
(0.204) (0.183) (0.219) (0.207)
Low intensity -0.510* 0.186 0.025 0.802***
<10h weekly care (0.222) (0.200) (0.231) (0.224)
Medium intensity -0.930 0.495 0.215 0.147
10-20h weekly care (0.530) (0.475) (0.601) (0.533)
High intensity -2.106** -0.068 -2.322** 0.898






*p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001, standard errors in parentheses. Sources: STREAM Wave 1-4 & USoc 
Wave 1-4.
Table A5.4: Estimation results by gender
Dutch Sample UK Sample
Males Females Males Females
MCS PCS MCS PCS MCS PCS MCS PCS
Any care -0.321 -0.196 -1.059*** 0.658 0.063 0.231 -0.390 0.977***
(0.258) (0.245) (0.312) (0.268) (0.326) (0.307) (0.293) (0.280)
Control 3,953 2,465 2,644 2,829
Treatment 846 865 694 1,019
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001, standard errors in parentheses. Sources: STREAM Wave 1-4 & USoc 
Wave 1-4.
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Table A5.5: Estimation results by care intensity and employment-status
Dutch Sample UK Sample
MCS PCS MCS PCS
Not full-time work & <10h -0.374 0.725* 0.082 1.317***
(0.336) (0.305) (0.360) (0.360)
Full-time work & <10h -0.932** -0.412 -0.156 0.412
(0.312) (0.276) (0.316) (0.299)
Not full-time & >=10h -0.535 -0.040 -0.542 0.778
(0.620) (0.522) (0.604) (0.543)
Full-time & >=10h -2.633*** 0.911 -2.179* 0.426
(0.674) (0.565) (0.882) (0.668)
Control
Not full-time 2,520 2,276
Full-time 3,459 2,670
Treatment
Not full-time & Low IC 638 566
Full-time & Low IC 639 598
Not full-time & High IC 184 240
Full-time & High IC 120 125
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8. Conclusion
Faced with an ageing population and rising health care costs, LTC systems are under 
pressure in many countries. To safeguard the fiscal and financial stability of these 
LTC systems, policymakers are considering a variety of options to reduce public LTC 
expenditures. Two potential solutions are often identified in this regard: stimulating 
informal care provision and ageing-in-place. This thesis focuses on two questions 
related to these presumed solutions by studying the health impact of providing 
informal care and the determinants and impact of a nursing home admission.
8.1 Research findings
Informal care has a negative impact on the health of informal caregivers
A large part of the demand for LTC is met by informal caregivers. This type of care is 
often preferred by both the dependent elderly as well as the informal care providers 
themselves. Additionally, increased reliance on informal caregivers could potentially 
substitute for collectively funded care. While informal caregivers provide care against 
no or low direct payments, this does not mean that informal caregiving does not have 
any costs. Individuals give up some of their time to provide care, which might come 
at the cost of labor force participation. Additionally, the act of providing care can 
be highly burdensome for the caregiver. The provision of informal care could lead 
to both physical health effects, like back aches or fatigue, as well as stress leading to 
mental health problems.
In the first part of this thesis the potential health effects of providing informal care 
are studied. The systematic literature review in chapter 2 indicates that there is a 
substantial body of literature that finds negative health effects of informal care 
provision. These studies show that informal care provision can have an impact on 
both the physical and mental health of care providers, and that these effects differ 
between subgroups of caregivers.
Many of the studies included in the review, however, did not make any attempt 
to disentangle the health impact of caring for someone from the health impact of 
worrying about an ill family member. Being aware of this distinction is important, 
as the prevention of these different causes of negative health effects may require 
different interventions. Chapter 3 and 4 explicitly take the so called family effect 
of worrying about an ill family member into account. In both a Dutch and UK 
sample, we find that controlling for the family effect does not affect the estimated 
health effects of care provision. The act of providing informal care directly affects 
someone’s health.
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The health effects of informal care provision are not the same for everyone. Individual 
and contextual characteristics, like the type of care provided or the circumstances 
under which this care is provided, can lead to a differential impact of informal care. A 
more thorough understanding of these differences can help to shape more adequate 
informal care support. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 all demonstrate that the intensity of the 
informal care provision is critical: the more care that is provided, the larger the 
experienced health effects. In the Netherlands any level of care provision negatively 
impacts health, while particularly large negative health effects are found among those 
individuals providing more than 20 hours of care a week. In the UK, predominantly 
individuals providing more than 20 hours of care a week face large mental health 
effects of care provision. Chapter 4 shows that the larger impact of informal care 
among spousal caregivers, compared to for example individuals providing care to 
their parents, is mainly explained by higher care intensity: spousal caregivers tend to 
provide more hours of care compared to other informal care providers. This higher 
care intensity, not the relationship with the care recipient, explains the larger health 
effects among this group of caregivers. In addition, mental health issues related to 
care provision are more prevalent when there are other responsibilities that compete 
for time. Especially individuals who provide many hours of informal care next to 
full-time employment are heavily affected by their care tasks (chapter 5).
Next to the immediate negative health effects of providing informal care, care 
provision can have longer-term effects. By following individuals after the start of 
care provision this thesis shows that the initial negative effects on mental health 
slowly decrease in size throughout the years, but remain persistent up to four or five 
years (chapter 4).
In contrast to individual differences, country differences that are for example 
related to the LTC system or social norms, do not seem to lead to large differences 
in health effects when similar caregivers are compared. Chapter 5 shows that very 
comparable health effects of care provision are observed for high intensity caregivers 
in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Even in a generous LTC system like 
the Netherlands, individuals can experience negative health effects of intensive 
care provision. However, this does not imply that differences in generosity of the 
LTC system are irrelevant. Country characteristics can drive the demand for (highly 
intensive) informal care. A generous LTC system may limit the number of individuals 
who provide many hours of informal care, thereby limiting the number of caregivers 
who suffer from the health consequences of doing so.
The move to a nursing home is not dictated by disability only
Next to incentivizing informal care, there is the widespread ambition to delay 
nursing home admissions and/or to stimulate substitution of nursing home care with 
home care. Despite this universal trend of stimulating ageing-in-place, nursing home 
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care use still widely differs across countries. To some extent, these differences can be 
explained by country-specific population characteristics. For example, a higher share 
of dependent elderly within a population may lead to higher LTC use. Additionally, 
system and cultural differences like accessibility of LTC and preferences towards 
informal care play a role in determining nursing home use. A better understanding 
of the sources of these differences in LTC use is critical in shaping policies that 
promote an appropriate care mix for dependent elderly.
Chapter 6 investigates what may explain the very different patterns of nursing home 
admissions in the Netherlands, Denmark and the US. In the US, the probability of a 
nursing home admission in the next two years among the 65+ community residing 
population is 6.6%, which is much higher than in the Netherlands (4.2%). In part, 
this can be explained by country-specific population characteristics. There are, for 
example, more dependent elderly among the community dwelling population in the 
US than in the Netherlands. Next to population characteristics, system differences, 
such as the generosity and organization of the system, play a role as well. In the 
US, elderly more often make use of short-term (often post-acute) nursing home 
care, potentially because of limited home care use options and high hospitalization 
rates among elderly. In contrast, long-term nursing home admissions are far more 
prevalent in the Netherlands and Denmark: for dependent elderly or elderly aged 85+, 
the probability of a nursing home admission of more than 100 days is much higher 
in the two European countries.
These findings highlight the importance of distinguishing different types of nursing 
home care: the ‘average’ nursing home admission may be very different across 
countries. Specifically, the separation of short (often post-acute) and longer-term 
nursing home admissions turned out to be critical for understanding the differences 
between US and European nursing home admissions. Furthermore, the findings 
indicate that nursing home admissions are not solely determined by the health 
or disability of elderly. System-related and culture-related country differences in 
nursing home care are equally important.
An important argument for the current ageing-in-place policies hinges on the 
assumption that individuals often fear the ‘last move’ to a nursing home and that 
this means that they are indeed better off at home. Chapter 7 compares the well-
being of different groups of nursing home entrants in the months before and after 
moving to a nursing home. We do not find any association between nursing home 
admissions and self-reported well-being scores. Moving to a nursing home hence 
does not seem as detrimental to someone’s well-being as is often conjectured, at 
least for the majority of the population that ends up moving to a nursing home 
at some point in their life. In contrast to commonly heard stories, in our sample 
health and well-being issues are nearly equally prevalent shortly before and after 
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moving to a nursing home. This seems to suggest that not nursing home admissions 
themselves are associated with lower perceived well-being, but rather that nursing 
homes admissions cater for individuals who already face falling levels of well-being.
8.2 Implications for policy
LTC policy decisions should better take into account the implications for informal care 
provision
The findings from this thesis provide some important lessons for policy. First of all, it 
is important to understand that long-term care entails much more than only formal 
care that is provided by professionals. A large part of the care for elderly is provided 
outside of formal care contracts, by friends and family members of the individual in 
need of help. In most EU-countries the estimated costs of informal care even exceed 
the expenditures on formal LTC (Van der Ende et al., 2020).
When (re)designing LTC policies, informal care providers should always be considered 
an important target group. Changes in the system will not only affect the elderly 
and formal care providers but also friends and family members who may consider 
to provide informal care. For example, increasing copayments for formal care can 
raise the demand for informal care and may therefore lead to the provision of more 
(intensive) informal care. This also implies that countries considering an expansion 
of publicly financed LTC coverage should realize that its benefits reach beyond the 
dependent elderly. Also the large group of potential informal care providers can benefit 
from an extended LTC coverage, as it may reduce the demand for informal care.
Formal and informal LTC are two interconnected care types which should be 
considered together. The recent covid-19 pandemic highlighted the importance of 
being aware of the crucial role informal caregivers play within LTC systems. In the 
midst of the pandemic, visit regulations for Dutch nursing homes were tightened and 
the availability of home care was limited. These policy changes had large implications 
for informal caregivers who were required to provide much more informal care or 
could not continue their caregiving tasks. However, there was little acknowledgement 
of the impact of these decisions on informal caregivers and their ability to provide 
care (SCP, 2020).
Support to informal caregivers should be targeted towards those in highest need
While the increased reliance on informal care could lessen public LTC expenditures, 
it simultaneously entails negative health consequences for those who take up 
caregiving tasks. This transition from formal to informal care affects the distribution 
of the care burden in society. While formal LTC is predominantly funded via 
collectively paid premiums and taxes, the burden of informal care falls on a fairly 
small group. Additionally, not everyone is equally inclined to provide informal care, 
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and in the Netherlands it is often the able elderly who provide informal care. The 
negative health effects of care provision are therefore often borne by individuals who 
are already vulnerable or at risk of needing care themselves.
These elements highlight the need to alleviate the care burden, which can be done 
via several routes. One of the solutions is aiming to distribute the burden more 
equally. The majority of Dutch informal caregivers indicates to enjoy providing care 
tasks for their family members (Plaisier et al., 2015), and many individuals state that 
they would be willing to provide informal care (De Klerk et al., 2017). Preferably, 
less vulnerable informal care providers should be attracted to limit the need for 
high-intensity care providers, for example by considering potential additional 
informal caregivers in someone’s social environment during screenings for formal 
care (Kooiker et al., 2019).
Next to, where possible, aiming to attract more care providers, current caregivers can 
be assisted with targeted support. In general two types of caregiver support can be 
identified. Caregivers can be supported by reducing the amount of required informal 
care for example by offering respite care, other formal care or assistive technology. 
Additionally, support options could be aimed at improving coping skills for example 
via support groups. Evidence points towards the effectiveness of various forms of 
both types of informal care support (with strongest evidence for replacement care, 
flexible working conditions, therapy, training and support groups) and indicates that 
often a combination of the two may be optimal (Brimblecombe et al., 2018).
Currently, many European countries offer some support to informal caregivers, most 
often in the form of financial support, respite care or training. The scale and scope 
of these services thus far is however limited and few countries aim to systematically 
identify caregivers and assess their needs (Mosca et al., 2017; Courtin et al., 2014). 
While in the Netherlands municipalities are obliged to provide support to informal 
caregivers, many often fail to help those who need support (VNG, 2016; Feijten et 
al., 2017).
To enhance the take up of support services it is important to understand the 
reasons for the low uptake. In the Netherlands limited supply of information and 
the (perceived) difficulty of getting access to support options seem to be the most 
prominent reasons for not using support options (Feijten et al. 2017). Improving 
efforts to inform informal caregivers about the available support options at the 
municipal level could increase uptake. Additionally, knowing who is (more strongly) 
affected by the provision of informal care can aid in targeting support and helps in 
deciding how to spend scarce resources. The findings in this thesis indicate that 
especially female, high-intensity and double burdened caregivers are the ones who 
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experience the largest mental health effects and therefore are in the highest need 
for support.
Three options to deal with the rising demand for LTC
So how should be dealt with the increasing demand for LTC that is expected in the 
coming decades? To preserve the current standard of care, there are three options to 
deal with the rising demand for LTC: (1) increase reliance on informal care, (2) higher 
individual copayments for formal care or (3) more public funding of formal care.
The first option of increasing reliance on informal care means that the costs of the 
increasing demand for LTC will be borne by a small group with a limited ability to 
carry these (e.g. older caregivers). As discussed above, this could lead to an unequal 
distribution of the care burden. Additionally, attracting sufficient informal care 
providers to meet demand may become difficult as the number of potential caregivers 
is expected to decrease in the coming decades. This is the result of various societal 
and demographic changes like an increasing female labour participation, increasing 
retirement age and divorce rates and decreasing family size and cohabitation 
with close family members (Colombo et al., 2011). Research predicts that in the 
Netherlands, the number of available informal caregivers around every care recipient 
will decline from 5 in 2018 to 3 in 2040 (Kooiker et al., 2019).
The second option, increasing individual copayments, obliges individuals to pay a 
larger share of their LTC expenditures themselves, thereby limiting the growth of 
public LTC expenditure and potentially limiting unnecessary care use. This approach 
might, however, induce inequality as well. Some of the costs that would otherwise 
have been funded by the society as a whole are now borne by those in need for 
care. This group is often the group with the lowest financial means (Bakx et al., 
2020a). When increasing copayments, one should protect this group, for example 
with additional subsidies or income dependent copayments.
The third option is increasing public expenditures on LTC. This option entails that 
the increasing need for LTC care would – at least partially – be met with formal 
care, paid from public means. The resulting increase of public LTC expenditures 
might crowd out other public expenditures (CPB, 2019), induce overconsumption of 
LTC (Non, 2017) and lead to potentially unwanted redistribution of costs between 
the generations, meaning that more costs will be borne by the younger generations 
(Wouterse & Smid, 2017). Proposals to increase copayments or informal care supply 
are hence no perfect solutions, but not acting on the foreseen increase in demand 
for LTC, is not a perfect alternative either. As all options entail pros and cons, a 
combination of the options seems to be the most straightforward possibility. The 
optimal division will differ per country and, among other things, depend on the value 
the public attaches to equal division of costs and equal access to LTC.
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The most appropriate balance between nursing home care and ageing-in-place differs 
per country
Nursing home admissions are not only driven by individual health but also by many 
other factors, like the generosity of the system and the prevailing social norms. As a 
result, the degree towards which individuals are stimulated to age-in-place is likely to 
differ across the globe based on cultural and system differences: there is no uniform 
optimal balance between staying at home (supported by either home care or informal 
care) and moving to a nursing home.
To develop LTC policies that fit country characteristics, and to aid individuals in 
decision making regarding where to live in the last years of life, policymakers first of 
all need to know more about life in a nursing home. One option to gain more insight 
would be to encourage large panel-data surveys to continue interviewing respondents 
after a nursing home admission. Currently few surveys manage to follow individuals 
into their nursing homes.
Additional information can aid further development of LTC policies and can help 
in careful assessment of the available care options in the last years of life. While 
ageing-in-place may be the preferred option for many, it may not be an option for 
all (Commissie Toekomst zorg thuiswonende ouderen, 2020). For some individuals, 
it may become too unsafe to continue living at home given the intensity of home 
healthcare they need. Moreover, for those individuals staying at home is not cheaper 
(considering formal care expenditures) than transitioning to a nursing home (Bakx et 
al,. 2020b). When also considering the informal care demand, it might even be more 
prominent that for some individuals the costs of staying home can become very high. 
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Summary
Populations are ageing rapidly in many countries, leading to an increasing demand 
for long-term care (LTC). This care refers to help or medical support that is provided 
to elderly who are in need for care for a longer period of time. LTC can be provided 
at home or in institutions and consists of informal care, care provided by friends 
and family members, and formal care, care provided by professionals. The increasing 
care demand pressures LTC systems in many countries. To safeguard stability of 
these systems, various options to reduce LTC expenditures are currently considered. 
Stimulating informal care provision and ageing-in-place are often identified as two 
potential solutions in this regard. This thesis focuses on two questions related to 
these presumed solutions by studying the differential health impact of providing 
informal care and the determinants and impact of a nursing home admission.
Part 1 - The health effects of providing informal care
Informal care could potentially substitute collectively funded formal LTC, thereby 
limiting formal care expenditures. While informal caregivers provide care against 
no or low direct payments, this does not imply that informal caregiving does not 
cost anything. Informal care provision is time consuming which might hinder labor 
force participation. Moreover, providing care can be demanding leading to mental 
or physical health effects for the care provider him or herself.
This thesis (chapter 2) provides an overview of the current literature on the health 
effects of providing informal care. The systematic literature review shows that a large 
base of literature points towards negative health effects of informal care provision. 
Most of these studies however do not separate the impact of caring for a family 
member from the impact of caring about a family member, the so-called family 
effect. It is however important to make a distinction between these two elements as 
both require different interventions and not accounting for the family effect might 
lead to an overestimation of the impact of providing informal care. Additionally, 
insights into the impact of informal care were thus far mostly limited to the United 
States or several European countries pooled together.
Chapter 3 adds to the literature by studying the health impact of care provision in 
the Netherlands. This is an interesting focus area as the Netherlands is a specific 
case: It has a comprehensive LTC system and is one of the countries with the highest 
public LTC expenditures. In this chapter both mental and physical health effects 
of providing informal care are estimated for a sample of 45-65 year old individuals 
while aiming to account for the family effect. Results indicate that, irrespective 
of the presence of a family effect, providing informal care can have significant 
negative impact on one’s mental health. The effects are larger for female and spousal 
caregivers, which might be driven by the intensity of care provided by these groups.
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Chapter 4 has a similar set-up, but studies the health effects of informal care 
provision in the United Kingdom (UK). In contrast to the Netherlands, the UK LTC 
system is less comprehensive and mainly targeted at those with the lowest means. 
In the UK, informal care provision also leads to mental health problems, however 
solely among individuals who provide at least 20 hours of care a week. Subgroup 
analyses show that the large health effects among spousal caregivers are indeed 
driven by hours of care provision, not the relationship with the care recipient. Next 
to studying the direct health effects of care provision, longer-term health effects are 
studied. The initially experienced mental health issues diminish, but persist for 4 
to 5 years, indicating that individuals might only adapt to or recover from intensive 
caregiving tasks slowly.
Insights from both Dutch and UK data are combined in chapter 5. In this chapter 
the health effects of informal care provision in both countries are compared to each 
other. As differences in norms, values and LTC systems might (indirectly) affect 
informal care provision it is interesting to understand how this leads to differences in 
experienced health effects of informal care provision. Is it easier to provide informal 
care in one of the two countries, for example because of a more generous LTC system 
or differences in norms and values?
This chapter shows that in both countries the intensity of the provided care is a large 
driver of the experienced health effects: Individuals who provide more than 20 hours 
of informal care per week experience the largest negative mental health effects. The 
more care someone provides, the more straining the situation becomes. However, 
while no large differences in health effects between both countries are found when 
comparing similar caregivers, this does not mean that country characteristics do not 
play a role. In the UK, where the LTC system is less generous, the share of caregivers 
providing highly intensive informal care is larger.
Part 2 – The determinants and impact of a nursing home admission
In the second part of the thesis the focus shifts from informal care to formal care. 
Next to incentivizing informal care, there is the widespread ambition to delay nursing 
home admissions and/or to stimulate substitution of nursing home care with home 
care. Despite this universal trend of stimulating ageing-in-place, nursing home care 
use widely differs across countries. A better understanding of the sources of these 
differences in LTC use is critical in shaping policies that promote an appropriate 
care mix for dependent elderly.
Chapter 6 explores this latter topic by investigating differences in nursing home 
admission rates between the United States, Denmark and the Netherlands. In the 
US, the probability of a nursing home admission in the next two years among the 
65+ community residing population is much higher than in the Netherlands. In part, 
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this can be explained by country-specific population characteristics. There are, for 
example, more dependent elderly among the community dwelling population in the 
US than in the Netherlands. Next to population characteristics, system differences, 
such as the generosity and organization of the system, play a role as well. In the 
US, elderly more often make use of short-term (often post-acute) nursing home 
care, potentially because of limited home care options and high hospitalization 
rates among elderly. In contrast, long-term nursing home admissions are far more 
prevalent in the Netherlands and Denmark. These findings highlight the importance 
of distinguishing different types of nursing home care: the ‘average’ nursing home 
admission may be very different across countries. Furthermore, the findings indicate 
that nursing home admissions are not solely determined by the health or disability 
of elderly. System-related and culture-related country differences in nursing home 
care play an important role as well.
Lastly, chapter 7 explores the levels of wellbeing of Dutch elderly in the period just 
before and after nursing home admission. Ageing-in-place policies often hinge on the 
assumption that elderly fear the last move and are better off at home. This chapter 
investigates the well-being of elderly just before and after a nursing home admission. 
Doing so, we explore whether nursing home residents are better or worse off than the 
not-yet-admitted. We do not find any association between nursing home admissions 
and self-reported well-being scores. Health and well-being issues show to be nearly 
equally prevalent right before and after a nursing home admission. We hence do 
not find evidence for the commonly held belief that nursing homes have a large 
negative effect on one’s well-being. The findings seem to suggest that not nursing 
home admissions themselves are associated with lower perceived well-being, but 
rather that nursing homes admissions cater for individuals who already face falling 
levels of well-being.
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Samenvatting
In veel landen is de bevolking sterk aan het vergrijzen, wat leidt tot een toenemende 
vraag naar langdurige zorg. Deze zorg heeft betrekking tot hulp of medische 
ondersteuning die wordt geboden aan ouderen die voor langere tijd een zorgbehoefte 
hebben. Deze zorg kan zowel thuis als in verpleeghuizen worden geboden en 
bestaat uit informele zorg, zorg verleend door familie of vrienden, en formele zorg, 
verleend door professionals. De toenemende vraag naar langdurige zorg zorgt ervoor 
dat in veel landen langdurige zorgsystemen onder druk komen te staan. Om de 
stabiliteit van deze systemen te waarborgen, worden momenteel verschillende opties 
overwogen om de uitgaven aan langdurige zorg te verminderen. Het stimuleren van 
informele zorgverlening en langer thuis wonen van ouderen worden in dit verband 
vaak gezien als twee mogelijke oplossingen. Dit proefschrift richt zich op twee vragen 
met betrekking tot deze veronderstelde oplossingen door het bestuderen van de 
gezondheidseffecten van het verlenen van informele zorg en de determinanten en 
impact van een verpleeghuisopname.
Deel 1 - De gezondheidseffecten van mantelzorg
Informele zorg of mantelzorg kan mogelijk collectief gefinancierde formele 
langdurige zorg vervangen en zo de zorguitgaven beperken. Hoewel mantelzorgers 
zorg verlenen tegen geen of lage directe betalingen, betekent dit niet dat het verlenen 
van mantelzorg geen kosten met zich meebrengt. Informele zorgverlening is 
tijdrovend, wat de arbeidsparticipatie kan belemmeren. Bovendien kan het verlenen 
van zorg veeleisend zijn, wat kan leiden tot mentale of fysieke gezondheidseffecten 
voor de zorgverlener zelf.
Dit proefschrift (hoofdstuk 2) geeft een overzicht van de huidige literatuur over 
de gezondheidseffecten van het verlenen van mantelzorg. Uit een systematisch 
literatuuronderzoek blijkt dat een groot deel van de literatuur wijst op negatieve 
gezondheidseffecten voor de mantelzorger zelf. De meeste van deze studies maken 
echter geen onderscheid tussen het effect van het zorgen voor een familielid en 
het effect van het zorgen maken over een familielid, het zogenaamde family effect. 
Het is echter belangrijk om een onderscheid te maken tussen deze twee elementen, 
aangezien beide effecten verschillende interventies vereisen en het niet meenemen 
van het family effect zou kunnen leiden tot een overschatting van het effect van het 
verlenen van mantelzorg. Daarnaast zijn inzichten in het effect van informele zorg 
tot nu toe meestal beperkt gebleven tot de Verenigde Staten of een aantal Europese 
landen samen.
Hoofdstuk 3 vult de literatuur aan door van de gezondheidseffecten van het 
verlenen van mantelzorg in Nederland het bestuderen. Nederlands is hierin een 
interessant aandachtsgebied: Het heeft een zeer uitgebreid langdurige zorgsysteem 
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en is een van de landen met de hoogste overheidsuitgaven aan langdurige zorg. In 
dit hoofdstuk worden zowel de mentale als fysieke gezondheidseffecten van het 
verlenen van informele zorg geschat voor een steekproef van 45-65 jarigen, waarbij 
er wordt getracht het family effect los te koppelen van het effect van het verlenen van 
mantelzorg. De resultaten tonen dat, ongeacht de aanwezigheid van een family effect, 
het verlenen van mantelzorg een significante invloed kan hebben op de mentale 
gezondheid. De effecten zijn groter voor vrouwen en partners die zorg verlenen, 
wat kan worden veroorzaakt door de intensiteit van de zorg die door deze groepen 
wordt verleend.
Hoofdstuk 4 heeft een vergelijkbare opzet, maar bestudeert de gezondheidseffecten 
van informele zorgverlening in het Verenigd Koninkrijk (VK). In tegenstelling tot 
Nederland is hier het langdurige zorgsysteem minder uitgebreid en vooral gericht op 
personen met de minste financiële mogelijkheden. Ook in het VK blijkt dat informele 
zorgverlening leidt tot mentale gezondheidsproblemen, echter alleen bij personen 
die ten minste 20 uur per week zorg verlenen. Uit subgroep analyses blijkt dat het 
grotere gezondheidseffect onder personen die mantelzorg verlenen aan hun partner 
inderdaad wordt veroorzaakt door het aantal uren zorg en niet de relatie met de 
zorgontvanger. Naast het bestuderen van de directe gezondheidseffecten van de 
zorgverlening worden nu ook gezondheidseffecten op langere termijn bestudeerd. 
De aanvankelijk ervaren mentale gezondheidsproblemen nemen af in grootte, maar 
houden 4 tot 5 jaar aan, wat aangeeft dat mensen zich mogelijk alleen langzaam 
aanpassen aan of herstellen van intensieve zorgtaken.
Inzichten uit zowel Nederlandse als Britse data worden gecombineerd in hoofdstuk 5. 
In dit hoofdstuk worden de gezondheidseffecten van de mantelzorg in beide landen 
met elkaar vergeleken. Aangezien de verschillen in normen, waarden en langdurige 
zorgsystemen van landen (indirect) van invloed kunnen zijn op mantelzorg, is het 
interessant om te begrijpen hoe dit leidt tot verschillen in ervaren gezondheidseffecten 
van de mantelzorg. Is het gemakkelijker om informele zorg te verlenen in een van 
de twee landen, bijvoorbeeld vanwege een genereuzer zorgsysteem of verschillen in 
normen en waarden?
In beide landen is de intensiteit van de geleverde zorg een grote drijvende kracht voor 
de ervaren gezondheidseffecten: Personen die meer dan 20 uur per week informele 
zorg verlenen, ondervinden grote negatieve gevolgen voor de mentale gezondheid. 
Hoe meer zorg iemand verleent, hoe meer belastend de situatie wordt. Hoewel er geen 
grote verschillen in gezondheidseffecten tussen beide landen worden gevonden bij 
het vergelijken van gelijksoortige zorgverleners, betekent dit niet dat landkenmerken 
geen rol spelen. In het Verenigd Koninkrijk, waar het langdurige zorgsysteem minder 
genereus is, biedt een groter deel van de informele zorgverleners zeer intensieve 
informele zorg.
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Deel 2 - De determinanten en gevolgen van een verpleeghuisopname
In het tweede deel van het proefschrift verschuift de focus van informele zorg naar 
formele zorg. Naast het stimuleren van informele zorg is er de wijdverbreide ambitie 
om verpleeghuisopnames uit te stellen en/of substitutie van verpleeghuiszorg door 
thuiszorg te stimuleren. Ondanks deze universele trend om langer thuis wonen te 
bevorderen bestaan er grote verschillen in verpleeghuiszorg gebruik tussen landen. 
Een beter begrip van de oorzaken van de verschillen in het gebruik van langdurige 
zorg is van cruciaal belang bij het uitstippelen van beleid dat een passende zorgmix 
voor afhankelijke ouderen bevordert.
Hoofdstuk 6 verkent dit laatste onderwerp door de verschillen in verpleeghuisopname 
tussen de Verenigde Staten (VS), Denemarken en Nederland te onderzoeken. In de 
VS is de kans op een verpleeghuisopname in de komende twee jaar onder 65-plussers 
veel groter dan in Nederland. Voor een deel kan dit worden verklaard door verschillen 
in bevolkingskenmerken. Zo kampen ouderen in de VS vaker met beperkingen dan 
in Nederland. Naast bevolkingskenmerken spelen ook systeemverschillen, zoals de 
generositeit en organisatie van het systeem, een rol. In de VS maken ouderen vaker 
gebruik van kortdurende (vaak post-acute) verpleeghuiszorg, mogelijk vanwege 
beperkte mogelijkheden voor thuiszorggebruik en hoge ziekenhuisopnamecijfers 
onder ouderen. Langdurige verpleeghuisopnamen komen daarentegen vaker voor 
in Nederland en Denemarken.
Uit deze bevindingen blijkt hoe belangrijk het is onderscheid te maken tussen de 
verschillende soorten verpleeghuiszorg: de “gemiddelde” verpleeghuisopname 
kan van land tot land sterk verschillen. Bovendien wijzen de bevindingen erop dat 
verpleeghuisopnamen niet uitsluitend worden bepaald door de gezondheid of de 
beperkingen van ouderen. Systeem- en cultuurgebonden verschillen tussen landen 
in de verpleeghuiszorg spelen hierin ook een belangrijke rol.
Tot slot gaat hoofdstuk 7 in op het welbevinden van Nederlandse ouderen in de 
periode vlak voor en na een verpleeghuisopname. Ageing-in-place beleid is vaak 
gebaseerd op de aanname dat ouderen bang zijn voor de laatste verhuizing en beter 
af zijn thuis. Dit hoofdstuk onderzoekt het welzijn van ouderen vlak voor en na 
een verpleeghuisopname. Daarbij gaan we na of verpleeghuisbewoners beter of 
slechter af zijn dan personen die nog niet zijn opgenomen. We vinden geen verband 
tussen verpleeghuisopname en zelf gerapporteerde welzijnsscores. Gezondheids- 
en welzijnsproblemen blijken vrijwel even vaak voor te komen vlak voor als na 
een verpleeghuisopname. We vinden dus geen bewijs voor de overtuiging dat 
verpleeghuizen een groot negatief effect hebben op iemands welzijn. De bevindingen 
lijken er eerder op te wijzen dat niet de verpleeghuisopname zelf geassocieerd is met 
een lager ervaren welzijn, maar dat verpleeghuisopnames zorg leveren aan personen 
die al kampen met een dalend welzijnsniveau.
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